[EM] "Compliant SODA?": seeking a SODA version which may meet more criteria
jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Fri Feb 3 09:16:16 PST 2012
2012/2/3 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at lavabit.com>
> On 02/03/2012 02:26 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>> Of course, in most real-world elections I've ever heard of, 4 candidates
>> are plenty. So is there a way to fix SODA to make those pesky
>> 5-candidate scenarios go away? Analogously, Condorcet's paradox arises
>> for 3 or more candidates, but you can make 3 candidates paradox-free if
>> you require a 2/3 supermajority, and continue to etcetera with an
>> arbitrarily high supermajority.
> I thought 2/3 supermajorities always were transitive. How would you make a
> supermajority cycle with many candidates?
oops, you're right.
One possibility would be for predeclared candidate preferences to be a
>> single approval ballot, rather than a preference ordering. That way, in
>> the scenario described above the delegator candidates could not disagree
>> on the order of preference of the target candidates. This would actually
>> simplify SODA rather than complicating it.
> Could you use a rated method instead of a ranked one for the candidate
> delegation orders?
Looked at that. Doesn't work.
Looking at the predeclare-approval idea... I think that if you assume that
there are three known candidates who, between them, get delegated votes
from over 75% of the electorate, and that these candidates predeclare
before the others, then I think that there may be a "correct strategy" for
all candidates for turning a preference order into predeclared preference
order. So basically, for up to 4 effective candidates, it would works
without a voodoo dependence on Sicilian candidate strategy in predeclaring
the approval ballots.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
More information about the Election-Methods