[EM] Re : An ABE solution

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Forest,


De : "fsimmons at pcc.edu" <fsimmons at pcc.edu>
>>À : Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> 
>>Cc : EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com> 
>>Envoyé le : Mercredi 23 Novembre 2011 19h47
>>Objet : Re: [EM] An ABE solution
>>


The latter is correct, because I used Woodall's scheme. By definition an election method doesn't use
approval ballots. You have to evaluate a rank ballot method that gives the same results (and there is more
than one way to do that with Approval).

The thing with three slots and three candidates, and the proof attempt, is just that it's probably possible to
convert the method into a rank method.

Kevin
This last statement is the one I referred to.  In the case of Approval the winner can be determined soley 
from the pairwise matrix, so Approval satisfies this condition.  It also satisfies the FBC, so the "proof" is 
either wrong or it makes other tacit assumptions that somehow rule out Approval.
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