[EM] MAV on electowiki
jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Thu Jun 27 16:10:00 PDT 2013
2013/6/27 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
> "I don't see it..."
> Say on an ABCD grading ballot you give your Lesser Evil X a B, and then in
> the second round both X and your Greater Evil Y reach the majority
> threshold. In that case you obviously might have cause to regret that you
> didn't give X an A.
OK, I see what you're saying now.
But I don't think it's realistic. If X and Y both reach a majority at B,
then there are some voters giving both of them a B or above. This looks a
lot more like a chicken dilemma situation between two similar frontrunners,
than like a situation where X versus Y is a gaping difference which
justifies the use of a just-in-case strategy for a low-probability
occurrence. Especially because, in a chicken dilemma situation, multiple
majorities would tend to slide down towards the second-to-bottom rating,
not up at the second-to-top one.
> That is why your suggestion makes it (even) less safe to not simply give
> all the acceptable candidates an A.
> "I think that's [IBIFA] a great method, but I would classify it as
> "improved Condorcet" rather than "Bucklin-like".
> No. There isn't any pairwise component in the algorithm, and unlike the
> "Improved Condorcet" methods it doesn't directly aim to come as close as
> possible to meeting Condorcet without violating Favorite Betrayal.
There is no pairwise component in the narrowest sense, but it still is only
summable at (R-1)*(N²), which is actually worse than a regular Condorcet
Again, I think this method would deliver excellent results, and I see why
it is in certain ways akin to a Bucklin or median method. But its
quasi-pairwise counting complexity still makes me see it as more similar to
improved Condorcet methods than to Bucklin ones.
> But another method I support is in that category, "TTPBA//TR". Mike
> Ossipoff promoted it as "Improved Condorcet, Top" (or ICT).
Right, there's a lot of good methods out there. Any of these would satisfy
me as more resistant to strategy than either Condorcet or Score. And those
two in turn are quite satisfactory as being at least as good as approval
with more expressivity, and approval is satisfactory as being a giant and
strict improvement over plurality. Great.
And I like to talk about the relative merits of each proposal here on the
But if we talk like this in front of non-mathematical voters, we'll only
turn them off. We need simple proposals. Approval is step one; most of us
agree on that. But some voters, like Bruce Gilson, will never be satisfied
with approval because it doesn't feel expressive enough.
So I think it's worth having a second option to offer. To me, pitching
Score feels dishonest: "Look at this great system! Amazing great things it
can do! (But watch out, if you vote other than approval-style, you'll
probably regret it.)" Condorcet is too complex. I want a simple, good
system. MAV would fit the bill. If you have another proposal that would,
then the way to get me onto your side is to demonstrate that it has more
supporters than just you. That goes for you, Chris, and also for you, Abd.
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