[EM] How to clone proof your favorite method (whether deterministic or stochastic).
email9648742 at gmail.com
Thu May 8 08:57:22 PDT 2014
> Does anybody else like this idea?
When that cloneproofing procedure is applied, can it lose the desirable
properties of the method that it's cloneproofing, thus gaining one
desirable property in return for another?
> Does anybody have a FEM method and ballot set that they would like to see
> it applied to?
Of the methods that I propose for various conditions, Approval, Score, and
ICT (the methods that I propose for current conditions) fail
Clone-Independence, and have been criticized for that.
Would your cloneproofing procedure lose any of their desirable properties.
For example, would it lose their FBC compliance, or ICT's CD compliance?
For the purpose of that question, let me re-state the definition of ICT:
(X>Y) is the number of ballots ranking X over Y
(Y>X) is the number of ballots ranking Y over X
(X=Y)T is the number of ballots top-ranking X and Y
1. X beats Y iff (X>Y) > (Y>X) +(X=Y)T
2. The winner is the unbeaten candidate who is top-ranked on the most
3. But if all candidates are beaten, then the winner is the candidate who
is top-ranked on the most ballots.
(A ballot top-ranks a candidate it doesn't rank anyone over hir, and ranks
hir over someone.)
[end of ICT definition]
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