[EM] [CES #4433] Looking at Condorcet

[Jameson Quinn]

2012/2/2 Stephen Unger <unger at cs.columbia.edu>

> A fundamental problem with all these fancy schemes is vote
> tabulation. All but approval are sufficiently complex to make manual
> processing messy, to the point where even checking the reported
> results of a small fraction of the precincts becomes a cumbersome,
> costly operation. (Score/range voting might be workable). Note that,
> even with plurality voting, manual recounts are rare. With any of the
> other schemes we would be committed to faith-based elections.
>
> Steve
>

Agreed.

(Notice how I manfully restrained myself from using the opening to promote
SODA, which is very easy to tally by hand?)

Jameson


On Thu, 2 Feb 2012, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>  For combined systems, I definitely prefer Abd's suggestion: vote a Range
>> ballot, count it by various rules, and if the winner by the different
>> rules
>> does not agree, hold a runoff. In most cases, it would agree; and in the
>> rest, a runoff would be a worthwhile second look at the best candidates,
>> not a timewasting requirement to repeat a determination already given.
>>
>> Jameson
>>
>> 2012/2/2 Raph Frank <raphfrk at gmail.com>
>>
>>  On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 3:22 AM, Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Voter can vote as in:
>>>> .     FPTP, ranking the single candidate liked best, and treating all
>>>>
>>> others
>>>
>>>> as equally liked less or disliked.
>>>> .     Approval, ranking those equally liked best, and treating all
>>>>
>>> others as
>>>
>>>> equally liked less or disliked.
>>>> .     IRV, giving each voted for a different rank, with higher ranks for
>>>> those liked best, and realizing that IRV vote counters would read only
>>>> as
>>>> many of the higher rankings as needed to make their decisions.
>>>> .     Condorcet, ranking the one or more liked, using higher ranks for
>>>>
>>> those
>>>
>>>> liked best, and ranking equally when more than one are liked equally.
>>>>
>>>
>>> You can combine all of those methods (though not IRV) into a
>>> super-ballot.  I think this was suggested on this list at some point.
>>>
>>> Basically, you give each candidate a rating, but fractional rankings
>>> are allowed.
>>>
>>> You then construct the condorcet matrix.  If a voter ranks A as 1 and
>>> B as 1.5, then that counts as half a vote for A over B.
>>>
>>> However, if the voter votes A as 1 and B as 5, then that only counts
>>> as 1 vote for A over B, since each voter gets a maximum of 1 vote.
>>>
>>> Ranked candidates are considered preferred by a full vote over unranked.
>>>
>>> This allows the voters to decide which method to use.
>>>
>>> Condorcet
>>> - just rank the candidates in order of your choice, equals allowed
>>>
>>> Approval
>>> - rank approved candidates as 1
>>>
>>> Range/Scorevoting
>>> - rank all candidates from 0 to 1 (0 = favorite)
>>>
>>> Each voter could decide, without one group having much more power than
>>> others.
>>>
>>> Abstains aren't handled that well.  Scorevoting assumes that they
>>> should have no effect.
>>>
>>> In theory, the rule could be that if a candidate is not ranked, then
>>> no preference ordering is assumed.  The ballot would have a zero for
>>> all comparisons relative to that candidate.
>>>
>>> However, that is a lot of hassle, maybe there could be a box to
>>> indicate how you want unranked candidates handled.  Do you want them
>>> equal lowest rank, or abstain.
>>>
>>>
>>
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