[EM] Re : An ABE solution

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Chris,


De : Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>À : "fsimmons at pcc.edu" <fsimmons at pcc.edu> 
>>Cc : EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com> 
>>Envoyé le : Mercredi 23 Novembre 2011 7h08
>>Objet : [EM] An ABE solution
>>
It is certainly a clear proof of the incompatibilty of  the Condorcet criterion and Kevin's later
>>suggested "variation" of  the FBC, "Sincere Favorite":
>> Suppose a subset of the ballots, all identical, rank every candidate in S (where S contains at least two candidates) equal to each other, and above every other candidate. Then, arbitrarily lowering some candidate X from S on these ballots must not increase the probability that the winner comes from S.
>>A simpler way to word this would be: You should never be able to help your favorites by lowering one of them.
>> 
>>http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#critfbc
>>
>>I can't see any real difference between this and regular FBC, which probably partly explains
>>why it didn't catch on.
 
Sincere Favorite is supposed to be a votes-only translation of FBC. It should clarify what I am doing when I
check whether a method satisfies FBC. It's possible that a method can satisfy FBC without satisfying Sincere
Favorite, but it would be hard to design a method to do so, I think.
 
Besides the issue you mention, there are also the facts that I rarely use the "sincere favorite" name myself and 
that the SF acronym would be confusing given the "Strategy-Free" criterion with the same initials.
 
Kevin
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