[EM] JQ wrt SODA
stepjak at yahoo.fr
Fri Feb 17 15:16:19 PST 2012
De : David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
>>À : election-methods at lists.electorama.com
>>Envoyé le : Vendredi 17 février 2012 13h37
>>Objet : Re: [EM] JQ wrt SODA
>IRV's got a first mover advantage over SODA and to catch up you need to convince someone like Soros to help you market it. It wouldn't matter if you got the whole EM list to agree with you that it was hunky-dory.
You are supposed to get the EM list to agree first, before writing Soros directly.
>But in the context of a 2-party dominated system, there aren't as many serious candidates
That doesn't make much sense to me. The election method is a part of the system and it has an obvious effect on how
many candidates could run.
and so what relative advantages there are of SODA over IRV will be less, which then makes the first-mover marketing problem more significant, especially if IRV can be souped up with the seemingly slight modification of the use of a limited form of approval voting in the first stage.
If I remember correctly your idea is to use approval to pick finalists. I don't think this is a good idea because it breaks
clone independence, which is an IRV selling point. If your goal is to e.g. not elect Condorcet winners who place third,
I think you should use the Approval-IRV hybrid that eliminates the least approved candidate until there is a majority
favorite. I call it AER... I think Woodall called it Approval AV.
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