[EM] Random Ballot Condorcet

Ross Hyman rahyman at sbcglobal.net
Wed May 7 16:51:21 PDT 2014

Random Ballot Condorcet:  Choose a random ballot.  Elect the lowest ranked candidate that pairwise beats all higher ranked candidates.

Has this method been discussed before?  I believe that the following are true:  It will always elect a Condorcet candidate if there is one.  Otherwise it will elect a member of the Smith set with some nonzero probability for each member of the Smith set.  Non-Smith set candidates will have zero probability of being elected.  It is monotonic in that raising a candidate on some ballots cannot decrease its probability of being elected.  It is clone proof in that the probability of electing from the clone set is independent of the number of clones in the set. It is independent of irrelevant alternatives in that deleting a candidate with zero probability of winning cannot effect the probabilities for electing other candidates.  
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