[EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.

[David L Wetzell]

On Wed, Nov 23, 2011 at 4:02 AM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>wrote:

> So, to answer the question: the kind of evidence which would convince you
> to support other methods instead of/in addition to IRV, would be evidence
> that one or more of them are likely to be implemented in the US?


dlw: I believe that |xirv-xother| is small and |pirv-pother| is big.  I
think that because of bounded rationality and fuzzy preferences and
strategic interactions that the |xi-xj| tends to be smaller than we'd
think.  As such, if you're going to go after the king, you gotta have an
heir apparent in the wings.  You all do not and this keeps pother low.
Youdalso need a marketing program as good as FairVote's worked out and
tested.

>
> If I've read you correctly here, it seems to me that you should sign the
> statement. You agree with everything it says, even if you wish it said some
> other things. And if you're truly being open-minded about this, you will
> want to avoid the circular logic involved in not signing. ("I won't sign it
> because it doesn't have wide enough support.")
>

dlw: Ah, but I can't support giving a lot of attention to single-winner
reforms when the empirical evidence suggests that it's the mix of
multi-winner and single-winner that is of far greater import.

dlw

>
> Jameson
>
>  2011/11/22 David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
>
>>
>>
>>  On Tue, Nov 22, 2011 at 5:34 PM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>wrote:
>>
>>> What kind of evidence would convince you to change your mind about IRV?
>>> How about on IRV3/AV3 resolving most of IRV's problems? (I believe that
>>> using 3-slot+unapproved ballots and implicit approval to run
>>> approval/runoff, which I guess in your notation is IRV3/AV2, would, but
>>> don't agree that IRV3/AV3 would).
>>
>>
>> dlw: 1. IRV is effectively the leading contender to replace FPTP in the
>> US. (We agree on this, even if we don't like it, right?)
>>
>> 2. If you're going to attack IRV then you got to have an alternative
>> (singular) to replace it with.  4 potential replacements do not cut it.  In
>> the US's current system, there can only be one alternative to FPTP at a
>> time.  If we push for multiple alternatives then the defenders of the
>> status quo will divide and defeat us.
>>
>> 3. Let X be the quality of an election rule.  Let p be its chances of
>> implementation over fptp in the US's current system.
>> Then Xirv doesn't need to be > Xother.  Xirv*p(irv) needs to be greater
>> than Xother*p(other) for IRV to deserve its place as the key alternative to
>> FPTP.
>>
>> 4. This is why I pick away at how the args in favor of other election
>> rules get watered down or annihilated when you make the homo politicus /
>> rational choice assumptions more "realistic" or you reduce the number of
>> effective candidates, or you consider how perceived biases/errors get
>> averaged out over time and space, or you focus on the import of marketing
>> and how IRV has the advantage in that area of critical importance to the
>> probability of successful replacement of FPTP.
>>
>> 5. It's not a religious commitment to IRV on my part.  My
>> ideological/religious commitment is to subvert the rivalry between the two
>> major parties and to increase the chances of vulnerable minorities being
>> swing voters by pushing for a much better mix of single-winner and
>> multi-winner election rules.  I also support IRV(or IRV3/AV3 (I don't
>> understand your IRV3/AV2 remark)) to replace FPTP in single-winner
>> elections.  I want others to turn away from or tone down their debating of
>> rival single-winner alternatives, whose probability of success in the near
>> future is effectively much lower than IRV, to focus more on what I believe
>> is the most needful electoral reform in the USA today.
>>
>> dlw
>>
>>
>
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