[EM] Fwd: XA

Forest Simmons fsimmons at pcc.edu
Mon Oct 31 16:27:34 PDT 2016

And any method that fails Participation also fails Consistency.

However, this example is not as bad as it looks:

(1) It shows that Majority Judgment and other forms of Bucklin fail
Participation in exactly the same way.

(2) Obviously, the voters were not aware of minimum strategy, i.e. to give
max support to Favorite, and no support to Worst;  No two-candidate
election can fail Participation if the ballots are normalized.

(3)  If the purpose of the ballots is to estimate the "worth" of the
respective candidates on a scale of zero to 100, then we don't talk about
"winner" or "loser."

Before the additional participants joined in, A's estimated worth (50%) was
within one standard deviation (about 11 points) of B's estimated worth of

After the additional ballots are added, the estimation intervals overlap
even more.

So the results are not inconsistent with the expected errors of estimation.

On Fri, Oct 28, 2016 at 8:56 AM, Toby Pereira <tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:

> I think Chiastic Approval would fail participation, assuming I've done
> this right. Take the following ballots with scores out of 100:
> 2 voters: A=50, B=40
> 1 voter: A=50, B=60
> A would have a score of 50. B would have a score of 40. Everyone gives B a
> score of at least 40, and only a third give B a score higher. Now imagine
> there are two extra voters and we have these ballots:
> 2 voters: A=50, B=40
> 1 voter: A=50, B=60
> 2 voters: A=100, B=60
> A still has a score of 50, but B now has a score of 60. So these two
> ballots cause B to overtake A despite them both preferring A to B.
> ------------------------------
> *From:* Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu>
> Does it satisfy Participation?
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