[EM] Jameson: MJ

[Jameson Quinn]

2012/2/3 MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>

>  *I'd said:
>
> ***>* But I'd told how easily a strategic faction can take advantage of and beat*>* a sincere-voting faction.*>**
> Not to my satisfaction.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Of course that won't do.
>
> If you want to claim that my statements referred to were incorrect,
> then you need to tell why you think so.
>
> Please repeat them then. (Doing so in the first place would have saved us
both time.)

>
> I clearly told how, in MJ, a strategizing faction can take advantage of a sincere faction. Which
> part of that description do you disagree with? Be specific.
> *
> I'd said:
>
> ***>* Thanks, Kristofer, for confirming my conjecture: MJ strategy is like RV*>* strategy.*>**>* This is for sure: In a u/a election, MJ's strategy is the same as that of*>* RV: Max-rate the acceptables and*>* min-rate the unacceptables.*>**
> This is not true. If sending a message about the relative value within
> either group is worth more than a thousand times less than winning the
> election, the rational strategy is to use the top two and the bottom two
> ratings.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Incorrect. In a u/a election, the all-important thing is ensuring that no
> unacceptable candidate wins.
> **>* I conjecture that, in a non-u/a, 0-info election, MJ's strategy is*>* likewise identical to that of RV: Max-rate the*>* above-mean candidates and min-rate the below-mean candidates.***
> As above.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Strategy whose purpose is the the outcome of the current election is called "instrumental strategy".
>
> It's usually or always what we're referring to when we speak of a method's voting strategy.
>
> I was talking about instrumental strategy. That can be, and often is, more important than
> sending a message. But sure, if what you want is to send a message about a merit-difference among the
> candidates for whom you'd vote for in instrumental Approval voting, then of course you might not do
>
> instrumental voting.
>
> We're humans, not robots. We always have both short-term instrumental and
long-term instrumental (which you mistakenly call non-instrumental) goals.
I agree that usually the former dominate. But in MJ, unless they around a
thousand times stronger, they do not lead to the strategy you posit.

>
> Sometimes, in mock elections, in rating the candidates,
> I have slightly differed from instrumental voting in order to express a difference.
>
> But, above, I was talking about instrumental strategy. Maybe you wouldn't do instrumental
> strategy. One thing for certain is that anyone who considers it a u/a election will do
> instrumental strategy.
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>
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>
>
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