[EM] [CES #8957] Score Voting and Approval Voting not practically substantially different from Plurality?

Benjamin Grant panjakrejn at gmail.com
Tue Jun 25 09:36:40 PDT 2013


I am surprised to see a lesser of evils argument rejected by someone on a
list about election methods, all of which seem to have significant
downsides. I guess I find it ironic that someone thinking about merits and
flaws of one voting system over another isn't more comfortable with the
lesser of evils approach.

I wasn't trying to start an argument, my point on this subject is
ultimately a dry and I think a non-controversial one. If there are choices
(such as an election) in which there are several unequal results, it is in
our best interests to choose the option that best answers our needs and
preferences. In my experience, people who reject voting for the lesser of
evils do so not because they have any reason to think that such a choice
yields a better future, but because either 1) it is a non rational outburst
caused by being deeply unhappy at not having better options or, 2) the
failure to see that all choices aren't identical.

I cannot do much about #1, but for any that are in camp #2 (and I think
that a lot of (but not all) people who *think* they are in camp #2 are
really in camp #1), any group of candidates, even if bought and paid for by
the same corporate interests, *are* going to prioritize their actions
differently. Even candidates that are 90% the same have a 10% difference
that, on the world stage, makes a HUGE difference.

Or to put another way, the supreme court would be VERY different in a
Democrat hadn't won the last two elections.

Make sense?

We don't have to like our options, but it is in our best interest to choose
the best one among them, even if that simply means the least awful.  I am
not saying this is a happy fact, just a pragmatic one. Either way, it is
simply true.

-Benn


On Tue, Jun 25, 2013 at 12:22 PM, Stephen Unger <unger at cs.columbia.edu>wrote:

> I guess that means that I am either unintelligent or a
> conservative. I'll choose the latter, altho many who call themselves
> conservative (except, perhaps Libertarians, who I am in accord with on
> the crucial issues of civil liberties and militarism) might disagree
> when they hear my views on various matters. For example, I don't think
> it is "conservative" to support the kind of police state that is now
> virtually established here, with the Bill of Rights being
> systematically shredded. Nor do I think it is conservative to allow
> our environment to be trashed, to allow marketing of inadequately
> tested pharmaceuticals, or to send drones to murder people all over
> the world.
>
> I don't think the above (abbreviated) list describes what one would
> normally think of as "progressives" either. Regarding election
> politics, my view is that Obama and the rest of the Democratic Party
> leadership does not represent what "liberals" call "the lesser evil",
> but rather what Bruce Dixon of the Black Agenda Report has
> characterized as "the more effective evil".
>
> It is obvious that, with the slick con man Obama in the White House,
> opposition by "liberals" to policies at least as bad as those of the
> awful Republicans under Bush is virtually nil. E.g., polls indicate
> that most Democrats now support government email snooping, which they
> opposed when Bush was president. (Most Republicans supported this
> under Bush and now oppose it.) See http://www.people-press.org/**
> 2013/06/10/majority-views-nsa-**phone-tracking-as-acceptable-**
> anti-terror-tactic/<http://www.people-press.org/2013/06/10/majority-views-nsa-phone-tracking-as-acceptable-anti-terror-tactic/>
>
> If we had approval voting, I would definitely NOT approve Rs and Ds,
> would approve the Greens and, depending on some details, would
> probably approve the Libertarians. (I did not vote for Clinton, Gore,
> Kerry, or Obama, and would not have approved any of them if that
> option had been available.
>
> I believe that the "lesser evil" concept has been a major factor in
> bringing us to the point where all the elements of a fascist state are
> now in place, and it is just a question of time before they are scaled
> up to make it obvious to all. So far I don't see any significant
> opposition, particularly from young people.
>
> Steve
> ............
>
> Stephen H. Unger
> Professor Emeritus
> Computer Science and Electrical Engineering
> Columbia University
> ............
>
> On Mon, 24 Jun 2013, Benjamin Grant wrote:
>
>
>> “Most non-conservative are intelligent enough to see that Gore and Bush
>> are
>> equally bad from their point of view.”
>>
>>
>>
>> was supposed to be
>>
>>
>>
>> “Most non-conservative are intelligent enough to see that Gore and Bush
>> are
>> NOT equally bad from their point of view.”
>>
>>
>>
>> My typing sucks and always has.  You lucky bastards get to try to read
>> what
>> I write. ;)
>>
>>
>>
>> -Benn Grant
>>
>> eFix Computer Consulting
>>
>> benn at 4efix.com
>>
>> 603.283.6601
>>
>>
>>
>> From: electionscience at googlegroups.**com<electionscience at googlegroups.com>
>> [mailto:electionscience@**googlegroups.com<electionscience at googlegroups.com>]
>> On Behalf Of Benjamin Grant
>> Sent: Monday, June 24, 2013 11:40 AM
>> To: electionsciencefoundation
>> Cc: EM
>> Subject: Re: [CES #8924] Score Voting and Approval Voting not practically
>> substantially different from Plurality?
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 11:08 AM, Stephen Unger <unger at cs.columbia.edu>
>> wrote:
>>
>>       One point overlooked here is that any new party has to go thru
>>       an
>>       incubation period during which it has virtually no chance of
>>       winning. Voting for such a party helps strengthen it, and makes
>>       it
>>       more likely that others will support it next time around. At
>>       some
>>       point it may become a contender, and then it might actually
>>       start
>>       winning elections. If you cast votes (approve or give high
>>       scores to)
>>       only for parties that might win the current election, then we
>>       will be
>>       stuck forever with the existing 2-party scam.
>>
>>
>>
>> It doesn't seem like you are saying I am wrong about that, you just seem
>> unhappy that I am right?
>>
>>
>>
>> And under Score/Approval/Plurality voting systems, there would be three
>> phases a party might go through:
>>
>>
>>
>> A) unpopular enough not to be a spoiler
>>
>> B) popular enough to be a spoiler, but not popular enough to win
>>
>> C) popular enough to win often (>25% of the time, for example.)
>>
>>
>>
>> On your way to C, you are going to have a LOT of B, and you may never make
>> it to C, especially if people get burned voting for the emerging party by
>> getting their least preferred candidate.
>>
>>
>>
>> The only way to build a strong new party in reality, as far as I can see,
>> is to have a voting system that does not penalize you into getting your
>> least favored choice by voting for your most favored one.
>>
>>
>>
>>       Voters may have many different philosophies, and the voting
>>       system
>>       should accommodate as many as possible.
>>
>>
>>
>> I don't know that I agree with either side of this.  Voters ultimately, by
>> and large and by definition, I think, want the best outcome possible.  If
>> Nader isn't a real possibility, then a non-conservation wants Gore FAR
>> ahead of Bush.  Most non-conservative are intelligent enough to see that
>> Gore and Bush are equally bad from their point of view.  And most would
>> rate the election of Bush far more a likely than the election of Nader,
>> and
>> even if it was a coind toss among all three (Gore/Nader/Bush) most would
>> rightly view stopping Bush as more critical than helping Nader beat Gore.
>>
>>
>>
>>  It is easily possible that, in the same SV election, voters A and B
>>
>>       both score 3 candidates, C1, C2, C3,  as 9, 0, 0, respectively
>>       for
>>       different reasons. A might consider C2 and C3 both to be
>>       terrible,
>>       while B might consider C2 to be perhaps a 4 or 5, but chooses 0
>>       because of concern that C2 might defeat C1. A third voter with
>>       views
>>       similar to C2's might score the  candidates as 9, 5, 0. All are
>>       perfectly legitimate actions. Since we cannot distinguish
>>       between
>>       pairs such as A and B, it is not appropriate to try to alter
>>       the
>>       voting system so as to prevent voters from acting
>>       "strategically". (I
>>       think it would be a good idea to urge voters to cast SV votes
>>       that
>>       accurately correspond to their appraisals, and candidates might
>>       do
>>       well to so advise their supporters.)
>>
>>
>>
>> Again, is it *theoretically possible" that Nader voters might prefer Bush
>> to Gore, but in the real world, progressive tend to see democrats as far
>> superior to republicans, and libertarians tend to see republicans as far
>> superior to democrats.  Ignoring that seems like a bad idea.
>>
>>
>>
>>  Efforts to change the voting system to nullify or prevent strategic
>>
>>       voting lead to systems that restrict the voter's options. E.g,
>>       median-based score voting, in effect, restricts the extent to
>>       which a
>>       voter can support a candidate.
>>
>>
>>
>> First of all, is "efforts to ... nullify or prevent strategic voting" the
>> same meaning as "efforts to make sincere voting produce similar choices to
>> strategic voting."?
>>
>>
>>
>> Second of all, it seems to me that the less divergence there is between
>> strategic and sincere voting, the more beneficial qualities the voting
>> system has, such as:
>>
>> -we can worry less about the spoiler effect, which promotes more than just
>> 2 parties
>>
>> -we can worry less that people are accidentally voting against their
>> interests
>>
>> -we can have fewer debates about whether people have an obligation to vote
>> strategically or sincerely
>>
>>
>>
>> This would seem to be a good thing.
>>
>>
>>
>> But ultimately, I don't think you answered my central questions (and
>> pardon
>> me if you did and I just don't see it):
>>
>>
>>
>> ·         Intelligent use of Score Voting becomes Approval Voting, and
>> the harm in unwise use of Score voting means that Approval Voting is
>> superior to (and simpler than) Score voting pragmatically.
>>
>> ·         Approval Voting tends to result in irrelevant approval votes
>> being given to weak candidates – which is pointless, or slightly stronger
>> (but still losing) candidates can once again present a spoiler effect
>> where
>> a person’s least preferred choice is elected because they cast their
>> approval only toward their most preferred choice, who was nowhere near
>> supported enough to stop their least preferred choice.
>>
>>
>>       Am I substantially wrong about any of this? Ultimately, in real
>> and practical terms, it seems that done intelligently, Score Voting
>> devolves into Approval Voting, and Approval Voting devolves into Plurality
>> Voting.
>>
>>
>>
>> Thanks.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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