[EM] MAV on electowiki

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 06:10 PM 6/27/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote:

>And I like to talk about the relative merits of each proposal here 
>on the list.
>
>But if we talk like this in front of non-mathematical voters, we'll 
>only turn them off. We need simple proposals. Approval is step one; 
>most of us agree on that. But some voters, like Bruce Gilson, will 
>never be satisfied with approval because it doesn't feel expressive enough.
>
>So I think it's worth having a second option to offer. To me, 
>pitching Score feels dishonest: "Look at this great system! Amazing 
>great things it can do! (But watch out, if you vote other than 
>approval-style, you'll probably regret it.)" Condorcet is too 
>complex. I want a simple, good system. MAV would fit the bill. If 
>you have another proposal that would, then the way to get me onto 
>your side is to demonstrate that it has more supporters than just 
>you. That goes for you, Chris, and also for you, Abd.

I just made a proposal, Evaluative Majority Approval Voting, designed 
to be a simple-to-amalgamate method that uses a full range ballot 
(Range 4 in the basic proposal), to seek majority approval (majority 
of voters rating winner at mid-range or higher), and then, failing 
that, to select the Range winner, if used single-round.

What's a bit weird is that I don't know that this idea has been 
suggested before. If not, then ... demanding acceptance before 
consideration is a tad strange, don't you think?

This, if implemented as a reform, would be collecting full range 
data, and voting it sincerely (i.e, voting at midrange or above if 
the candidate meets or exceeds the election expectation) is sane. It 
has limited later-no-harm protection; if it comes down to a contest 
between a favorite and less-preferred candidate, the favorite gets 
more vote strength.

This method satisfied two basic purposes:

1. It respects the desirability of majority consent to a result, a 
basic democratic principle. The method supports majority consent in a 
way that gives this majority some flexibility. I.e., the descending 
approval cutoff of Bucklin amalgamation, down to bare minimum 
expectation, allows full freedom to distinguish the favorite -- and 
important point where Approval can fail -- without loss of voting 
power as to other pairwise contests.

2. Where it makes a difference, i.e., where there is no majority or 
there are multiple majorities, what Jameson calls a "tie," i.e., the 
same median rating within the approved ratings, it uses the social 
utility optimization of Range. Votes at lower ratings, below midrage, 
i.e., disapproval ratings would never directly elect a candidate, 
unless there is majority failure or a multiple majority. It reduces, 
in this case, to pure range voting.

Multiple majority "failure" cannot be a poor result, with this 
method. It is *possible* that the result is not ideal, and the method 
fails Condorcet, as does Range. In a runoff system, the full method 
could be Condorcet-compliant, it depends on the nomination and 
specific runoff rules. My sense is that, because the supporters of a 
Condorcet winner have the option of voting strategically in the 
runoff, being very well informed by the primary that this is their 
position, Condorcet failure in the runoff would be rare, even if the 
rules permit it. (i.e, there could be a Condorcet test in the runoff 
as well, and it would prevail.)

I would rather not think about "sides," here, but I do have a bit of 
a "position" with CES. Totally informal, they are not responsible for 
me, but, more than any other single individual, I "represented" the 
CES (then "ESF") community in that Asset election several years ago. 
So my opinions do count. That could change, of course, I could lose 
it, become senile, etc., communities move on, but ... it is what it is.

So I'm looking for comment on EMAV. I'll post the method to the EM list.

One more point about EMAV. It's entirely possible that, with time and 
analysis and reaction to data from EMAV elections, Bucklin evaluation 
would be dropped, but only majority approval be required to complete 
in one round, and it's possible that the system would *never* elect 
in the first round, it would simply collect and analyze the range 
data to suggest general election nominations. There are many 
possibilities, all of them, to me, inspiring.

Voters could use the same system in both primary and runoff/general 
election. People would become quite familiar with strategy, and 
"strategic voting" is another name for "sane, informed voting." The 
claim that the only sane votes are bullet votes or full-on 
approval/disapproval is quite misleading. It depends on defective 
game-theoretical analysis, simplistic, unconfirmed, and, in fact, 
contrary to experience.