# [EM] CLDMMPO

Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Tue Jan 10 16:35:55 PST 2012

```OK, so I'm seeing this as a nice, simple method with good properties.
Technically, I'd call it: MiniMax (Pairwise Opposition or Disapproval). But
MMPOD is not a name you can use to market a method, and I think this one is
good enough to merit branding.

Smallest Focused Opposition Group? (You could claim that either "we all
like X better" or "we all hate you" both count as focused opposition)...
the acronym is very San Francisco.

... it's hard to say "minimax" without confusing people...

Smallest Coherent Opposition? (Same logic) SCO... I could live with that,
it's at least pronounceable.

Any other ideas?

Jameson

2012/1/10 <fsimmons at pcc.edu>

> Mike,
>
> Here's why I think that the CLD part is not necessary when we limit MMPO
> to three slots:
>
> The most likely situation where the CL wins is the case in which there is
> a clone cycle of three
> candidates that generate a lot of opposition among themselves, more
> opposition than any of them
> generate against the CL.
>
> When we limit to two slots of approval (and two or fewer slots of
> disapproval) then there can be no clone
> cycle, assuming that clones are mostly approved together or disapproved
> together.
>
> So that basically takes care of the CL problem.
>
> AS for Kevin's bad example, I have suggested including the disapprovals as
> oppositions as well as
> symmetric completion at the bottom.  Either of these by itself will solve
> the problem, but I think that the
> disapproval idea is easier to sell than explaining why we want symmetric
> completion at the bottom . but
> not at the top.
>
> 49 C
> 03 A
> 24 A>B
> 24 B (>A?)
>
> With the disapprovals included (along the diagonal) with the other
> pairwise oppositions we get
>
> Oppositions to A are  [ 73, 24, 49]
> Oppositions to B are  [ 27, 52, 49]
> Oppositions to C are  [ 27, 48, 51],
>
> so C wins.  But if the B supporters give as much support to A as the A
> supporters have given to B, then
> the 73 disapproval opposition reduces to 49 and A wins with room to spare
> (a one percent margin).
>
> It also solves the other Kevin bad example
>
> 49 A
> 01 A=C
> 01 B=C
> 49 B
>
> The disapproval opposition to C is 98, which makes C the MMPO loser when
> we include disapproval as
> an opposition, i.s. as the opposition of the "approval cutoff" ideal
> candidate/level of acceptance.
>
> What do you think?
>
> Forest
>
>
>
>
> > From: MIKE OSSIPOFF
> > To:
> > Subject: [EM] CLDMMPO
> >
> > Forest--
> >
> > You wrote:
> >
> > I wonder if it is possible for a CL to win three slot MMPO when
> > the number of ballots on which X appears
> > in the bottom slot is counted as an oppsitions to X.
> >
> > In other words, I wonder if the CL disqualification is redudant
> > in that context.
> >
> > Also, how does the CLD rule affect the FBC in general?
> >
> > [endquote]
> >
> > I too have been concerned that FBC compliance could be affected
> > by CLD, or the other
> > disqualification and completion proposals that I've
> > speculatively suggested.
> >
> > I suggest that when one method is completed by another, or when
> > there are
> > disqualifications, the "," relation should be used instead of
> > the "//" relation.
> >
> > So, when applying the 2nd method--the completion method, or the
> > method used after
> > the disqualifications--the entire initial set of candidates
> > would be used in
> > calculating the scores for the completion or post-
> > disqualification method, even
> > though that method is applied only to the post-disqualification
> > candidates.
> > Doesn't that do a lot to protect FBC compliance.
> >
> > I found that CLDMMPO wouldn't avoid Kevin's MMPO bad-example (I
> > mentioned that in
> > my other post today). But, as Ted suggested, maybe 3-slot
> > methods can avoid many
> > of the problems that can happen with unlimited-ranking methods.
> > So that's another
> > thing to investigate. Might 3-slot MMPO be easier to protect
> > from Kevin's
> > bad-example? Is there some easy way to achieve that?
> >
> > Mike Ossipoff
> ----
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