[EM] The Global Fight For Electoral Justice: A Primer

[Erik Moeller]

On Fri, Dec 23, 2016 at 9:53 PM, Michael Ossipoff
<email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:

Michael,

Thanks for your detailed thoughts.

> 2. Not Precinct-Summable:
>
> If we had pubic ballot-imaging, then any voting system would be secure against count-fraud.
> But we don't, and verifiable vote-count is something that we'll probably never have. So, given the
> ridiculously questionable vote-counting, the last thing that we need is a voting-system that makes
> count-fraud even easiesr than it already is.

That's a good point, and I think anyone who's been paying attention to
the ballot scanner chaos in Michigan and some of the other disasters
of this election would take these concerns seriously.

I'm not familiar with the full set of rules governing ballot
initiatives, but would it be feasible to make IRV ballot initiatives
contingent on a third party voting equipment audit and overhaul?

== IRV vs. other methods ==

There seem to be a few competing reform efforts in the US right now:

1) the IRV->STV path, which appears to be Fairvote's main reform
strategy, and which has plenty of precedent (positive and negative)
2) some limited advocacy for European-style PR models, mostly by academics
3) business-backed initiatives for nonpartisan blanket primaries
("jungle primaries")
4) some completely novel schemes, e.g. score runoff voting (which is a
possible upgrade for 3)

Am I forgetting some?

A few comments on each of these reform projects.

=== The IRV->STV path ====

I am skeptical about this path not because of the Condorcet Winner
deficiencies of IRV, but because we've seen repeals of IRV and STV in
the past. I think those repeals have almost always been politically
motivated and used anti-intellectual arguments ("pinball voting",
"lottery voting"), so we should not overestimate the role that IRV's
failure to find the Condorcet Winner played in repeals. Jack Santucci
argues convincingly that repeals generally are the result of changing
party power constellations:

http://www.jacksantucci.com/docs/papers/repeal_dec2016.pdf

The story of IRV/STV's rejection suggests to me that simplicity is one
of the greatest virtues of voting system reform (which relates to your
point about voting security as well), and should lead us to question
whether this is really the best path, regardless of near-term
successes as in Maine.

At the same time, we should all be prepared to refute
anti-intellectual arguments, and be ready to speak to IRV/STV's
virtues relative to plurality.

=== European-style PR models ===

As a European, I love open list PR, but I understand the desire to
have local plurality winners that's a big part of US culture. One of
the most interesting proposals in this regard is Single Ballot Mixed
Member Proportional (SB-MMP), as explained here:

http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/Committee/421/ERRE/Brief/BR8397882/br-external/HutcheonDavidA-TomekJennifer-e.pdf

And here:

http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/Committee/421/ERRE/Brief/BR8538777/br-external/SlavenRobert-e.pdf

This system is easy to summarize: You vote for your preferred local
candidate and party with the same vote. The plurality winner becomes a
district representative. The overall party % is used to draft
additional region-wide representatives, preferring the best-performing
runners-up. The end result is a proportional legislature or council in
which ever member has strong district ties, and where vigorous
district-level campaigns are the norm.

That last part, I think, is a pretty big deal. Imagine Green Party
candidates in every district really fighting hard to get the most
votes, because it may make the difference for _them_ to get drafted to
the legislature. It would lead to a much richer, more diverse, more
competitive democracy. And it would instantly obsolete gerrymandering,
allowing districts to be drawn in a manner that reflects people's real
neighborhoods.

Legal scholar Allan Ides similarly has expressed strong support for a
(two vote) MMP style model for the California assembly, alongside
transition to a unicameral assembly. ICYMI, his "Approximating
Democracy" paper from 2011 is excellent, in my opinion:

http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=llr

Generally, I think for most reformers feel like MMP is a bridge too
far in America. However, I think when we consider it in combination
with other changes, it's perhaps not so crazy an idea.

=== Jungle primaries ===

The jungle primary (technical term: nonpartisan blanket primary -
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nonpartisan_blanket_primary ),
implemented by ballot initiative in WA and CA, is a pretty big change
to elections and I don't think it's fully understood. It moves America
closer to the French model of two-round voting, except that in France,
every party still gets to hold its own primary, and both general
election rounds are a big deal with 80% turnout.

In the jungle primary as implemented in CA, you may get weird
intra-party spoiler effect, or you may end up with two candidates from
the same party in the final round.

It's overall an odd reform; I'm frankly surprised it was implemented
given the obvious adverse consequences for small parties (they don't
have much of a chance to get to the general ballot anymore) and the
seemingly insane decision to use plurality voting for the first round.
Oregon soundly rejected it, but it's backed by business interests who
want to see "less partisanship" so it will probably keep coming back
onto the ballot in other states.

=== Other reform initiatives ===

Range voting seems to have a lot of dedicated fans, and the Score
Runoff Voting proposal is pretty elaborate:

http://www.equal.vote/

Intuitively, I'm skeptical of the strategic voting properties in the
real-world, and the arguments on the site aren't wholly persuasive in
that regard. But some alternative-voting first-round (perhaps approval
rather than score) makes sense to me as an upgrade for jungle
primaries.

=== Centrists vs. partisans ===

A big distinction between many reform efforts seems to be whether they
want to elect centrists who appeal to everyone, or partisans who
appeal to a large faction while being very off-putting to others. It
doesn't make sense to me to aim for pure centrism in assemblies,
Congress, etc. -- you lose the ability to _directly_ represent
specific concerns, and instead aim for some kind of prototype
politician-bot who can serve all constituencies. It's understandable
why business interests would want such a system, since it has a
consistent API for lobbyists.

But it's unlikely the general populace will be very satisfied with it
in the long run, since many concerns and ideas will never be directly
represented in such a system. And I doubt that it produces the best
politics, because it lacks the tension/disruption that makes
innovation possible.

At the same time, in the American presidential system, positions like
Governor or President are arguably _least_ suited for strong
partisanship, because these figures have to be able to speak to
everyone, and help bridge divides in Congress or a state legislature.
So this is where you might actually bias in favor of a system that
elects centrists.

Hence my personal bias, so far, based on everything I've read about
reform in the US and voting systems elsewhere:

1) Transition to unicameral legislatures for the reasons outlined by Allan Ides,
2) Transition to SB-MMP or another MMP variant to elect members of
these legislatures, as also well-argued by Ides; possibly extended to
city councils, as well;
3) Replace the first-round voting system in jungle primaries and limit
it to unique offices like governor, president.

Regarding 3), the use of approval voting, for example, would mean that
the two candidates advancing into the final round would both be people
with wide appeal (although they might still be from the same party,
which is a bit bizarre for an office like governor).

Note that none of the above includes reference to IRV or STV. We may
be able to do away entirely with any notion of ranking, or even
scoring, by focusing on "single X" and "multiple X" methods. This is
not a criticism of Fairvote's efforts, but simply a hypothesis that a
reform platform more closely in line with the above steps would
produce better long term outcomes. It's simple for voters, yields
proportional representative bodies, and balances centrism with
partisanship.

If you've made it this far, thank you -- would appreciate anyone
poking holes in the above logic.

Warmly,

Erik