[EM] PR election results
David L Wetzell
wetzelld at gmail.com
Mon Nov 21 06:14:46 PST 2011
a las, I had trouble accessing the vote outcomes.
I need to purchase the software, right?
dlw
On Mon, Nov 21, 2011 at 8:11 AM, Jeffrey O'Neill <jeff.oneill at openstv.org>wrote:
> OpenSTV can't do this automatically, but since the ballots are available
> here:
> http://www.opavote.org/vote?ekey=agNzdHZyEAsSCEVsZWN0aW9uGJTHHww
> you can do it manually:
> (1) edit the ballots to keep only the top 3 and do AV to get the
> nominations.
> (2) use the unedited ballots, withdraw candidates who didn't get
> nominated, and count with IRV.
>
>
> On Mon, Nov 21, 2011 at 9:03 AM, David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>wrote:
>
>> I was wondering if Jeff O'Neill could illustrate the IRV3/AV3 approach by
>> counting only people's top 3 rankings of PR methods and treating the
>> rankings as approval votes in a first stage to get three finalists and then
>> doing IRV in the second stage?
>>
>> I voted closed list PR as my 1st, but I want to clarify that I think the
>> valuation of election rules should be contextual. I value the use of
>> 3-seat LR Hare in "more local" elections that don't typically command very
>> much voter interest. In a 3-seat LR Hare, election, there's fewer
>> candidates since there's only one per party, so there's fewer voices vying
>> for voter attention. And if folks are less likely to do their homework to
>> get reasonable rankings of the candidates then it'd be better to give them
>> only one vote.
>>
>> dlw
>>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>> From: "Jeffrey O'Neill" <jeff.oneill at openstv.org>
>> To: election-methods-electorama.com at electorama.com
>> Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 21:13:57 -0500
>> Subject: [EM] Results of poll for favorite multi-winner voting system
>>
>> The results for the multi-winner voting system poll are in. Only 15
>> people voted, but the results are interesting nonetheless. The votes were
>> counted using instant runoff voting, Condorcet, and the Borda count.
>> Instant Runoff Voting
>>
>> Not surprisingly, Meek STV was the runaway winner, and WIGM STV was a
>> solid second place. I do find it interesting that some people prefer WIGM
>> STV to Meek STV. Meek is clearly better than WIGM in terms of the quality
>> of the proportional representation, but apparently some people find the
>> simplicity of WIGM more important.
>>
>> Open list PR was in third although the one voter for closed list PR had
>> Meek as the next choice. Because of the small number of voters we can't
>> read much into this though.
>> Condorcet
>>
>> All three STV candidates did well as did open list PR. I find it
>> surprising that cumulative voting and limited voting did so poorly since
>> these two methods provide reasonable proportional representation and are
>> also very easy to count. Approval voting did not do well, likely because it
>> does not provide good proportional representation. Plurality at-large
>> voting was last on every ballot except that it beat mixed member on one
>> ballot.
>> Borda Count
>>
>> The three STV candidates again did very well as well as open list PR. I'm
>> surprised that open list PR did so much better than closed list PR as I
>> don't find the differences between the two that significant.
>> Summary
>>
>> This was a more difficult poll to run since there are many factors to
>> consider in selecting a multi-winner voting system and any particular
>> system may be good in some situations but not in others. I personally
>> believe that STV, and especially Meek STV, is a good choice in many
>> situations, and many others seem to agree.
>>
>> Thank you for participating in these polls, and feel free to do your own
>> polls at opavote.org or to contact me with suggestions for future polls.
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> Counting votes using Instant Runoff Voting.
>>
>> R|Open l|Closed|Mixed |Cumula|Limite|Plural|Meek S|WIGM S|Other |Approv|Exhaus
>> |ist PR| list |member|tive v|d voti|ity at|TV |TV (eg|STV |al vot|ted
>> | |PR | PR |oting |ng |-large| |, Scot| |ing |
>> | | | | | | votin| |tish S| | |
>> | | | | | |g | |TV) | | |
>> ===============================================================================
>> 1| 1| 1| 1| 1| 0| 0| 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> | Count of first choices.
>> ===============================================================================
>> 2| 1| 1| 1| 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> | Count after eliminating Limited voting and Plurality at-large voting and
>> | transferring votes. Since this is the first elimination round, all
>> | candidates without any votes are eliminated.
>> ===============================================================================
>> 3| 2| 1| | 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> | Count after eliminating Mixed member PR and transferring votes. Candidates
>> | Open list PR, Closed list PR, Mixed member PR, Cumulative voting, Other
>> | STV, and Approval voting were tied when choosing candidates to eliminate.
>> | Candidate Mixed member PR was chosen by breaking the tie randomly.
>> ===============================================================================
>> 4| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | 1| 0
>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> | Count after eliminating Other STV and transferring votes. Candidates Closed
>> | list PR, Cumulative voting, Other STV, and Approval voting were tied when
>> | choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Other STV was chosen by
>> | breaking the tie randomly.
>> ===============================================================================
>> 5| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | | 1
>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> | Count after eliminating Approval voting and transferring votes. Candidates
>> | Closed list PR, Cumulative voting, and Approval voting were tied when
>> | choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Approval voting was chosen by
>> | breaking the tie randomly.
>> ===============================================================================
>> 6| 2| | | 1| | | 8| 3| | | 1
>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> | Count after eliminating Closed list PR and transferring votes. Candidates
>> | Closed list PR and Cumulative voting were tied when choosing candidates to
>> | eliminate. Candidate Closed list PR was chosen by breaking the tie
>> | randomly.
>> ===============================================================================
>> 7| 2| | | | | | 8| 3| | | 2
>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> | Count after eliminating Cumulative voting and transferring votes.
>> ===============================================================================
>> 8| | | | | | | 9| 3| | | 3
>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> | Count after eliminating Open list PR and transferring votes. Candidate Meek
>> | STV is elected.
>>
>> Winner is Meek STV.
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> Counting votes using Condorcet Voting.
>>
>> Pairwise Comparison Matrix:
>>
>> |Open|Clos|Mixe|Cumu|Limi|Plur|Meek|WIGM|Othe|Appr
>> ----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----
>> Open| 0| 12| 10| 13| 12| 13| 3| 4| 5| 13
>> Clos| 1| 0| 3| 9| 8| 10| 3| 2| 2| 8
>> Mixe| 4| 9| 0| 9| 9| 11| 3| 2| 2| 10
>> Cumu| 1| 2| 3| 0| 8| 10| 1| 1| 1| 8
>> Limi| 1| 2| 3| 2| 0| 9| 0| 0| 0| 4
>> Plur| 0| 0| 1| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0
>> Meek| 10| 9| 10| 11| 11| 11| 0| 9| 8| 11
>> WIGM| 9| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 3| 0| 8| 12
>> Othe| 8| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 4| 4| 0| 12
>> Appr| 2| 4| 3| 3| 7| 9| 2| 2| 2| 0
>>
>> Smith Set: Meek STV
>>
>> No completion necessary since the Smith set has just one candidate.
>> Winner is Meek STV.
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> Counting votes using Approval Voting.
>>
>> Candidate | Count
>> ===================================
>> Open list PR | 13
>> Closed list PR | 10
>> Mixed member PR | 12
>> Cumulative voting | 10
>> Limited voting | 9
>> Plurality at-large voting | 6
>> Meek STV | 11
>> WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 12
>> Other STV | 12
>> Approval voting | 9
>> Exhausted | 0
>>
>> Count of all approvals.
>>
>> Winner is Open list PR.
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> Counting votes using Borda Count.
>>
>> Candidate | Count
>> ===================================
>> Open list PR | 85
>> Closed list PR | 46
>> Mixed member PR | 59
>> Cumulative voting | 35
>> Limited voting | 21
>> Plurality at-large voting | 1
>> Meek STV | 90
>> WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 89
>> Other STV | 85
>> Approval voting | 34
>> Exhausted | 130
>>
>> Borda count totals.
>>
>> Winner is Meek STV.
>>
>>
>>
>> _________________________________________________________
>> OpenSTV -- Software for counting STV and ranked-choice voting
>> OpaVote -- Online elections for ranked-choice voting
>> http://www.OpenSTV.org <http://www.openstv.org/>
>> http://www.OpaVote.org <http://www.opavote.org/>
>>
>> On Sun, Nov 20, 2011 at 11:43 PM, <
>> election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to
>>> election-methods at lists.electorama.com
>>>
>>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>>>
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>>>
>>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
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>>> election-methods-owner at lists.electorama.com
>>>
>>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
>>> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..."
>>>
>>> Today's Topics:
>>>
>>> 1. Markus: Re: Beatpath as a proposal in the U.S. (MIKE OSSIPOFF)
>>> 2. Refinements to definition of voting x over y (MIKE OSSIPOFF)
>>> 3. Results of poll for favorite multi-winner voting system
>>> (Jeffrey O'Neill)
>>> 4. TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?) (C.Benham)
>>>
>>>
>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
>>> To: <election-methods at electorama.com>
>>> Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 20:57:52 +0000
>>> Subject: [EM] Markus: Re: Beatpath as a proposal in the U.S.
>>> Markus:
>>>
>>> You wrote:
>>>
>>> The Schulze method is currently used by more than
>>> 50 organizations with more than 70,000 members in
>>> total.
>>>
>>> [endquote]
>>>
>>> Organizations aren't the general public. Certainly the fancier Condorcet
>>> methods have been adopted by some organizations (and rejected by others
>>> due to complexity). That doesn't mean that the person on the streetcorner
>>> accepts them.
>>>
>>> The requirements for a public proposal are entirely different than for
>>> some organizations.
>>>
>>> Also, it depends on whether a particular country's "public" is already
>>> familiar with
>>> electoral systems more complicated than Plurality.
>>>
>>> You continued:
>>>
>>> Of all Condorcet methods, that are currently discussed,
>>> the Schulze method is that method that has the best
>>> chances of getting adopted.
>>>
>>> [endquote]
>>>
>>> Methods that meet Condorcet's Criterion fail FBC.
>>>
>>> I've told why FBC is necessary for the U.S.
>>>
>>> Aside from that, for the above-stated reasons, Beatpath has far less
>>> chance of adoption in the U.S
>>> than MTA or Approval.
>>>
>>> ...Or even ABucklin. Bucklin was adopted, and used to be used, by some
>>> U.S. cities or counties.
>>>
>>> Mike Ossipoff
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
>>> To: <election-methods at electorama.com>
>>> Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 21:47:07 +0000
>>> Subject: [EM] Refinements to definition of voting x over y
>>>
>>>
>>> My definition of voting one x over y was:
>>>
>>> You're voting x over y if switching x and y on your ballot is more
>>> likely to change the winnner from x to y than from y to x.
>>>
>>> [end of definition of voting x over y]
>>>
>>>
>>> I should add the clause "...if there is no information about other
>>> voters' ballots."
>>>
>>> Of course that isn't a problem if "more likely" is defined or replaced
>>> by "consistent with more possible configurations
>>> of other voters' ballots".
>>>
>>> If there's any question of what "switching x and y on your ballot"
>>> means, it could be changed to "switching the _names
>>> of_ x and y on your ballot", or "voting x exactly as you were voting y,
>>> and voting y exactly as you were votinlg x".
>>>
>>> Mike Ossipoff
>>>
>>>
>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>> From: "Jeffrey O'Neill" <jeff.oneill at openstv.org>
>>> To: election-methods-electorama.com at electorama.com
>>> Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 21:13:57 -0500
>>> Subject: [EM] Results of poll for favorite multi-winner voting system
>>>
>>> The results for the multi-winner voting system poll are in. Only 15
>>> people voted, but the results are interesting nonetheless. The votes were
>>> counted using instant runoff voting, Condorcet, and the Borda count.
>>> Instant Runoff Voting
>>>
>>> Not surprisingly, Meek STV was the runaway winner, and WIGM STV was a
>>> solid second place. I do find it interesting that some people prefer WIGM
>>> STV to Meek STV. Meek is clearly better than WIGM in terms of the quality
>>> of the proportional representation, but apparently some people find the
>>> simplicity of WIGM more important.
>>>
>>> Open list PR was in third although the one voter for closed list PR had
>>> Meek as the next choice. Because of the small number of voters we can't
>>> read much into this though.
>>> Condorcet
>>>
>>> All three STV candidates did well as did open list PR. I find it
>>> surprising that cumulative voting and limited voting did so poorly since
>>> these two methods provide reasonable proportional representation and are
>>> also very easy to count. Approval voting did not do well, likely because it
>>> does not provide good proportional representation. Plurality at-large
>>> voting was last on every ballot except that it beat mixed member on one
>>> ballot.
>>> Borda Count
>>>
>>> The three STV candidates again did very well as well as open list PR.
>>> I'm surprised that open list PR did so much better than closed list PR as I
>>> don't find the differences between the two that significant.
>>> Summary
>>>
>>> This was a more difficult poll to run since there are many factors to
>>> consider in selecting a multi-winner voting system and any particular
>>> system may be good in some situations but not in others. I personally
>>> believe that STV, and especially Meek STV, is a good choice in many
>>> situations, and many others seem to agree.
>>>
>>> Thank you for participating in these polls, and feel free to do your own
>>> polls at opavote.org or to contact me with suggestions for future
>>> polls.
>>> ------------------------------
>>>
>>> Counting votes using Instant Runoff Voting.
>>>
>>> R|Open l|Closed|Mixed |Cumula|Limite|Plural|Meek S|WIGM S|Other |Approv|Exhaus
>>> |ist PR| list |member|tive v|d voti|ity at|TV |TV (eg|STV |al vot|ted
>>> | |PR | PR |oting |ng |-large| |, Scot| |ing |
>>> | | | | | | votin| |tish S| | |
>>> | | | | | |g | |TV) | | |
>>> ===============================================================================
>>> 1| 1| 1| 1| 1| 0| 0| 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> | Count of first choices.
>>> ===============================================================================
>>> 2| 1| 1| 1| 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> | Count after eliminating Limited voting and Plurality at-large voting and
>>> | transferring votes. Since this is the first elimination round, all
>>> | candidates without any votes are eliminated.
>>> ===============================================================================
>>> 3| 2| 1| | 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> | Count after eliminating Mixed member PR and transferring votes. Candidates
>>> | Open list PR, Closed list PR, Mixed member PR, Cumulative voting, Other
>>> | STV, and Approval voting were tied when choosing candidates to eliminate.
>>> | Candidate Mixed member PR was chosen by breaking the tie randomly.
>>> ===============================================================================
>>> 4| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | 1| 0
>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> | Count after eliminating Other STV and transferring votes. Candidates Closed
>>> | list PR, Cumulative voting, Other STV, and Approval voting were tied when
>>> | choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Other STV was chosen by
>>> | breaking the tie randomly.
>>> ===============================================================================
>>> 5| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | | 1
>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> | Count after eliminating Approval voting and transferring votes. Candidates
>>> | Closed list PR, Cumulative voting, and Approval voting were tied when
>>> | choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Approval voting was chosen by
>>> | breaking the tie randomly.
>>> ===============================================================================
>>> 6| 2| | | 1| | | 8| 3| | | 1
>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> | Count after eliminating Closed list PR and transferring votes. Candidates
>>> | Closed list PR and Cumulative voting were tied when choosing candidates to
>>> | eliminate. Candidate Closed list PR was chosen by breaking the tie
>>> | randomly.
>>> ===============================================================================
>>> 7| 2| | | | | | 8| 3| | | 2
>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> | Count after eliminating Cumulative voting and transferring votes.
>>> ===============================================================================
>>> 8| | | | | | | 9| 3| | | 3
>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> | Count after eliminating Open list PR and transferring votes. Candidate Meek
>>> | STV is elected.
>>>
>>> Winner is Meek STV.
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------
>>>
>>> Counting votes using Condorcet Voting.
>>>
>>> Pairwise Comparison Matrix:
>>>
>>> |Open|Clos|Mixe|Cumu|Limi|Plur|Meek|WIGM|Othe|Appr
>>> ----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----
>>> Open| 0| 12| 10| 13| 12| 13| 3| 4| 5| 13
>>> Clos| 1| 0| 3| 9| 8| 10| 3| 2| 2| 8
>>> Mixe| 4| 9| 0| 9| 9| 11| 3| 2| 2| 10
>>> Cumu| 1| 2| 3| 0| 8| 10| 1| 1| 1| 8
>>> Limi| 1| 2| 3| 2| 0| 9| 0| 0| 0| 4
>>> Plur| 0| 0| 1| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0
>>> Meek| 10| 9| 10| 11| 11| 11| 0| 9| 8| 11
>>> WIGM| 9| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 3| 0| 8| 12
>>> Othe| 8| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 4| 4| 0| 12
>>> Appr| 2| 4| 3| 3| 7| 9| 2| 2| 2| 0
>>>
>>> Smith Set: Meek STV
>>>
>>> No completion necessary since the Smith set has just one candidate.
>>> Winner is Meek STV.
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------
>>>
>>> Counting votes using Approval Voting.
>>>
>>> Candidate | Count
>>> ===================================
>>> Open list PR | 13
>>> Closed list PR | 10
>>> Mixed member PR | 12
>>> Cumulative voting | 10
>>> Limited voting | 9
>>> Plurality at-large voting | 6
>>> Meek STV | 11
>>> WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 12
>>> Other STV | 12
>>> Approval voting | 9
>>> Exhausted | 0
>>>
>>> Count of all approvals.
>>>
>>> Winner is Open list PR.
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------
>>>
>>> Counting votes using Borda Count.
>>>
>>> Candidate | Count
>>> ===================================
>>> Open list PR | 85
>>> Closed list PR | 46
>>> Mixed member PR | 59
>>> Cumulative voting | 35
>>> Limited voting | 21
>>> Plurality at-large voting | 1
>>> Meek STV | 90
>>> WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 89
>>> Other STV | 85
>>> Approval voting | 34
>>> Exhausted | 130
>>>
>>> Borda count totals.
>>>
>>> Winner is Meek STV.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _________________________________________________________
>>> OpenSTV -- Software for counting STV and ranked-choice voting
>>> OpaVote -- Online elections for ranked-choice voting
>>> http://www.OpenSTV.org
>>> http://www.OpaVote.org
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>> From: "C.Benham" <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>> To: em <election-methods at electorama.com>
>>> Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2011 16:13:22 +1030
>>> Subject: [EM] TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?)
>>>
>>> Mike Ossipoff has been understandably concerned about what he calls the
>>> "Approval
>>> Bad Example" (ABE), as exemplified by
>>>
>>> 49: C (sincere)
>>> 27: A>B (sincere)
>>> 24: B (sincere is B>C, but are trying to steal election from A).
>>>
>>> He considers that a voting method must meet the Favorite Betrayal
>>> Criterion (FBC) and
>>> also he objects to the B voters in the above scenario being rewarded for
>>> their "defection"
>>> from the sincere {A,B} coalition (as they are with any method that meets
>>> both the Plurality
>>> and Minimal Defense criteria).
>>>
>>> I suggest this method to fill the bill. It uses Kevin Venzke's special
>>> "Tied-at-the-Top"
>>> pairwise rule.
>>>
>>> http://wiki.electorama.com/**wiki/index.php?title=Tied_at_**the_top<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=Tied_at_the_top>
>>>
>>> *Voters submit 3-slot ratings ballots, default rating is Bottom
>>> signifying least preferred,
>>> Top rating signifies most preferred, the other ratings slot is Middle.
>>>
>>> According to the "Tied-at-the-Top" pairwise rule (TTP), candidate X
>>> beats candidate Y
>>> if the number of ballots on which X is given a higher rating than Y
>>> *plus the number of
>>> ballots on which X and Y are both rated Top* is greater than the number
>>> of ballots on
>>> which Y is given a higher rating than X.
>>>
>>> (And of course vice versa, so it is possible for any pair of candidates
>>> X and Y that some
>>> ballots show Top rating for both to TTP beat each other).
>>>
>>> If any candidate X TTP beats any candidate Y, is not in turn TTP beaten
>>> by Y and is
>>> not TTP beaten by any candidate Z that doesn't also TTP beat Y, then Y
>>> is disqualified.
>>>
>>> Elect the undisqualified candidate that is rated Top on the highest
>>> number of ballots.*
>>>
>>> I think and hope this meets the FBC. If it can be shown not to then I
>>> will withdraw my
>>> support for it. It meets the Mono-add-Plump and the Plurality criteria.
>>>
>>> In the above example election no candidate is disqualified and C wins.
>>> If the B supporters
>>> vote sincerely then C will be disqualified and A will win.
>>>
>>> My suggested name for this method "Tied at Top Pairwise
>>> Disqualification, Top Ratings"
>>> (TTPD,TR) is currently tentative and unenthusiastic, so if it is agreed
>>> that it meets the FBC
>>> then I'm open to other suggestions.
>>>
>>> Chris Benham
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Election-Methods mailing list
>>> Election-Methods at lists.electorama.com
>>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
>>>
>>>
>>
>
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