[EM] not fair.

[David L Wetzell]

>
>
> From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
> To: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> Cc:
> Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2012 16:25:26 -0600
> Subject: Re: [EM] not fair.
>
>
> 2012/2/3 David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
>
>> [sarcasm]Thanks for the constructive criticism of the model building
>> process.
>>
>> I'm so sorry I haven't had as many pseudo-experimental models to buttress
>> my args on this list.  They so commonly shed so much light on the matter,
>> it's no wonder you all agree on so much...[/sarcasm]
>>
>
> We actually do agree on a lot. We talk about the stuff we don't agree on.
>

dlw: 4 electoral rules in your consensus statement is not a lot of
agreement.
You're going back and forth on Approval vs Condorcet.  I believe I can get
some amens from some of our less techie readers here that it's rather
bewildering for them.

>
>
>>
>> Once again, you're the one w.o. any institutional backing.
>>
>
> OK, I'll go back to writing the voting server for Ubuntu then.
>

If political voting rules were only like such...

>
> Seriously, you can do better than sarcasm. I think "simplify, simplify,
> simplify" is in fact very constructive feedback on model-building. It's
> exactly what I want to hear when I'm doing it.
>

dlw: I said there were parts that I could leave out.
I'd rather start w. the whole and then drop feature by feature to see
what's driving the results.
It's something I learned in a Computer Science course I took as an
undergrad.

>
>
>>  I'm the guy defending a modified version of the status quo single-winner
>> electoral alternative.  The burden of proof is on you more so than me,
>> simply because the amount of time/energy spent educating folks about IRV is
>> o.w. a sunk cost that will likely have to be repeated if we theoretically
>> were to start over again.
>>
>
> Yes. What percent of US voters understand IRV? (Even if I substituted "US"
> with "Cambridge" or "SF", I doubt you'd reach even half.) The sunk cost is
> trivial relative to the size of the task.
>

Among progressive/centrist activists who are the movers and shakers of the
US's democracy, there's a lot higher understanding of IRV.

dlw

>
>
>>
>> dlw
>>
>> On Fri, Feb 3, 2012 at 3:06 PM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>wrote:
>>
>>> Please, stop talking, and start calculating. If you're not ready to
>>> calculate, then at least stop arguing with us, and start arguing with the
>>> fuzzy beast, until you are.
>>>
>>> Jameson
>>>
>>>  2012/2/3 David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
>>>
>>>>   dlw: When you try out a new piece of technology, you can't expect to
>>>>>> get it right right away.  A democracy is a function of both the rules and
>>>>>> people's habits.  If GOPers had seen that their party couldn't win then
>>>>>> some of them wd've voted Dem first and the CW wd have won....
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> David!  That's the point!  That's the problem!  IRV promised that you
>>>>> could vote for your favorite candidate and that would not help elect your
>>>>> least favorite.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> dlw: They promised it to those who had to vote strategically way too
>>>> often with FPTP.  They did not promise it was always true.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> it explicitly failed to do that on the second try.  In this town that,
>>>>> at least 3 years ago, had 3 major parties (so the spoiler wasn't some kinda
>>>>> Ron Paul or Ralph Nader gadfly who had no hope of election but could still
>>>>> rob victory from the majority candidate).  In the context where the 3 (or
>>>>> more) candidates are *all* plausible, Condorcet would have elected a
>>>>> candidate where, by definition, no other candidate was preferred over this
>>>>> CW and, at least in the Burlington 2009 example, would not have suffered
>>>>> spoiler, punishment for sincere voting, non-monotonicity, and
>>>>> non-summability/transparency.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> dlw: non-monotonicity is not at fault here, unless you expect a large
>>>> no. of GOP supporters to have a huge change of heart to support the Prog
>>>> party first....Neither was there a problem with summability/transparency...
>>>>
>>>> And how do you know there wouldn't be other foibles that emerge as
>>>> folks got adjusted to a Condorcet method?
>>>>
>>>> Perhaps the number of candidates would proliferate so much that it'd be
>>>> a vote-counting nightmare...
>>>>
>>>> At the end of the day, 3-way competitive elections for single-seat
>>>> positions are hard to sustain.  IRV wd have made the parties around the
>>>> true center be the major parties.  Now, it seems that won't be the case...
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> rbj: It *failed*, David.  (but it still beats Plurality and,
>>>>> unfortunately the voters of Burlington, who adopted IRV by 65% in 2005,
>>>>> tossed the baby out with the bathwater in 2010 and *really* did in 2011
>>>>> when they rejected the 50% threshold.)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> dlw: Depends on your loss-function and whether you take a single-period
>>>> or multi-period assessment of the outcomes.
>>>> I refuse to accept a pass-fail assessment of IRV wrt Burlington.  It's
>>>> not appropriate.  It's playing into the hands of the opponents of electoral
>>>> reform by repeating their frames.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> rbj:  now, elections are something that we (any particular group of
>>>>> people) do not do every day.  it's not like you got your iPhone or iPad and
>>>>> it worked the day you bought it, and had trouble the second day, but you
>>>>> are willing to see how well it works the next day.  it's more like a
>>>>> high-rise building technique or bridge-building technique (e.g. Tacoma
>>>>> Narrows Bridge).  if you use some new technique and it fails the first time
>>>>> you use it, you better believe there will be hesitation and controversy the
>>>>> next time its use is proposed.  and very similar if it happens the second
>>>>> use.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It depends on the severity of the loss.  You are exaggerating the
>>>> practical bads of the election of a non-CW somewhat left of the CW.
>>>> Micronumerosity says we got to not draw strong conclusions from very
>>>> limited use of something new.  It tells us we need to turn away from our
>>>> fallen human natures driven by our fears.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> rbj: on the other hand, if the technique was used 50 times before it
>>>>> failed, you would more likely look at the failure as a fluke or outlier.
>>>>>  elections happen once or twice a year (if you're politically active, if
>>>>> you're not it's more like once in four years) and their consequences are
>>>>> significant, in some cases worse than a building collapse.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> dlw: Once again, assess the "damage" and take the longer view of how
>>>> this will play into the next election.  If IRV had been continued the Prog
>>>> candidate wd have moved to the right some to woo Democrats so the outcome
>>>> wd have been preferred by most people.
>>>>
>>>> "a failure that occurs so soon after adoption might very well be an
>>>> indication of something systemic, not just an outlier."
>>>>
>>>> dlw: It ain't necessarily so... and you got to consider the relative
>>>> import of type one vs type two errors.  A sample of type 2 is not going to
>>>> be powerful and when you try to make it powerful, you increase the
>>>> likelihood of a type one error, ending the use of a good election rule
>>>> before it had a chance to prove itself among a populace that understands it
>>>> better.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> dlw:To prevent all tactical voting is not the greatest good.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The *primary* reason for adopting ranked-choice voting, the greatest
>>>>> good promised, is to remove the *burden* of tactical voting from voters so
>>>>> that they do not experience voter's regret the day after the election
>>>>> (which, here in Burlington, soured many voters that do not return to the
>>>>> polls, thus reducing participation in democracy).  i don't suggest that we
>>>>> can prevent all tactical voting, but the common burden of tactical voting,
>>>>> the tactic called "compromising", is avoidable and *should* be avoided
>>>>> where at all possible.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Think about it.  Really?  Preventing anyone from being pressured to
>>>> tactical voting is the greatest good?  Shouldn't it be to make the parties
>>>> responsive to the general views of the population?  To reduce the distance
>>>> between the de facto and true political center?
>>>>
>>>> I don't have a problem if a major party chooses to get ideologically
>>>> stuck so some of its supporters have to abandon it because of its
>>>> non-electability.
>>>>
>>>> In our context where $peech is so strong the "tactical voters" are more
>>>> likely to be the ones who've been gaming the system for their own bottom
>>>> line for quite some time.  It isn't the same thing for them to be pressured
>>>> to vote insincerely as it is when third party dissenters from "dumb and
>>>> dumber" get pressured to vote that way.  The former bonds the de facto and
>>>> true center.  The latter severs the two.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> dlw
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> ----
>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
>>>> info
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>
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