[EM] Re : An ABE solution

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Jameson,
 
De : Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
>>À : Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> 
>>Cc : MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>; "fsimmons at pcc.edu" <fsimmons at pcc.edu>; em <election-methods at electorama.com> 
>>Envoyé le : Mercredi 23 Novembre 2011 4h18
>>Objet : Re: [EM] An ABE solution
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>>My perspective is the following:
>>1. Most real-world elections will have a sincere CW, although that might not be visible from the ballots.
>>1a. Those elections without a sincere CW don't really have a "wrong answer", so I don't worry as much about the pathologies in that case.
>>2. Therefore, we can divide FBC-violating strategies into two (overlapping) classes: those which work when there is not a CW among the other voters, which I will call "offensive" strategies, and which usually work by creating a false cycle; and those which work when there is no CW among the other voters, which I will call "defensive".
>>3. I consider that a method with no "offensive" FBC violations is good enough. That's why I've used those labels: why would "defensive" strategies be a problem if "offensive" ones weren't?
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Having some problems understanding where you're coming from. A defensive FBC-violating strategy isn't likely going to be 
provoked by an offensive FBC-violating strategy. I would expect it to be provoked by the truncation of other voters.

If you want to say that it's enough for methods to not be suspectible to strategies that would necessitiate defensive compromise
from other voters, then I might agree, but that is almost the same thing, in practice, as saying the method should satisfy FBC.

Kevin
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