[EM] Participation Criteria and Bucklin - perhaps they *can* work together after all?

[Jameson Quinn]

2013/6/17 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com>

> At 01:23 PM 6/17/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>  2013/6/17 Benjamin Grant <<mailto:benn at 4efix.com>benn@**4efix.com<benn at 4efix.com>
>> >
>>
>>
>> Is *this* an example of Bucklin failing Participation?
>>
>> 5: A>B>C
>>
>> 4: B>C>A
>>
>> A wins
>>
>> Right
>>
>> But add these in:
>>
>> 2: C>A>B
>>
>>  B wins.
>>
>>
>> Yes, with your "tiebreaker".
>>
>
> This is not participation failure. Adding ballots ranking C highest did
> not cause C to lose.
>

Abd, you're wrong. Adding B>A ballots caused A to lose; that is a
participation failure.


>
> By the way, an oddity about this example. Bucklin is ranked approval. Did
> all the voters approve all candidates?
>

You would prefer it if he had left the third candidate off for each voter
group. A less obtuse way to say that would be to say "I would have written
this scenario as ... because ...".

>
> Round 1. Majority is 5
>
> A wins in round 1.
>
> Adding the2 voters, majority is now 6.
>
> First round:
> A: 5
> B: 4
> C: 2
>
> no majority, go to next round.
>
> Second round:
> A: 7
> B: 4
> C: 6
>

No. B:9. If you are going to claim that 2 others are wrong, please check
your work before sending it out.

>
> A still wins. B does *not* win. Bucklin terminates when a majority is
> found.
>
> Participation criterion from previous post: "Adding one or more ballots
> that vote X over Y should never change the winner from X to Y"
>
> Showing the third preferences is confusing and irrelevant. I do not know
> why Jameson approved "B wins." But even if B had won, it would not have
> shown participation failure. The vote must change the result away from C to
> another winner.
>
> One fact that should be understood about Bucklin: first of all, Bucklin
> votes are *approvals*. Every explicit Bucklin vote is voting *for* the
> candidate under the condition that the rank has been reached in the
> amalgamation process.
>
> Secondly, a Bucklin ballot is a *Range* ballot, covering the approved
> range only. So ranks may be left empty. Bucklin is *not* a pure ranked
> system. So if a voter has A>B>C, the voter will *not* vote for all three,
> unless there is some other worse candidates, or the voter really does want
> to completely stand aside from the election. And that doesn't work with
> respect to write-in candidates....
>
> So if the voter has preferences A>B>C, the voter may vote, in the form of
> Bucklin we generally are working with, called Bucklin-ER (equal ranking),
> these votes, and all could be sincere:
>
> A
> A>B
> A>.>B (blank second rank)
> A=B
>
> This *assumes* that there is a third candidate, C, that is least
> preferred. If there are four candidates (or more), the voter can have *many
> more sincere voting patterns*.
>
> Each pattern has implications about *preference strength*. That is part of
> why I say that Bucklin uses a Range ballot.
>
> Suppose that the voter *really prefers* a candidate not on the ballot, and
> wants to vote for that candidate, we'll call W.
>
> W
> W>A
> W>A>B
> W>A=B
> W>.>A
> W>.>A=B
> W=A>B
> W=A>.>B
> W=A=B
>
> Just to make this clear.
>
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