[EM] Alright, burial might be prohibitive problem for wv & MMPO.

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Wed Oct 5 11:35:45 PDT 2016

Of course, the fancier a method is, & the more luxury advantages it offers,
then the more potential problems can result from its more complicated

So it isn't so surprising that MAM & MMPO (in both it's plain & Smith
versions) make you pay for their unique strategy advantages...

...with a potentially extreme problem, in the form of the perpetual-burial
fiasco problem that started this thread.

Of course I'm not saying for sure that will happen, but it led me to call
MAM & MMPO "doubtful" proposals.

But let me mention some mitigation:

1. If that fiasco began, then maybe any voter whose favorite has any
likelihood of being CWs would use the plumping countermeasure. ...maybe to
the extent that the burial would reliably never gain anything.

If so, then maybe people wouldn't have any reason to take the trouble to
bother with the burial.

2. The fiasco scenario depends on the CWs being in the buriers' bottom-set.
That's why they're indifferent to the punitive consequences of their burial
when countermeasures are used. They don't care which bottom-set candidate

But any remote possibility of the burial defeating the CWs & electing from
the buriers' top-set, depends on the CWs's voters liking the buriers'
preferred candidate(s) enough to be inclined to rank them well.

But aren't those 2 requirements a bit mutually contradictory?

Maybe that upgrades MAM & MMPO from "doubtful" to "maybe a bit

Maybe they're worth a try, though there'd need to be some disclosure of the
potential perpetual burial fiasco.

Michael Ossipoff
On Oct 1, 2016 8:08 AM, "Kevin Venzke" <stepjak at yahoo.fr> wrote:

> There are conflicting incentives, at least under the Schwartz methods.
> Contributing to the defeat strength of some candidate A>B is bad for B, but
> it can be good for A, because it can give A a stronger path against
> "top-set" candidates, and make *them* lose. There's a transitivity to
> defeats.
> If you have an estimate of who is the worse of two frontrunners (and there
> are just two), you shouldn't rank that candidate over anybody. This is true
> even if you feel indifferent among your bottom-set.
> Kevin
> ------------------------------
> *De :* Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> *À :* election-methods at electorama.com; C. Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au>
> *Envoyé le :* Vendredi 30 septembre 2016 20h40
> *Objet :* [EM] Alright, burial might be prohibitive problem for wv & MMPO.
> Chris was right about bottom-end burial being a likely big problem for wv
> & MMPO.
> In wv & MMPO, if people rate candidates as top-set & bottom-set, then,
> contrary to what I said, they _won't_ be deterred from burial among their
> bottom-set.   ...because they don't care which of them wins, if they have
> at least some tiny chance of defeating them all...as they could if the
> CWs's voters ever forget to plump, or misjudge who's CWs. (If the CWs is in
> their bottom-set).
> If so, then maybe burial could be so rampant that the CWs would rarely win.
> ..a mess.
> Bucklin & Approval (including 3-Slot ICT as an Approval-version) have a
> simplicity, solidity & reliability that pairwise-count unlimited-rank
> methods don't have.
> Michael Ossipoff
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
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