[EM] Re : An ABE solution

Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Fri Nov 25 03:50:36 PST 2011


2011/11/24 Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>

> Hi Jameson,
>
>
>    *De :* Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
> *À :* Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
> *Cc :* MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>; "fsimmons at pcc.edu" <
> fsimmons at pcc.edu>; em <election-methods at electorama.com>
> *Envoyé le :* Mercredi 23 Novembre 2011 4h18
>
> *Objet :* Re: [EM] An ABE solution
>
>
>
>
>
>
> My perspective is the following:
> 1. Most real-world elections will have a sincere CW, although that might
> not be visible from the ballots.
> 1a. Those elections without a sincere CW don't really have a "wrong
> answer", so I don't worry as much about the pathologies in that case.
> 2. Therefore, we can divide FBC-violating strategies into two
> (overlapping) classes: those which work when there is not a CW among the
> other voters, which I will call "offensive" strategies, and which usually
> work by creating a false cycle; and those which work when there is no CW
> among the other voters, which I will call "defensive".
> 3. I consider that a method with no "offensive" FBC violations is good
> enough. That's why I've used those labels: why would "defensive" strategies
> be a problem if "offensive" ones weren't?
>
>
> Having some problems understanding where you're coming from. A defensive
> FBC-violating strategy isn't likely going to be
> provoked by an offensive FBC-violating strategy. I would expect it to be
> provoked by the truncation of other voters.
>
> If you want to say that it's enough for methods to not be suspectible to
> strategies that would necessitiate defensive compromise
> from other voters, then I might agree, but that is almost the same thing,
> in practice, as saying the method should satisfy FBC.
>

Kevin, I suspect that you're probably closer to the truth than I am on
this, because you have more experience twiddling the knobs on your
simulator. But your brief assertions here don't really give me enough
fodder for me to understand why I'm wrong, if I am.

Do you agree with me that lack of a sincere CW will be rare? Do you agree
with me that some methods have strategic possibilities which are irrelevant
as long as there is a sincere CW who is known as such by most voters? Do
you agree that some FBC violations fall into that category?

Apparently you do not agree that all FBC violations which start from a
non-CW scenario fall into that category; and apparently this is because
non-FBC-violating truncation strategies could cause the non-CW scenario. If
I've read you correctly on this, you may well be right, but I don't follow
all the logic. But even if I have and you are, the questions in the
preceding paragraph are more important for the big picture.

Jameson

>
> Kevin
>
>
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