# [EM] How to clone proof your favorite method (whether deterministic or stochastic).

Forest Simmons fsimmons at pcc.edu
Thu May 8 16:26:05 PDT 2014

```Michael,

I'm sorry to report that although the method does fix the random candidate
clone problem, in just about every other method it destroys the
monotonicity, so it's not going to help with ICT.

Forest

On Thu, May 8, 2014 at 8:57 AM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>wrote:

>
>>
>> Does anybody else like this idea?
>>
>
>
> When that cloneproofing procedure is applied, can it lose the desirable
> properties of the method that it's cloneproofing, thus gaining one
> desirable property in return for another?
>
>
>
>>  Does anybody have a FEM method and ballot set that they would like to
>> see it applied to?
>>
>>
>
> Of the methods that I propose for various conditions, Approval, Score, and
> ICT (the methods that I propose for current conditions) fail
> Clone-Independence, and have been criticized for that.
>
> Would your cloneproofing procedure lose any of their desirable
> properties.  For example, would it lose their FBC compliance, or ICT's CD
> compliance?
>
> For the purpose of that question, let me re-state the definition of ICT:
>
> Improved-Condorcet-Top (ICT):
>
> Notation:
>
> (X>Y) is the number of ballots ranking X over Y
> (Y>X) is the number of ballots ranking Y over X
> (X=Y)T is the number of ballots top-ranking X and Y
>
> 1. X beats Y iff (X>Y) > (Y>X) +(X=Y)T
>
> 2. The winner is the unbeaten candidate who is top-ranked on the most
> ballots.
>
> 3. But if all candidates are beaten, then the winner is the candidate who
> is top-ranked on the most ballots.
>
> (A ballot top-ranks a candidate it doesn't rank anyone over hir, and ranks
> hir over someone.)
>
> [end of ICT definition]
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
>
>
>
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