fsimmons at pcc.edu
Sat Oct 1 12:09:16 PDT 2016
Here's an idea for fixing MMPO's lack of Plurality compliabnce:
Include the opposition of the Implicit Approval Cutoff Candidate, the
virtual candidate on the truncation boundary.
In regular MMPO, the max opposition to C is 40. But when the number of
ballots on which C is truncated is counted among the oppositions, the max
opposition becomes 80. Thus Plurality is rescued.
How about the Chicken problem?
3 A (sincere A>B)
24 B (sincere B>A)
Regular MMPO gives A the win contrary to Plurality.
Taking the truncation opposition into account we have max oppositions for
A, B, and C, respectively, as 73, 52, and 51. Candidate C wins, punishing
B's defection. This only required three of the A supporters to truncate B.
Unfortunately, even this new version of MMPO fails Condorcet Loser and
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
More information about the Election-Methods