[EM] SODA criteria

[Jameson Quinn]

2012/2/2 Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>

> Hi Jameson,
>
>
>   *De :* Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
> *À :* Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>
> *Cc :* em <election-methods at electorama.com>
> *Envoyé le :* Mercredi 1 février 2012 18h35
>
> *Objet :* Re: [EM] SODA criteria
>
>
>
>
>    In
> your criteria list you had "Majority" but for that you must actually be
> assuming the opposite of what I am trying, namely that
> *everyone* is delegating, is that right?
>
>
> Everyone who votes for the majority candidate is either delegating to
> them, or voting them above all other alternatives - that is, approving only
> them but checking "do not delegate". This is the standard meaning of the
> majority criterion. For instance, by this meaning, approval meets the
> majority criterion.
>
> For MMC, everyone in the mutual majority is either delegating to one of
> the candidates, or approving all of them and nobody else.
>
>
> Oh, I missed that the voter can't rank at all. So you are good with FBC.
> But I don't regard Approval as satisfying what I
> call MF and Woodall's Majority. It's possible to say it satisfies MF, but
> I prefer Woodall's treatment.
>

I don't know what MF stands for. I agree that it fails Woodall's majority,
though not in the unique strong Nash equilibrium.


>  (The criteria framework
> I use doesn't have any way to say that Approval satisfies MMC. You can
> equate approval with equal-top, above-bottom, or
> call it something external, but I can't say that voters stick to a limited
> number of slots. I understand the meaning of "two-slot
> MMC" or "voted MMC" but I see these as inferior versions.)
>

"voted", because delegation means there's sometimes effectively more than
two slots.

>
> In response to your last line, if the majority set involves more than one
> candidate, the delegating voters are never part of it
> and are unnecessary in getting one of these candidates elected. (I'm using
> your treatment that voters only have two rank
> levels.) If you don't agree, I'd like to hear how you are interpreting
> MMC, because I can't think of how else it would work.
>

10: A(>B>C>?...)
10: B(>C>A>?...)
10: C(>A>B>?...)
21: ABC
49: ????

One of A, B, or C must win.

Jameson


>
> Kevin
>
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