[EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.

[David L Wetzell]

>
>
>> dlw: 1. IRV is effectively the leading contender to replace FPTP in the
>> US. (We agree on this, even if we don't like it, right?)
>> 2. If you're going to attack IRV then you got to have an alternative
>> (singular) to replace it with.  4 potential replacements do not cut it.  In
>> the US's current system, there can only be one alternative to FPTP at a
>> time.  If we push for multiple alternatives then the defenders of the
>> status quo will divide and defeat us.
>>
>> 3. Let X be the quality of an election rule.  Let p be its chances of
>> implementation over fptp in the US's current system.  Then Xirv doesn't
>> need to be > Xother.  Xirv*p(irv) needs to be greater than Xother*p(other)
>> for IRV to deserve its place as the key alternative to FPTP.
>>
>
> KM:I think this is where we differ, really. On a scale from 0 to 1, you
> think their relative merit is something like:
>
> 0: Plurality
> 0.7: IRV3/AV3
> 0.72: Condorcet, MJ, etc
>
> while I think it's something like:
>
> 0: Plurality
> 0.25: IRV
> 0.3: IRV3/AV3
> 0.7: Condorcet, MJ, etc.
>
> (Rough numbers.)
>
> If you're right, of course arguing for Condorcet seems like an
> angels-on-the-head-of-a-pin thing - and it's even harmful because X_IRV *
> p(IRV) >> X_Condorcet * p(Condorcet) . The step from IRV3/AV3 to Condorcet
> is only 0.02 after all, and the momentum difference is huge! But if I'm
> right (and this is why I keep bringing up the examples where IRV has been
> used), then going for IRV is much more likely to rebound on you later.


dlw: This is a good statement of our diffs.  I'd say I rank the partial use
of PR to get a contested duopoly (or to prevent a contested monopoly) very
high, while you rank it rather low, especially relative to the development
of a multi-party system, not unlike what you have in Norway.  This is
likely a matter of political cultural differences, which makes my
valuations more likely to be prevalent in the US.

I think you're judging IRV too harshly on account of Burlington VT.  The
sample size is too small to make such a strong judgment.

>
>
>  4. This is why I pick away at how the args in favor of other election
>> rules get watered down or annihilated when you make the homo politicus /
>> rational choice assumptions more "realistic" or you reduce the number of
>> effective candidates, or you consider how perceived biases/errors get
>> averaged out over time and space, or you focus on the import of marketing
>> and how IRV has the advantage in that area of critical importance to the
>> probability of successful replacement of FPTP.
>>
>
> You try to do so. From my point of view, when I give you examples from the
> real world, you say that it'll be different here (re Australia on the one
> hand and France on the other, for instance). When I pull from theory, you
> say that the theory doesn't apply because it assumes too much; and when I
> pick examples where theory and practice seem to agree (Burlington), you say
> that that's just because the status-quo-ists put pressure to bear on IRV.
>

dlw: 1. Well, the sample of IRV uses is small, which makes it hard to
render verdict on it.
2.  AU does use IRV/PR in the opposite from ideal mix if the goal is to
increase the number of competitive elections.
3. WRT France, we disagreed on matters of taxonomy.  I classified their top
two as a hybrid.  You classified it as a winner-take-all and used it to
show how IRV has been improved upon and could be improved upon further.
4. Rational choice theory is unrealistic (at least for all political
elections).  This makes a lot of the Condorcet et al stuff be much ado
about nothing.  You acceded that fuzziness in the perceptions of voters and
the positioning of candidates muddied the waters considerably.
5. You can't divorce what happened in Burlington from the real-politik.
 It's not a slam-dunk, because the opponents of electoral reform are well
aware of the divide and conquer strategy.

All of which is to say that | X_IRV-X_Condorcet | is likely smaller than
the electoral analytics purport, while you concede p_IRV is considerably
greater than p_Condorcet.

>
> KM:How can we go anywhere from there? If you can say every application is
> a special case that doesn't apply in the situation you have in mind, and if
> you can say that the theory that remains has no verification in the form of
> practical results, then we're not left with much except restating our
> relative merit numbers to each other.


dlw:  There is a small data set for IRV apps and an even smaller one for
the infinite array of alternative electoral rules.

My point is that when you argue "falsely" that | X_IRV-X_Condorcetetal | >>
0, with the latter over the former, you risk lowering
| p_IRV-p_Condorcetetal |  by making p_IRV drop a lot more than
p_Condorcetetal rises.  p_Condorcetetal does not rise because there's no
heir apparent, likely because the Xothers vary relatively little among real
world voters.

We can't say it's just a matter of opinion, cuz it's probably not such, and
so what makes sense to me is to rally around IRV3/AV3 and trust that when
it's use is prevalent that it'll be the basis for choosing among a wider
set of electoral reforms, which will have a further ratchet effect in
expanding upon what is democracy.

>
>
>  5. It's not a religious commitment to IRV on my part.  My
>> ideological/religious commitment is to subvert the rivalry between the two
>> major parties and to increase the chances of vulnerable minorities being
>> swing voters by pushing for a much better mix of single-winner and
>> multi-winner election rules.  I also support IRV(or IRV3/AV3 (I don't
>> understand your IRV3/AV2 remark)) to replace FPTP in single-winner
>> elections.  I want others to turn away from or tone down their debating of
>> rival single-winner alternatives, whose probability of success in the near
>> future is effectively much lower than IRV, to focus more on what I believe
>> is the most needful electoral reform in the USA today.
>>
>
> KM: I have no problem with PR. The problem, as it is, is that advocating
> PR through FairVote (center of that momentum you like and want to use)
> bears with it the baggage of IRV. By my merit numbers, that's *a lot* to
> pay for marketing.
>

dlw: And I'm saying the real life sample sizes are too damn small  to
justify rhetorically torpedoing FairVote's marketing/bundling strategy.
 Why not, push for more experimentation with other election rules in Norway
or elsewhere and trust that the US will find its way in its own way,
hopefully with some critical learning from across the pond.

dlw
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