[EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

David L Wetzell wrote:
> 
> 
> On Tue, Nov 22, 2011 at 5:34 PM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com 
> <mailto:jameson.quinn at gmail.com>> wrote:
> 
>     What kind of evidence would convince you to change your mind about
>     IRV? How about on IRV3/AV3 resolving most of IRV's problems? (I
>     believe that using 3-slot+unapproved ballots and implicit approval
>     to run approval/runoff, which I guess in your notation is IRV3/AV2,
>     would, but don't agree that IRV3/AV3 would).
> 
> 
> dlw: 1. IRV is effectively the leading contender to replace FPTP in the 
> US. (We agree on this, even if we don't like it, right?)   
> 
> 2. If you're going to attack IRV then you got to have an alternative 
> (singular) to replace it with.  4 potential replacements do not cut it. 
>  In the US's current system, there can only be one alternative to FPTP 
> at a time.  If we push for multiple alternatives then the defenders of 
> the status quo will divide and defeat us.
> 
> 3. Let X be the quality of an election rule.  Let p be its chances of 
> implementation over fptp in the US's current system.  
> Then Xirv doesn't need to be > Xother.  Xirv*p(irv) needs to be greater 
> than Xother*p(other) for IRV to deserve its place as the key alternative 
> to FPTP. 

I think this is where we differ, really. On a scale from 0 to 1, you 
think their relative merit is something like:

0: Plurality
0.3: Required for a sufficiently contested duopoly given PR
0.35: Top-two
0.5: IRV
0.7: IRV3/AV3
0.72: Condorcet, MJ, etc
?.??: Required for multipartyism in single-winner/seat/office positions 
(not important)

while I think it's something like:

0: Plurality
0.25: IRV
0.3: IRV3/AV3
0.4: Required for a sufficiently contested duopoly given PR
0.45: Top-two
0.65: Required for multipartyism in single-winner/seat/office positions
0.7: Condorcet, MJ, etc.

(Rough numbers.)

If you're right, of course arguing for Condorcet seems like an 
angels-on-the-head-of-a-pin thing - and it's even harmful because X_IRV 
* p(IRV) >> X_Condorcet * p(Condorcet) . The step from IRV3/AV3 to 
Condorcet is only 0.02 after all, and the momentum difference is huge! 
But if I'm right (and this is why I keep bringing up the examples where 
IRV has been used), then going for IRV is much more likely to rebound on 
you later.

> 4. This is why I pick away at how the args in favor of other election 
> rules get watered down or annihilated when you make the homo politicus / 
> rational choice assumptions more "realistic" or you reduce the number of 
> effective candidates, or you consider how perceived biases/errors get 
> averaged out over time and space, or you focus on the import of 
> marketing and how IRV has the advantage in that area of critical 
> importance to the probability of successful replacement of FPTP.

You try to do so. From my point of view, when I give you examples from 
the real world, you say that it'll be different here (re Australia on 
the one hand and France on the other, for instance). When I pull from 
theory, you say that the theory doesn't apply because it assumes too 
much; and when I pick examples where theory and practice seem to agree 
(Burlington), you say that that's just because the status-quo-ists put 
pressure to bear on IRV.

How can we go anywhere from there? If you can say every application is a 
special case that doesn't apply in the situation you have in mind, and 
if you can say that the theory that remains has no verification in the 
form of practical results, then we're not left with much except 
restating our relative merit numbers to each other.

> 5. It's not a religious commitment to IRV on my part.  My 
> ideological/religious commitment is to subvert the rivalry between the 
> two major parties and to increase the chances of vulnerable minorities 
> being swing voters by pushing for a much better mix of single-winner and 
> multi-winner election rules.  I also support IRV(or IRV3/AV3 (I don't 
> understand your IRV3/AV2 remark)) to replace FPTP in single-winner 
> elections.  I want others to turn away from or tone down their debating 
> of rival single-winner alternatives, whose probability of success in the 
> near future is effectively much lower than IRV, to focus more on what I 
> believe is the most needful electoral reform in the USA today.

I have no problem with PR. The problem, as it is, is that advocating PR 
through FairVote (center of that momentum you like and want to use) 
bears with it the baggage of IRV. By my merit numbers, that's *a lot* to 
pay for marketing.