[EM] non-monotonicity in SODA

[David L Wetzell]

JQ, you gotta also recognize that every extra wrinkle you add to a rule to
deal with a contrived irregularity makes it disproportionately more
difficult to market to the general public.

When you get around to the marketing of SODA, you're going to realize that
a lot of FairVote's simplifications of IRV were necessary to streamline the
product.

dlw

On Tue, Jan 10, 2012 at 12:37 PM, <
election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com> wrote:

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> Today's Topics:
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>   1. Re: A problem with IRV3/AV3 (Jameson Quinn) (David L Wetzell)
>   2. CLDMM{O (fsimmons at pcc.edu)
>   3. Re: A problem with IRV3/AV3 (Jameson Quinn) (Jameson Quinn)
>   4. SODA: polls via "like/+1/reddit"; resulting nonmonotonicity;
>      natural fix (Jameson Quinn)
>   5. AERLO in conditional voting. Speculations. (MIKE OSSIPOFF)
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
> To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Cc:
> Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2012 14:28:53 -0600
> Subject: Re: [EM] A problem with IRV3/AV3 (Jameson Quinn)
>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>> From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
>> To: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
>> Cc:
>> Date: Sun, 8 Jan 2012 19:03:29 -0600
>> Subject: [EM] A problem with IRV3/AV3
>> Imagine a scenario of an ABCD one-dimensional continuum:
>>
>> 41: A>B>C
>> 19: B>A>C
>> 20: B>C>D
>> 20: C>B>D
>>
>> If the A voters vote A>>D then A will win. By raising the turkey D over
>> the true CW B, they have stolen the win. Even if their strategy fails to
>> keep B out of the top 3, they lose nothing; B will still win.
>>
>
> thanks for doing this.  In the first stage wouldn't B and C tie for 3rd
> place if only the first set of voters all voted strategically together in
> the same way?     They'd both get rankings from 59 of the voters.  So if it
> came down to a coin-toss, there'd be a 50-50 chance of the CW winning vs
> the 2nd place candidate given a massive coordinated strategic vote by only
> a subset of the sample (We assume none of the 3rd or 4th set of voters
> decide to strategically leave off D rankings)?
>
>>
>> To be honest, it was harder to tune this scenario than I thought it would
>> be. Thus, having taken the time to write this down, I am no longer opposed
>> to IRV3/AV3. (For IRV2/AV2, it's easier to get this problem. It's also
>> easier to get the problem if there are clones involved, but real-world
>> clones beyond 3 candidates are unlikely.)
>>
>
> Thank you again.
>
> The MSM+relevant portion of the Blogosphere shd be helpful in identifying
> clones in real world.
>
>>
>> Since I'm now not opposed to IRV3/AV3, I consider it one of the 3 reforms
>> (along with SODA and IRV) that would be most acceptable to incumbents,
>> because it avoids the weak Condorcet winner problem.
>>
>
> remind me what is the weak Condorcet winner problem?
>
>
>> Still, it is basically just as bad as IRV for nonmonotonicity and
>> spoilers; all the spoiler scenarios I consider realistic are essentially
>> 3-candidate anyway. As such, I see no reason to believe that it would not
>> lead to lesser-evil voting and 2-party domination, as IRV does. Since I see
>> 2-party domination (as opposed to just having 2 strongest parties, a
>> logical necessity) as a source of the most-serious problems with Plurality,
>> I still feel that SODA is a much better option than IRV3/AV3.
>>
>
> dlw: And our difference is that I see the near exclusive use of Plurality
> voting rules as the source of my country's current evils, since it's not
> hard to imagine 2 party dominated system that is a lot better.  All it
> takes is for there to be better checks and balances between them and for
> there to be two quite different major parties plus scope for
> outsiders/dissenters to express themselves via minor parties and LTPs.
>
> dlw
> ps, I'm going to repost this on my blog.
>
>>
>> Jameson
>>
>
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: fsimmons at pcc.edu
> To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Cc:
> Date: Mon, 09 Jan 2012 21:12:04 +0000 (GMT)
> Subject: [EM] CLDMM{O
> Mike,
>
> I wonder if it is possible for a CL to win three slot MMPO when the number
> of ballots on which X appears
> in the bottom slot is counted as an oppsitions to X.
>
> In other words, I wonder if the CL disqualification is redudant in that
> context.
>
> Also, how does the CLD rule affect the FBC in general?
>
> Forest
>
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
> To: David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
> Cc: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2012 18:20:02 -0600
> Subject: Re: [EM] A problem with IRV3/AV3 (Jameson Quinn)
>
>
> 2012/1/9 David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>> From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
>>> To: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
>>> Cc:
>>> Date: Sun, 8 Jan 2012 19:03:29 -0600
>>> Subject: [EM] A problem with IRV3/AV3
>>> Imagine a scenario of an ABCD one-dimensional continuum:
>>>
>>> 41: A>B>C
>>> 19: B>A>C
>>> 20: B>C>D
>>> 20: C>B>D
>>>
>>> If the A voters vote A>>D then A will win. By raising the turkey D over
>>> the true CW B, they have stolen the win. Even if their strategy fails to
>>> keep B out of the top 3, they lose nothing; B will still win.
>>>
>>
>> thanks for doing this.  In the first stage wouldn't B and C tie for 3rd
>> place if only the first set of voters all voted strategically together in
>> the same way?
>>
> Right, though of course it would be easy to fix that by changing some
> fraction of the B>A>C voters to B>A.
>
>
>>     They'd both get rankings from 59 of the voters.  So if it came down
>> to a coin-toss, there'd be a 50-50 chance of the CW winning vs the 2nd
>> place candidate given a massive coordinated strategic vote by only a subset
>> of the sample (We assume none of the 3rd or 4th set of voters decide to
>> strategically leave off D rankings)?
>>
>>>
>>> To be honest, it was harder to tune this scenario than I thought it
>>> would be. Thus, having taken the time to write this down, I am no longer
>>> opposed to IRV3/AV3. (For IRV2/AV2, it's easier to get this problem. It's
>>> also easier to get the problem if there are clones involved, but real-world
>>> clones beyond 3 candidates are unlikely.)
>>>
>>
>> Thank you again.
>>
>> The MSM+relevant portion of the Blogosphere shd be helpful in identifying
>> clones in real world.
>>
>>>
>>> Since I'm now not opposed to IRV3/AV3, I consider it one of the 3
>>> reforms (along with SODA and IRV) that would be most acceptable to
>>> incumbents, because it avoids the weak Condorcet winner problem.
>>>
>>
>> remind me what is the weak Condorcet winner problem?
>>
>
> A polarized electorate, 49% A, 49%B. 2% support an unknown centrist X.
> Now, 25% each from A and B decide, "X couldn't possibly be worse than the
> other side", so add a second choice, without really looking into whether X
> really is better or worse. Most systems would then make X win, even if they
> would be crushed by either in an actual runoff where the voters actually
> took a serious look at them.
>
>
>>
>>
>>> Still, it is basically just as bad as IRV for nonmonotonicity and
>>> spoilers; all the spoiler scenarios I consider realistic are essentially
>>> 3-candidate anyway. As such, I see no reason to believe that it would not
>>> lead to lesser-evil voting and 2-party domination, as IRV does. Since I see
>>> 2-party domination (as opposed to just having 2 strongest parties, a
>>> logical necessity) as a source of the most-serious problems with Plurality,
>>> I still feel that SODA is a much better option than IRV3/AV3.
>>>
>>
>> dlw: And our difference is that I see the near exclusive use of Plurality
>> voting rules as the source of my country's current evils, since it's not
>> hard to imagine 2 party dominated system that is a lot better.  All it
>> takes is for there to be better checks and balances between them and for
>> there to be two quite different major parties plus scope for
>> outsiders/dissenters to express themselves via minor parties and LTPs.
>>
>> dlw
>> ps, I'm going to repost this on my blog.
>>
>>>
>>> Jameson
>>>
>>
>>
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>>
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
> To: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> Cc:
> Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2012 11:59:05 -0600
> Subject: [EM] SODA: polls via "like/+1/reddit"; resulting nonmonotonicity;
> natural fix
> I'm designing a SODA poll that would use facebook "like", google+ "+1",
> and/or reddit upvotes, along with automated delegated vote assignment, to
> give live-updated results. In thinking about this, I've realized that SODA
> can be nonmonotonic in the following (highly contrived) scenario:
>
> (delegated preferences in parentheses)
>
> 35: A(>C)
> 30: B
> 25: C
> 10-n: X
> n: Y(>B>A)
>
> With n=4, A wins. With n=6, Y's votes are enough to make B win, so A
> approves C to prevent that from happening, and C wins; a worse result from
> the perspective of the Y voters.
>
> The natural fix is to allow A to approve C with only some of their
> delegated votes. Then, when n=6, A can approve C with 12 votes. Now Y's
> votes cannot make B win, so Y approves A, and the nonmonotonicity is gone.
>
> Of course, in order for this to work like that in a live poll, I have to
> make the logic for automatically updating assigned approvals much, much
> more complex. In fact, off the top of my head, I can't even prove that the
> general problem isn't NP-hard. But in real life, it's very unlikely that
> the scenario would be even this complex, so I'm not too worried about that.
>
> Jameson
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
> To: <election-methods at electorama.com>
> Cc:
> Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2012 18:37:00 +0000
> Subject: [EM] AERLO in conditional voting. Speculations.
>  I want to emphasize the distinction between speculations and proposals.
>
> AOC, MTAOC, MCAOC, AOCBucklin, and their automatic
> (non-optional)-conditionality versions
> AC, MTAC, MCAC and ACBucklin are proposals, not speculations.
>
> I prefer the optional-conditionality versions to the
> automatic-conditionality versions.
>
> Because the conditional voting methods are offered as optional, offering
> those ways of using one's
> Approval vote as voting options in the Approval election doesn't wrong
> anyone who doesn't choose
> to use them.
>
> I sometimes mention speculations too. I'll mention a few at the end of
> this post.
>
> AERLO in conditional voting:
>
> 1. Obviously, if you want your middle rating for a candidate to be
> conditional, then you certainly wouldn't
> want to give hir unconditional AERLO status. So, plainly, if a ballot
> marks an above-AERLO candidate
> as "(conditional)", the AERLO status should only apply if the candidate
> qualifies for receiving your
> conditional middle rating.
>
> 2. I suggested that the default assumption for designation of
> coalition-suitable candidates should
> be "Above AERLO (or top-rated or top-ranked if the ballot doesn't use
> AERLO)".
>
> But, for use in conditional voting, I suggest, for that default
> assumption, two additional requirements
> for a coalition-suitable candidate:
>
> a) must not be a conditionally-rated candidate
>
> b) must be ranked over the candidate being considered for actually
> receiving the conditional vote listed
> for hir on the ballot.
>
> I mentioned that, in MTA or MCA, when AERLO is used, a ballot's
> middle-rated candidates could be
> listed vertically, as a ranking, for AERLO purposes, even though they're
> all middle-rated. That
> qualifies as the ranking referred to in b).
>
> 3. Though I wouldn't unilaterally suggest it, AERLO could fairly be
> automatic at the bottom of any
> ranking that doesn't choose AERLO.
>
> After all, you like all of your ranked candidates better than any of your
> unranked ones. So, in the event
> that none of your ranked candidates wins, it could only be beneficial to
> you to move them all up to
> 1st place, for a 2nd count. That could only be beneficial.
>
> Still, it amounts to changing someone's ranking without their permission.
> Based on that principle,
> and wanting to offer AERLO as an _option_, my inclination is to not make
> AERLO automatic
> at the end of ballots that don't specify use of AERLO. If others advocated
> that, then sure. But
> I wouldn't unilaterally suggest any automatic, non-optional application of
> AERLO, or any
> other non-optional modifications of a voted ballot.
>
> A speculation, regarding #1, above:
>
> Maybe, for top rating, there could and should be a stronger mutuality
> requirement, a top-mutuality
> requirement, before moving the conditional, but above-AERLO, candidate to
> top, but I haven't
> looked at if, or how, that could work. It's a speculation. I emphasize
> that I don't suggest that complication for the
> poll. And, for public proposals, that would be a _later_ proposal. If such
> a requirement were workable
> and desirable, it could be implemented exactly as conditional middle
> ratings are dealt with in MTAOC.
>
> Some FBC/ABE Condorcet-like rank method speculations:
>
> I mentioned that maybe Condorcet could be modified for FBC/ABE methods.
> Before that, of course Kevin's
> tied-at-top pairwise comparisons had been suggested for use in such
> methods.
>
> Yesterday I suggested MMPO, but with an initial disqualification of
> Condorcet losers. But that wouldn't avoid
> Kevin's bad-example, because we could add a Candidate D, whom no one
> ranks. C pairwise pair-beats hir, and
> so isn't Condorcet loser.
>
> Maybe Condorcet (Tied-At-Top), MMPO2 is more promising. I don't know if it
> would have the desired
> properties. It's only a speculation at this point.
>
> Other such speculations:
>
> 1. MinMax Tied-at-Top pairwise defeat? A Tied-at-Top counterpart to MMPO.
>
> Of course I mean that its pairwise comparisons would be Kevin's
> tied-at-top pairwise comparisons.
>
> 2. Greatest Tied-at-Top pairwise win?
>
> 3. Condorcet(Tied-at-Top), Top.    Among the candidates who don't have a
> tied-at-top pairwise defeat, elect the one
> who has the most top ratings.
>
> I haven't examined those speculations.
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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