[EM] Kevin V. wrt anti-Approval Voting.

David L Wetzell wetzelld at gmail.com
Fri Feb 3 15:33:31 PST 2012

> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>
> To: em <election-methods at electorama.com>
> Cc:
> Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2012 21:56:53 +0000 (GMT)
> Subject: Re: [EM] Sparring over AV vs IRV at Least of All Evils...
> Hi David,
> I'm trying to make sense of this as an anti-Approval argument, since you
> say we don't want people to pursue the
> center "too doggedly." Did you explain what bad consequence follows from
> pursuing the center doggedly, though?
> I thought I understood your post as an "IRV is not so bad" argument, until
> I reached this line.

dlw: I guess I have probably given two different args here.
1. X*P is more important than X by itself and so Xoth-Xirv>0 isn't so bad
if Pirv>>Poth.
2. Whether Xoth is greater than Xirv is itself in question if there are
other considerations that matter besides nailing the center,
I think I make more clear what I mean by that in my brainstorm'n post.  I
view political preferences as somewhat haphazard and that the true center
is taking a random walk that we don't per se want to follow too much, given
how most important political changes, like HC reform, take time to make.

In my defense, I did always use |Xirv-Xoth| so I did not always formally
concede that Xoth was greater than Xirv, although I think I also argued
that it depends on the context which election rule is "best".  For the use
of the Condorcet method, it seems to work well when there are relatively
few candidates and voters and the voters know a lot about the options.  For
Range Voting, I like situations not unlike Olympic competitions, where
there's a simple, literal "objective" basis for comparison and the
judgements are made publicly immediately.  This is not like most political
elections.  I suppose since Approval Voting is a watered down version of
Range Voting, that is part of why I'm wary of its' use in politics as well.
 SODA tries to get at my concerns quite inventively, but I think it
combines enough concepts/practices that would be alien to the experiences
of US_American voters that it'd be quite hard to pitch and not per se much
better than an approval enhanced IRV within the US's 2-party dominated

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