[EM] [CES #15276] Re: PAR: nearly-equivalent rules
Jameson Quinn
jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Mon Nov 14 16:13:23 PST 2016
Nevin's proposed method is pretty good, but it suffers from a slippery
slope problem in a chicken dilemma scenario.
2016-11-14 17:54 GMT-05:00 Nevin Brackett-Rozinsky <
nevin.brackettrozinsky at gmail.com>:
> How about something like this:
>
> 1. Voters indicate whether they Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate.
> 2. Identify the candidate with the most Prefer votes, call them P.
> 3. Identify the candidate with the most Accept-or-better votes, call them
> Q.
> 4. Elect the head-to-head winner between P and Q.
>
> For step 4, this means to count the number of ballots which rate P ahead
> of Q, and vice versa, and elect whichever is higher up on more ballots.
>
> Essentially, this method looks at the ballots and says, “We know who the
> most voters prefer, and we know who the most voters accept, but which of
> them should win? Hey, I know, we can let the votes decide!”
>
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