[EM] MAV on electowiki

Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Fri Jun 28 07:53:15 PDT 2013


Frankly, I'm a bit frustrated. One of the main reasons I proposed MAV in
the first place was that you seemed to support it. You've done a good job
expressing the advantages of Bucklin systems, and I wanted to get past the
point where I was talking about GMJ and you were talking about "Bucklin" as
an individual system, since the differences are trivial.

I still feel that way. Sure, I have an opinion on whether MAV or EMAV is
better (I prefer MAV). But the similarities are more important than the
differences. Unless we're all willing to give up on getting our own
personal ideal in every detail, we're never going to have enough unity to
make a difference. To put this in stark terms: I think it's far more of a
danger that voting reform will fail because of the picky disunity of people
proposing their personal best system, than that it will pass but lead to
some bad result because of a minor flaw in the system.

And it's clear that you do see the importance of the similarities, or you
wouldn't have dubbed your proposal EMAV.

So I'm willing to have a discussion about the relative advantages and
disadvantages of MAV versus EMAV. And I'm willing to commit to following
the majority consensus of that discussion; if, at the end of that
discussion, there are more voices in support of EMAV, then I will use EMAV
as my default second proposal (after approval). But I haven't yet heard a
similar commitment from you: when the topic is what comes after approval,
will you agree to try to show unity in what system you mention first,
rather than just rambling about whatever occurred to you most recently?

I'm sorry for the harsh language, but you should understand that focus is a
recurring issue with you. Politely addressing it only in its specific
manifestations seems not to work, so I'm consciously deciding to be more
forceful here. I hope you realize that I would not be doing this if I
didn't truly respect your intelligence and insight.


2013/6/28 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com>

> At 06:10 PM 6/27/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>  And I like to talk about the relative merits of each proposal here on the
>> list.
>> But if we talk like this in front of non-mathematical voters, we'll only
>> turn them off. We need simple proposals. Approval is step one; most of us
>> agree on that. But some voters, like Bruce Gilson, will never be satisfied
>> with approval because it doesn't feel expressive enough.
>> So I think it's worth having a second option to offer. To me, pitching
>> Score feels dishonest: "Look at this great system! Amazing great things it
>> can do! (But watch out, if you vote other than approval-style, you'll
>> probably regret it.)" Condorcet is too complex. I want a simple, good
>> system. MAV would fit the bill. If you have another proposal that would,
>> then the way to get me onto your side is to demonstrate that it has more
>> supporters than just you. That goes for you, Chris, and also for you, Abd.
> I just made a proposal, Evaluative Majority Approval Voting, designed to
> be a simple-to-amalgamate method that uses a full range ballot (Range 4 in
> the basic proposal), to seek majority approval (majority of voters rating
> winner at mid-range or higher), and then, failing that, to select the Range
> winner, if used single-round.
> What's a bit weird is that I don't know that this idea has been suggested
> before. If not, then ... demanding acceptance before consideration is a tad
> strange, don't you think?
> This, if implemented as a reform, would be collecting full range data, and
> voting it sincerely (i.e, voting at midrange or above if the candidate
> meets or exceeds the election expectation) is sane. It has limited
> later-no-harm protection; if it comes down to a contest between a favorite
> and less-preferred candidate, the favorite gets more vote strength.
> This method satisfied two basic purposes:
> 1. It respects the desirability of majority consent to a result, a basic
> democratic principle. The method supports majority consent in a way that
> gives this majority some flexibility. I.e., the descending approval cutoff
> of Bucklin amalgamation, down to bare minimum expectation, allows full
> freedom to distinguish the favorite -- and important point where Approval
> can fail -- without loss of voting power as to other pairwise contests.
> 2. Where it makes a difference, i.e., where there is no majority or there
> are multiple majorities, what Jameson calls a "tie," i.e., the same median
> rating within the approved ratings, it uses the social utility optimization
> of Range. Votes at lower ratings, below midrage, i.e., disapproval ratings
> would never directly elect a candidate, unless there is majority failure or
> a multiple majority. It reduces, in this case, to pure range voting.
> Multiple majority "failure" cannot be a poor result, with this method. It
> is *possible* that the result is not ideal, and the method fails Condorcet,
> as does Range. In a runoff system, the full method could be
> Condorcet-compliant, it depends on the nomination and specific runoff
> rules. My sense is that, because the supporters of a Condorcet winner have
> the option of voting strategically in the runoff, being very well informed
> by the primary that this is their position, Condorcet failure in the runoff
> would be rare, even if the rules permit it. (i.e, there could be a
> Condorcet test in the runoff as well, and it would prevail.)
> I would rather not think about "sides," here, but I do have a bit of a
> "position" with CES. Totally informal, they are not responsible for me,
> but, more than any other single individual, I "represented" the CES (then
> "ESF") community in that Asset election several years ago. So my opinions
> do count. That could change, of course, I could lose it, become senile,
> etc., communities move on, but ... it is what it is.
> So I'm looking for comment on EMAV. I'll post the method to the EM list.
> One more point about EMAV. It's entirely possible that, with time and
> analysis and reaction to data from EMAV elections, Bucklin evaluation would
> be dropped, but only majority approval be required to complete in one
> round, and it's possible that the system would *never* elect in the first
> round, it would simply collect and analyze the range data to suggest
> general election nominations. There are many possibilities, all of them, to
> me, inspiring.
> Voters could use the same system in both primary and runoff/general
> election. People would become quite familiar with strategy, and "strategic
> voting" is another name for "sane, informed voting." The claim that the
> only sane votes are bullet votes or full-on approval/disapproval is quite
> misleading. It depends on defective game-theoretical analysis, simplistic,
> unconfirmed, and, in fact, contrary to experience.
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