[EM] The Global Fight For Electoral Justice: A Primer

[Michael Ossipoff]

Erik--

>
> > 2. Not Precinct-Summable:
> >
> > If we had pubic ballot-imaging, then any voting system would be secure
> against count-fraud.
> > But we don't, and verifiable vote-count is something that we'll probably
> never have. So, given the
> > ridiculously questionable vote-counting, the last thing that we need is
> a voting-system that makes
> > count-fraud even easiesr than it already is.
>
> That's a good point, and I think anyone who's been paying attention to
> the ballot scanner chaos in Michigan and some of the other disasters
> of this election would take these concerns seriously.
>
> I'm not familiar with the full set of rules governing ballot
> initiatives, but would it be feasible to make IRV ballot initiatives
> contingent on a third party voting equipment audit and overhaul?
>

Maybe IRvists' desire to enact IRV could be a motivation for them to demand
verifiable vote-counting. So far as I'm aware, nothing less than public
ballot-imaging will do.

I probably already defined that in my other post, and so I'll just describe
it very briefly. It seems to me that I read that vote-counting used to be a
public event, with people, and party-representatives in particular,
observing the count, but I don' t know for sure if that's so. But it's a
good idea.

Nowadays, it should be public ballot-imaging:

Whether the voting is by marking a paper, or by touchscreen, there should
be a paper ballot (maybe coming out of the touchscreen voting machine). The
voter looks at it, and puts it in a slot in a locked ballot-box.

On count-day, each ballot, one at a time, is placed on a table,
sequentially stamped. Above the table is a frame on which are mounted
digital cameras belong to & operated by, political parties across the
political spectrum. I'll call them "observer parties" (OPs).

Each OP thus has its own images of all the ballots at the precinct (and
therefore at all the precincts), and can scan them into a computer program,
and do their own count.

OP representatives ride with the ballot-boxes to & from secure storage.

Secure storage is in a windowless reinforced concrete building or room, and
includes locks, cameras, & alarms owned & operated by each of the OPs.

Attempted count fraud or ballot-tampering would be treated as the serious
felony that it is, and would result in mandatory life imprisonment without
possibility of parole, in a maximum-security facility.

I suppose that that could be part of an IRV initiative, but maybe it should
be established before IRV is even considered.

Of course there's no democracy at all, without verified vote-counting, and
I don't know of any way to achieve it without public ballot-imaging.

European-style PR would be great. But, for the U.S., that, and any reform
at all, is really all science-fiction.

I don't want to try to discourage anyone who is trying for improvement, but
I'm just saying don't count on success.

A runoff with Score would fail FBV. I strongly recommend against runoffs
with Score or Approval.

Michael Ossipoff




>
> == IRV vs. other methods ==
>
> There seem to be a few competing reform efforts in the US right now:
>
> 1) the IRV->STV path, which appears to be Fairvote's main reform
> strategy, and which has plenty of precedent (positive and negative)
> 2) some limited advocacy for European-style PR models, mostly by academics
> 3) business-backed initiatives for nonpartisan blanket primaries
> ("jungle primaries")
> 4) some completely novel schemes, e.g. score runoff voting (which is a
> possible upgrade for 3)
>
> Am I forgetting some?
>
> A few comments on each of these reform projects.
>
> === The IRV->STV path ====
>
> I am skeptical about this path not because of the Condorcet Winner
> deficiencies of IRV, but because we've seen repeals of IRV and STV in
> the past. I think those repeals have almost always been politically
> motivated and used anti-intellectual arguments ("pinball voting",
> "lottery voting"), so we should not overestimate the role that IRV's
> failure to find the Condorcet Winner played in repeals. Jack Santucci
> argues convincingly that repeals generally are the result of changing
> party power constellations:
>
> http://www.jacksantucci.com/docs/papers/repeal_dec2016.pdf
>
> The story of IRV/STV's rejection suggests to me that simplicity is one
> of the greatest virtues of voting system reform (which relates to your
> point about voting security as well), and should lead us to question
> whether this is really the best path, regardless of near-term
> successes as in Maine.
>
> At the same time, we should all be prepared to refute
> anti-intellectual arguments, and be ready to speak to IRV/STV's
> virtues relative to plurality.
>
> === European-style PR models ===
>
> As a European, I love open list PR, but I understand the desire to
> have local plurality winners that's a big part of US culture. One of
> the most interesting proposals in this regard is Single Ballot Mixed
> Member Proportional (SB-MMP), as explained here:
>
> http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/Committee/421/ERRE/Brief/
> BR8397882/br-external/HutcheonDavidA-TomekJennifer-e.pdf
>
> And here:
>
> http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/Committee/421/ERRE/Brief/
> BR8538777/br-external/SlavenRobert-e.pdf
>
> This system is easy to summarize: You vote for your preferred local
> candidate and party with the same vote. The plurality winner becomes a
> district representative. The overall party % is used to draft
> additional region-wide representatives, preferring the best-performing
> runners-up. The end result is a proportional legislature or council in
> which ever member has strong district ties, and where vigorous
> district-level campaigns are the norm.
>
> That last part, I think, is a pretty big deal. Imagine Green Party
> candidates in every district really fighting hard to get the most
> votes, because it may make the difference for _them_ to get drafted to
> the legislature. It would lead to a much richer, more diverse, more
> competitive democracy. And it would instantly obsolete gerrymandering,
> allowing districts to be drawn in a manner that reflects people's real
> neighborhoods.
>
> Legal scholar Allan Ides similarly has expressed strong support for a
> (two vote) MMP style model for the California assembly, alongside
> transition to a unicameral assembly. ICYMI, his "Approximating
> Democracy" paper from 2011 is excellent, in my opinion:
>
> http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=llr
>
> Generally, I think for most reformers feel like MMP is a bridge too
> far in America. However, I think when we consider it in combination
> with other changes, it's perhaps not so crazy an idea.
>
> === Jungle primaries ===
>
> The jungle primary (technical term: nonpartisan blanket primary -
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nonpartisan_blanket_primary ),
> implemented by ballot initiative in WA and CA, is a pretty big change
> to elections and I don't think it's fully understood. It moves America
> closer to the French model of two-round voting, except that in France,
> every party still gets to hold its own primary, and both general
> election rounds are a big deal with 80% turnout.
>
> In the jungle primary as implemented in CA, you may get weird
> intra-party spoiler effect, or you may end up with two candidates from
> the same party in the final round.
>
> It's overall an odd reform; I'm frankly surprised it was implemented
> given the obvious adverse consequences for small parties (they don't
> have much of a chance to get to the general ballot anymore) and the
> seemingly insane decision to use plurality voting for the first round.
> Oregon soundly rejected it, but it's backed by business interests who
> want to see "less partisanship" so it will probably keep coming back
> onto the ballot in other states.
>
> === Other reform initiatives ===
>
> Range voting seems to have a lot of dedicated fans, and the Score
> Runoff Voting proposal is pretty elaborate:
>
> http://www.equal.vote/
>
> Intuitively, I'm skeptical of the strategic voting properties in the
> real-world, and the arguments on the site aren't wholly persuasive in
> that regard. But some alternative-voting first-round (perhaps approval
> rather than score) makes sense to me as an upgrade for jungle
> primaries.
>
> === Centrists vs. partisans ===
>
> A big distinction between many reform efforts seems to be whether they
> want to elect centrists who appeal to everyone, or partisans who
> appeal to a large faction while being very off-putting to others. It
> doesn't make sense to me to aim for pure centrism in assemblies,
> Congress, etc. -- you lose the ability to _directly_ represent
> specific concerns, and instead aim for some kind of prototype
> politician-bot who can serve all constituencies. It's understandable
> why business interests would want such a system, since it has a
> consistent API for lobbyists.
>
> But it's unlikely the general populace will be very satisfied with it
> in the long run, since many concerns and ideas will never be directly
> represented in such a system. And I doubt that it produces the best
> politics, because it lacks the tension/disruption that makes
> innovation possible.
>
> At the same time, in the American presidential system, positions like
> Governor or President are arguably _least_ suited for strong
> partisanship, because these figures have to be able to speak to
> everyone, and help bridge divides in Congress or a state legislature.
> So this is where you might actually bias in favor of a system that
> elects centrists.
>
> Hence my personal bias, so far, based on everything I've read about
> reform in the US and voting systems elsewhere:
>
> 1) Transition to unicameral legislatures for the reasons outlined by Allan
> Ides,
> 2) Transition to SB-MMP or another MMP variant to elect members of
> these legislatures, as also well-argued by Ides; possibly extended to
> city councils, as well;
> 3) Replace the first-round voting system in jungle primaries and limit
> it to unique offices like governor, president.
>
> Regarding 3), the use of approval voting, for example, would mean that
> the two candidates advancing into the final round would both be people
> with wide appeal (although they might still be from the same party,
> which is a bit bizarre for an office like governor).
>
> Note that none of the above includes reference to IRV or STV. We may
> be able to do away entirely with any notion of ranking, or even
> scoring, by focusing on "single X" and "multiple X" methods. This is
> not a criticism of Fairvote's efforts, but simply a hypothesis that a
> reform platform more closely in line with the above steps would
> produce better long term outcomes. It's simple for voters, yields
> proportional representative bodies, and balances centrism with
> partisanship.
>
> If you've made it this far, thank you -- would appreciate anyone
> poking holes in the above logic.
>
> Warmly,
>
> Erik
> ----
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>
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