[EM] SODA criteria

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Jameson,
 

De : Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
À : Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr> 
Cc : em <election-methods at electorama.com> 
Envoyé le : Mercredi 1 février 2012 18h35
Objet : Re: [EM] SODA criteria



>>
>>
>>In 
>>>your criteria list you had "Majority" but for that you must actually be assuming the opposite of what I am trying, namely that
>>>*everyone* is delegating, is that right?
>>
>>
>>Everyone who votes for the majority candidate is either delegating to them, or voting them above all other alternatives - that is, approving only them but checking "do not delegate". This is the standard meaning of the majority criterion. For instance, by this meaning, approval meets the majority criterion.
>>
>>
>>For MMC, everyone in the mutual majority is either delegating to one of the candidates, or approving all of them and nobody else.

Oh, I missed that the voter can't rank at all. So you are good with FBC. But I don't regard Approval as satisfying what I
call MF and Woodall's Majority. It's possible to say it satisfies MF, but I prefer Woodall's treatment. (The criteria framework
I use doesn't have any way to say that Approval satisfies MMC. You can equate approval with equal-top, above-bottom, or
call it something external, but I can't say that voters stick to a limited number of slots. I understand the meaning of "two-slot 
MMC" or "voted MMC" but I see these as inferior versions.)

In response to your last line, if the majority set involves more than one candidate, the delegating voters are never part of it
and are unnecessary in getting one of these candidates elected. (I'm using your treatment that voters only have two rank 
levels.) If you don't agree, I'd like to hear how you are interpreting MMC, because I can't think of how else it would work.

Kevin
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