JQ, you gotta also recognize that every extra wrinkle you add to a rule to deal with a contrived irregularity makes it disproportionately more difficult to market to the general public.<div><br></div><div>When you get around to the marketing of SODA, you're going to realize that a lot of FairVote's simplifications of IRV were necessary to streamline the product.</div>
<div><br></div><div>dlw<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Jan 10, 2012 at 12:37 PM, <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com">election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com</a>></span> wrote:<br>
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<br>Today's Topics:<br>
<br>
1. Re: A problem with IRV3/AV3 (Jameson Quinn) (David L Wetzell)<br>
2. CLDMM{O (<a href="mailto:fsimmons@pcc.edu">fsimmons@pcc.edu</a>)<br>
3. Re: A problem with IRV3/AV3 (Jameson Quinn) (Jameson Quinn)<br>
4. SODA: polls via "like/+1/reddit"; resulting nonmonotonicity;<br>
natural fix (Jameson Quinn)<br>
5. AERLO in conditional voting. Speculations. (MIKE OSSIPOFF)<br>
<br><br>---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>From: David L Wetzell <<a href="mailto:wetzelld@gmail.com">wetzelld@gmail.com</a>><br>To: <a href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a><br>
Cc: <br>Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2012 14:28:53 -0600<br>Subject: Re: [EM] A problem with IRV3/AV3 (Jameson Quinn)<br><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>From: Jameson Quinn <<a href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com" target="_blank">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>><br>
To: EM <<a href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com" target="_blank">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a>><br>Cc: <br>Date: Sun, 8 Jan 2012 19:03:29 -0600<br>Subject: [EM] A problem with IRV3/AV3<br>
Imagine a scenario of an ABCD one-dimensional continuum:<div>
<br></div><div>41: A>B>C</div><div>19: B>A>C</div><div>20: B>C>D</div><div>20: C>B>D</div><div><br></div><div>If the A voters vote A>>D then A will win. By raising the turkey D over the true CW B, they have stolen the win. Even if their strategy fails to keep B out of the top 3, they lose nothing; B will still win.</div>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>thanks for doing this. In the first stage wouldn't B and C tie for 3rd place if only the first set of voters all voted strategically together in the same way? They'd both get rankings from 59 of the voters. So if it came down to a coin-toss, there'd be a 50-50 chance of the CW winning vs the 2nd place candidate given a massive coordinated strategic vote by only a subset of the sample (We assume none of the 3rd or 4th set of voters decide to strategically leave off D rankings)? </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div><br></div><div>To be honest, it was harder to tune this scenario than I thought it would be. Thus, having taken the time to write this down, I am no longer opposed to IRV3/AV3. (For IRV2/AV2, it's easier to get this problem. It's also easier to get the problem if there are clones involved, but real-world clones beyond 3 candidates are unlikely.)</div>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Thank you again. </div><div><br></div><div>The MSM+relevant portion of the Blogosphere shd be helpful in identifying clones in real world. </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div><br></div><div>Since I'm now not opposed to IRV3/AV3, I consider it one of the 3 reforms (along with SODA and IRV) that would be most acceptable to incumbents, because it avoids the weak Condorcet winner problem. </div>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>remind me what is the weak Condorcet winner problem? </div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>Still, it is basically just as bad as IRV for nonmonotonicity and spoilers; all the spoiler scenarios I consider realistic are essentially 3-candidate anyway. As such, I see no reason to believe that it would not lead to lesser-evil voting and 2-party domination, as IRV does. Since I see 2-party domination (as opposed to just having 2 strongest parties, a logical necessity) as a source of the most-serious problems with Plurality, I still feel that SODA is a much better option than IRV3/AV3.</div>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: And our difference is that I see the near exclusive use of Plurality voting rules as the source of my country's current evils, since it's not hard to imagine 2 party dominated system that is a lot better. All it takes is for there to be better checks and balances between them and for there to be two quite different major parties plus scope for outsiders/dissenters to express themselves via minor parties and LTPs. </div>
<div><br></div><div>dlw</div><div>ps, I'm going to repost this on my blog.</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div><br></div><div>Jameson</div>
</blockquote></div><br>
<br><br>---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>From: <a href="mailto:fsimmons@pcc.edu">fsimmons@pcc.edu</a><br>To: <a href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a><br>Cc: <br>
Date: Mon, 09 Jan 2012 21:12:04 +0000 (GMT)<br>Subject: [EM] CLDMM{O<br>Mike,<br>
<br>
I wonder if it is possible for a CL to win three slot MMPO when the number of ballots on which X appears<br>
in the bottom slot is counted as an oppsitions to X.<br>
<br>
In other words, I wonder if the CL disqualification is redudant in that context.<br>
<br>
Also, how does the CLD rule affect the FBC in general?<br>
<br>
Forest<br>
<br>
<br><br>---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>From: Jameson Quinn <<a href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>><br>To: David L Wetzell <<a href="mailto:wetzelld@gmail.com">wetzelld@gmail.com</a>><br>
Cc: <a href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a><br>Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2012 18:20:02 -0600<br>Subject: Re: [EM] A problem with IRV3/AV3 (Jameson Quinn)<br><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">
2012/1/9 David L Wetzell <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:wetzelld@gmail.com" target="_blank">wetzelld@gmail.com</a>></span><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>From: Jameson Quinn <<a href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com" target="_blank">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>><br>
To: EM <<a href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com" target="_blank">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a>><br>Cc: <br>Date: Sun, 8 Jan 2012 19:03:29 -0600<br>Subject: [EM] A problem with IRV3/AV3<br>
Imagine a scenario of an ABCD one-dimensional continuum:<div>
<br></div><div>41: A>B>C</div><div>19: B>A>C</div><div>20: B>C>D</div><div>20: C>B>D</div><div><br></div><div>If the A voters vote A>>D then A will win. By raising the turkey D over the true CW B, they have stolen the win. Even if their strategy fails to keep B out of the top 3, they lose nothing; B will still win.</div>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>thanks for doing this. In the first stage wouldn't B and C tie for 3rd place if only the first set of voters all voted strategically together in the same way? </div></div></blockquote>
<div>Right, though of course it would be easy to fix that by changing some fraction of the B>A>C voters to B>A.<br> <br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div class="gmail_quote"><div> They'd both get rankings from 59 of the voters. So if it came down to a coin-toss, there'd be a 50-50 chance of the CW winning vs the 2nd place candidate given a massive coordinated strategic vote by only a subset of the sample (We assume none of the 3rd or 4th set of voters decide to strategically leave off D rankings)? </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div><br></div><div>To be honest, it was harder to tune this scenario than I thought it would be. Thus, having taken the time to write this down, I am no longer opposed to IRV3/AV3. (For IRV2/AV2, it's easier to get this problem. It's also easier to get the problem if there are clones involved, but real-world clones beyond 3 candidates are unlikely.)</div>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Thank you again. </div><div><br></div><div>The MSM+relevant portion of the Blogosphere shd be helpful in identifying clones in real world. </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div><br></div><div>Since I'm now not opposed to IRV3/AV3, I consider it one of the 3 reforms (along with SODA and IRV) that would be most acceptable to incumbents, because it avoids the weak Condorcet winner problem. </div>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>remind me what is the weak Condorcet winner problem? </div></div></blockquote><div><br>A polarized electorate, 49% A, 49%B. 2% support an unknown centrist X. Now, 25% each from A and B decide, "X couldn't possibly be worse than the other side", so add a second choice, without really looking into whether X really is better or worse. Most systems would then make X win, even if they would be crushed by either in an actual runoff where the voters actually took a serious look at them.<br>
</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div class="gmail_quote"><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div>Still, it is basically just as bad as IRV for nonmonotonicity and spoilers; all the spoiler scenarios I consider realistic are essentially 3-candidate anyway. As such, I see no reason to believe that it would not lead to lesser-evil voting and 2-party domination, as IRV does. Since I see 2-party domination (as opposed to just having 2 strongest parties, a logical necessity) as a source of the most-serious problems with Plurality, I still feel that SODA is a much better option than IRV3/AV3.</div>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: And our difference is that I see the near exclusive use of Plurality voting rules as the source of my country's current evils, since it's not hard to imagine 2 party dominated system that is a lot better. All it takes is for there to be better checks and balances between them and for there to be two quite different major parties plus scope for outsiders/dissenters to express themselves via minor parties and LTPs. </div>
<div><br></div><div>dlw</div><div>ps, I'm going to repost this on my blog.</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div><br></div><div>Jameson</div>
</blockquote></div><br>
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Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="http://electorama.com/em" target="_blank">http://electorama.com/em</a> for list info<br>
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<br><br>---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>From: Jameson Quinn <<a href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>><br>To: EM <<a href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a>><br>
Cc: <br>Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2012 11:59:05 -0600<br>Subject: [EM] SODA: polls via "like/+1/reddit"; resulting nonmonotonicity; natural fix<br>I'm designing a SODA poll that would use facebook "like", google+ "+1", and/or reddit upvotes, along with automated delegated vote assignment, to give live-updated results. In thinking about this, I've realized that SODA can be nonmonotonic in the following (highly contrived) scenario:<div>
<br></div><div>(delegated preferences in parentheses)</div><div><br></div><div>35: A(>C)</div><div>30: B</div><div>25: C</div><div>10-n: X</div><div>n: Y(>B>A)</div><div><br></div><div>With n=4, A wins. With n=6, Y's votes are enough to make B win, so A approves C to prevent that from happening, and C wins; a worse result from the perspective of the Y voters.</div>
<div><br></div><div>The natural fix is to allow A to approve C with only some of their delegated votes. Then, when n=6, A can approve C with 12 votes. Now Y's votes cannot make B win, so Y approves A, and the nonmonotonicity is gone.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Of course, in order for this to work like that in a live poll, I have to make the logic for automatically updating assigned approvals much, much more complex. In fact, off the top of my head, I can't even prove that the general problem isn't NP-hard. But in real life, it's very unlikely that the scenario would be even this complex, so I'm not too worried about that.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Jameson</div>
<br><br>---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <<a href="mailto:nkklrp@hotmail.com">nkklrp@hotmail.com</a>><br>To: <<a href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com">election-methods@electorama.com</a>><br>
Cc: <br>Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2012 18:37:00 +0000<br>Subject: [EM] AERLO in conditional voting. Speculations.<br>
<div><div dir="ltr">
I want to emphasize the distinction between speculations and proposals.<br><br>AOC, MTAOC, MCAOC, AOCBucklin, and their automatic (non-optional)-conditionality versions<br>AC, MTAC, MCAC and ACBucklin are proposals, not speculations.<br>
<br>I prefer the optional-conditionality versions to the automatic-conditionality versions.<br><br>Because the conditional voting methods are offered as optional, offering those ways of using one's<br>Approval vote as voting options in the Approval election doesn't wrong anyone who doesn't choose<br>
to use them.<br><br>I sometimes mention speculations too. I'll mention a few at the end of this post.<br><br>AERLO in conditional voting:<br><br>1. Obviously, if you want your middle rating for a candidate to be conditional, then you certainly wouldn't<br>
want to give hir unconditional AERLO status. So, plainly, if a ballot marks an above-AERLO candidate<br>as "(conditional)", the AERLO status should only apply if the candidate qualifies for receiving your<br>conditional middle rating.<br>
<br>2. I suggested that the default assumption for designation of coalition-suitable candidates should<br>be "Above AERLO (or top-rated or top-ranked if the ballot doesn't use AERLO)".<br><br>But, for use in conditional voting, I suggest, for that default assumption, two additional requirements<br>
for a coalition-suitable candidate:<br><br>a) must not be a conditionally-rated candidate<br><br>b) must be ranked over the candidate being considered for actually receiving the conditional vote listed<br>for hir on the ballot.<br>
<br>I mentioned that, in MTA or MCA, when AERLO is used, a ballot's middle-rated candidates could be <br>listed vertically, as a ranking, for AERLO purposes, even though they're all middle-rated. That<br>qualifies as the ranking referred to in b).<br>
<br>3. Though I wouldn't unilaterally suggest it, AERLO could fairly be automatic at the bottom of any<br>ranking that doesn't choose AERLO.<br><br>After all, you like all of your ranked candidates better than any of your unranked ones. So, in the event<br>
that none of your ranked candidates wins, it could only be beneficial to you to move them all up to<br>1st place, for a 2nd count. That could only be beneficial.<br><br>Still, it amounts to changing someone's ranking without their permission. Based on that principle,<br>
and wanting to offer AERLO as an _option_, my inclination is to not make AERLO automatic<br>at the end of ballots that don't specify use of AERLO. If others advocated that, then sure. But<br>I wouldn't unilaterally suggest any automatic, non-optional application of AERLO, or any<br>
other non-optional modifications of a voted ballot.<br><br>A speculation, regarding #1, above:<br><br>Maybe, for top rating, there could and should be a stronger mutuality requirement, a top-mutuality<br>requirement, before moving the conditional, but above-AERLO, candidate to top, but I haven't<br>
looked at if, or how, that could work. It's a speculation. I emphasize that I don't suggest that complication for the<br>poll. And, for public proposals, that would be a _later_ proposal. If such a requirement were workable<br>
and desirable, it could be implemented exactly as conditional middle ratings are dealt with in MTAOC.<br><br>Some FBC/ABE Condorcet-like rank method speculations:<br><br>I mentioned that maybe Condorcet could be modified for FBC/ABE methods. Before that, of course Kevin's<br>
tied-at-top pairwise comparisons had been suggested for use in such methods.<br><br>Yesterday I suggested MMPO, but with an initial disqualification of Condorcet losers. But that wouldn't avoid<br>Kevin's bad-example, because we could add a Candidate D, whom no one ranks. C pairwise pair-beats hir, and<br>
so isn't Condorcet loser. <br><br>Maybe Condorcet (Tied-At-Top), MMPO2 is more promising. I don't know if it would have the desired<br>properties. It's only a speculation at this point.<br><br>Other such speculations:<br>
<br>1. MinMax Tied-at-Top pairwise defeat? A Tied-at-Top counterpart to MMPO. <br><br>Of course I mean that its pairwise comparisons would be Kevin's tied-at-top pairwise comparisons.<br><br>2. Greatest Tied-at-Top pairwise win?<br>
<br>3. Condorcet(Tied-at-Top), Top. Among the candidates who don't have a tied-at-top pairwise defeat, elect the one<br>who has the most top ratings.<br><br>I haven't examined those speculations.<br><br>Mike Ossipoff<br>
<br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br> </div></div>
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