<div><br><div class="gmail_quote">2012/2/2 Stephen Unger <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:unger@cs.columbia.edu">unger@cs.columbia.edu</a>></span><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
A fundamental problem with all these fancy schemes is vote<br>
tabulation. All but approval are sufficiently complex to make manual<br>
processing messy, to the point where even checking the reported<br>
results of a small fraction of the precincts becomes a cumbersome,<br>
costly operation. (Score/range voting might be workable). Note that,<br>
even with plurality voting, manual recounts are rare. With any of the<br>
other schemes we would be committed to faith-based elections.<br>
<br>
Steve<br></blockquote><div> </div>Agreed.<div><br></div><div>(Notice how I manfully restrained myself from using the opening to promote SODA, which is very easy to tally by hand?)</div><div><br></div><div>Jameson </div><div>
<br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="HOEnZb"><div class="h5">
On Thu, 2 Feb 2012, Jameson Quinn wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
For combined systems, I definitely prefer Abd's suggestion: vote a Range<br>
ballot, count it by various rules, and if the winner by the different rules<br>
does not agree, hold a runoff. In most cases, it would agree; and in the<br>
rest, a runoff would be a worthwhile second look at the best candidates,<br>
not a timewasting requirement to repeat a determination already given.<br>
<br>
Jameson<br>
<br>
2012/2/2 Raph Frank <<a href="mailto:raphfrk@gmail.com" target="_blank">raphfrk@gmail.com</a>><br>
<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 3:22 AM, Dave Ketchum <<a href="mailto:davek@clarityconnect.com" target="_blank">davek@clarityconnect.com</a>><br>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Voter can vote as in:<br>
. FPTP, ranking the single candidate liked best, and treating all<br>
</blockquote>
others<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
as equally liked less or disliked.<br>
. Approval, ranking those equally liked best, and treating all<br>
</blockquote>
others as<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
equally liked less or disliked.<br>
. IRV, giving each voted for a different rank, with higher ranks for<br>
those liked best, and realizing that IRV vote counters would read only as<br>
many of the higher rankings as needed to make their decisions.<br>
. Condorcet, ranking the one or more liked, using higher ranks for<br>
</blockquote>
those<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
liked best, and ranking equally when more than one are liked equally.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
You can combine all of those methods (though not IRV) into a<br>
super-ballot. I think this was suggested on this list at some point.<br>
<br>
Basically, you give each candidate a rating, but fractional rankings<br>
are allowed.<br>
<br>
You then construct the condorcet matrix. If a voter ranks A as 1 and<br>
B as 1.5, then that counts as half a vote for A over B.<br>
<br>
However, if the voter votes A as 1 and B as 5, then that only counts<br>
as 1 vote for A over B, since each voter gets a maximum of 1 vote.<br>
<br>
Ranked candidates are considered preferred by a full vote over unranked.<br>
<br>
This allows the voters to decide which method to use.<br>
<br>
Condorcet<br>
- just rank the candidates in order of your choice, equals allowed<br>
<br>
Approval<br>
- rank approved candidates as 1<br>
<br>
Range/Scorevoting<br>
- rank all candidates from 0 to 1 (0 = favorite)<br>
<br>
Each voter could decide, without one group having much more power than<br>
others.<br>
<br>
Abstains aren't handled that well. Scorevoting assumes that they<br>
should have no effect.<br>
<br>
In theory, the rule could be that if a candidate is not ranked, then<br>
no preference ordering is assumed. The ballot would have a zero for<br>
all comparisons relative to that candidate.<br>
<br>
However, that is a lot of hassle, maybe there could be a box to<br>
indicate how you want unranked candidates handled. Do you want them<br>
equal lowest rank, or abstain.<br>
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
</blockquote>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>