[EM] PR election results
Jeffrey O'Neill
jeff.oneill at openstv.org
Mon Nov 21 06:11:24 PST 2011
OpenSTV can't do this automatically, but since the ballots are available
here:
http://www.opavote.org/vote?ekey=agNzdHZyEAsSCEVsZWN0aW9uGJTHHww
you can do it manually:
(1) edit the ballots to keep only the top 3 and do AV to get the
nominations.
(2) use the unedited ballots, withdraw candidates who didn't get nominated,
and count with IRV.
On Mon, Nov 21, 2011 at 9:03 AM, David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com> wrote:
> I was wondering if Jeff O'Neill could illustrate the IRV3/AV3 approach by
> counting only people's top 3 rankings of PR methods and treating the
> rankings as approval votes in a first stage to get three finalists and then
> doing IRV in the second stage?
>
> I voted closed list PR as my 1st, but I want to clarify that I think the
> valuation of election rules should be contextual. I value the use of
> 3-seat LR Hare in "more local" elections that don't typically command very
> much voter interest. In a 3-seat LR Hare, election, there's fewer
> candidates since there's only one per party, so there's fewer voices vying
> for voter attention. And if folks are less likely to do their homework to
> get reasonable rankings of the candidates then it'd be better to give them
> only one vote.
>
> dlw
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: "Jeffrey O'Neill" <jeff.oneill at openstv.org>
> To: election-methods-electorama.com at electorama.com
> Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 21:13:57 -0500
> Subject: [EM] Results of poll for favorite multi-winner voting system
>
> The results for the multi-winner voting system poll are in. Only 15 people
> voted, but the results are interesting nonetheless. The votes were counted
> using instant runoff voting, Condorcet, and the Borda count.
> Instant Runoff Voting
>
> Not surprisingly, Meek STV was the runaway winner, and WIGM STV was a
> solid second place. I do find it interesting that some people prefer WIGM
> STV to Meek STV. Meek is clearly better than WIGM in terms of the quality
> of the proportional representation, but apparently some people find the
> simplicity of WIGM more important.
>
> Open list PR was in third although the one voter for closed list PR had
> Meek as the next choice. Because of the small number of voters we can't
> read much into this though.
> Condorcet
>
> All three STV candidates did well as did open list PR. I find it
> surprising that cumulative voting and limited voting did so poorly since
> these two methods provide reasonable proportional representation and are
> also very easy to count. Approval voting did not do well, likely because it
> does not provide good proportional representation. Plurality at-large
> voting was last on every ballot except that it beat mixed member on one
> ballot.
> Borda Count
>
> The three STV candidates again did very well as well as open list PR. I'm
> surprised that open list PR did so much better than closed list PR as I
> don't find the differences between the two that significant.
> Summary
>
> This was a more difficult poll to run since there are many factors to
> consider in selecting a multi-winner voting system and any particular
> system may be good in some situations but not in others. I personally
> believe that STV, and especially Meek STV, is a good choice in many
> situations, and many others seem to agree.
>
> Thank you for participating in these polls, and feel free to do your own
> polls at opavote.org or to contact me with suggestions for future polls.
> ------------------------------
>
> Counting votes using Instant Runoff Voting.
>
> R|Open l|Closed|Mixed |Cumula|Limite|Plural|Meek S|WIGM S|Other |Approv|Exhaus
> |ist PR| list |member|tive v|d voti|ity at|TV |TV (eg|STV |al vot|ted
> | |PR | PR |oting |ng |-large| |, Scot| |ing |
> | | | | | | votin| |tish S| | |
> | | | | | |g | |TV) | | |
> ===============================================================================
> 1| 1| 1| 1| 1| 0| 0| 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> | Count of first choices.
> ===============================================================================
> 2| 1| 1| 1| 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> | Count after eliminating Limited voting and Plurality at-large voting and
> | transferring votes. Since this is the first elimination round, all
> | candidates without any votes are eliminated.
> ===============================================================================
> 3| 2| 1| | 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> | Count after eliminating Mixed member PR and transferring votes. Candidates
> | Open list PR, Closed list PR, Mixed member PR, Cumulative voting, Other
> | STV, and Approval voting were tied when choosing candidates to eliminate.
> | Candidate Mixed member PR was chosen by breaking the tie randomly.
> ===============================================================================
> 4| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | 1| 0
> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> | Count after eliminating Other STV and transferring votes. Candidates Closed
> | list PR, Cumulative voting, Other STV, and Approval voting were tied when
> | choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Other STV was chosen by
> | breaking the tie randomly.
> ===============================================================================
> 5| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | | 1
> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> | Count after eliminating Approval voting and transferring votes. Candidates
> | Closed list PR, Cumulative voting, and Approval voting were tied when
> | choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Approval voting was chosen by
> | breaking the tie randomly.
> ===============================================================================
> 6| 2| | | 1| | | 8| 3| | | 1
> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> | Count after eliminating Closed list PR and transferring votes. Candidates
> | Closed list PR and Cumulative voting were tied when choosing candidates to
> | eliminate. Candidate Closed list PR was chosen by breaking the tie
> | randomly.
> ===============================================================================
> 7| 2| | | | | | 8| 3| | | 2
> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> | Count after eliminating Cumulative voting and transferring votes.
> ===============================================================================
> 8| | | | | | | 9| 3| | | 3
> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> | Count after eliminating Open list PR and transferring votes. Candidate Meek
> | STV is elected.
>
> Winner is Meek STV.
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Counting votes using Condorcet Voting.
>
> Pairwise Comparison Matrix:
>
> |Open|Clos|Mixe|Cumu|Limi|Plur|Meek|WIGM|Othe|Appr
> ----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----
> Open| 0| 12| 10| 13| 12| 13| 3| 4| 5| 13
> Clos| 1| 0| 3| 9| 8| 10| 3| 2| 2| 8
> Mixe| 4| 9| 0| 9| 9| 11| 3| 2| 2| 10
> Cumu| 1| 2| 3| 0| 8| 10| 1| 1| 1| 8
> Limi| 1| 2| 3| 2| 0| 9| 0| 0| 0| 4
> Plur| 0| 0| 1| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0
> Meek| 10| 9| 10| 11| 11| 11| 0| 9| 8| 11
> WIGM| 9| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 3| 0| 8| 12
> Othe| 8| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 4| 4| 0| 12
> Appr| 2| 4| 3| 3| 7| 9| 2| 2| 2| 0
>
> Smith Set: Meek STV
>
> No completion necessary since the Smith set has just one candidate.
> Winner is Meek STV.
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Counting votes using Approval Voting.
>
> Candidate | Count
> ===================================
> Open list PR | 13
> Closed list PR | 10
> Mixed member PR | 12
> Cumulative voting | 10
> Limited voting | 9
> Plurality at-large voting | 6
> Meek STV | 11
> WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 12
> Other STV | 12
> Approval voting | 9
> Exhausted | 0
>
> Count of all approvals.
>
> Winner is Open list PR.
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Counting votes using Borda Count.
>
> Candidate | Count
> ===================================
> Open list PR | 85
> Closed list PR | 46
> Mixed member PR | 59
> Cumulative voting | 35
> Limited voting | 21
> Plurality at-large voting | 1
> Meek STV | 90
> WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 89
> Other STV | 85
> Approval voting | 34
> Exhausted | 130
>
> Borda count totals.
>
> Winner is Meek STV.
>
>
>
> _________________________________________________________
> OpenSTV -- Software for counting STV and ranked-choice voting
> OpaVote -- Online elections for ranked-choice voting
> http://www.OpenSTV.org <http://www.openstv.org/>
> http://www.OpaVote.org <http://www.opavote.org/>
>
> On Sun, Nov 20, 2011 at 11:43 PM, <
> election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
>
>> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to
>> election-methods at lists.electorama.com
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>> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..."
>>
>> Today's Topics:
>>
>> 1. Markus: Re: Beatpath as a proposal in the U.S. (MIKE OSSIPOFF)
>> 2. Refinements to definition of voting x over y (MIKE OSSIPOFF)
>> 3. Results of poll for favorite multi-winner voting system
>> (Jeffrey O'Neill)
>> 4. TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?) (C.Benham)
>>
>>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
>> To: <election-methods at electorama.com>
>> Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 20:57:52 +0000
>> Subject: [EM] Markus: Re: Beatpath as a proposal in the U.S.
>> Markus:
>>
>> You wrote:
>>
>> The Schulze method is currently used by more than
>> 50 organizations with more than 70,000 members in
>> total.
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> Organizations aren't the general public. Certainly the fancier Condorcet
>> methods have been adopted by some organizations (and rejected by others
>> due to complexity). That doesn't mean that the person on the streetcorner
>> accepts them.
>>
>> The requirements for a public proposal are entirely different than for
>> some organizations.
>>
>> Also, it depends on whether a particular country's "public" is already
>> familiar with
>> electoral systems more complicated than Plurality.
>>
>> You continued:
>>
>> Of all Condorcet methods, that are currently discussed,
>> the Schulze method is that method that has the best
>> chances of getting adopted.
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> Methods that meet Condorcet's Criterion fail FBC.
>>
>> I've told why FBC is necessary for the U.S.
>>
>> Aside from that, for the above-stated reasons, Beatpath has far less
>> chance of adoption in the U.S
>> than MTA or Approval.
>>
>> ...Or even ABucklin. Bucklin was adopted, and used to be used, by some
>> U.S. cities or counties.
>>
>> Mike Ossipoff
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
>> To: <election-methods at electorama.com>
>> Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 21:47:07 +0000
>> Subject: [EM] Refinements to definition of voting x over y
>>
>>
>> My definition of voting one x over y was:
>>
>> You're voting x over y if switching x and y on your ballot is more likely
>> to change the winnner from x to y than from y to x.
>>
>> [end of definition of voting x over y]
>>
>>
>> I should add the clause "...if there is no information about other
>> voters' ballots."
>>
>> Of course that isn't a problem if "more likely" is defined or replaced by
>> "consistent with more possible configurations
>> of other voters' ballots".
>>
>> If there's any question of what "switching x and y on your ballot" means,
>> it could be changed to "switching the _names
>> of_ x and y on your ballot", or "voting x exactly as you were voting y,
>> and voting y exactly as you were votinlg x".
>>
>> Mike Ossipoff
>>
>>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>> From: "Jeffrey O'Neill" <jeff.oneill at openstv.org>
>> To: election-methods-electorama.com at electorama.com
>> Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 21:13:57 -0500
>> Subject: [EM] Results of poll for favorite multi-winner voting system
>>
>> The results for the multi-winner voting system poll are in. Only 15
>> people voted, but the results are interesting nonetheless. The votes were
>> counted using instant runoff voting, Condorcet, and the Borda count.
>> Instant Runoff Voting
>>
>> Not surprisingly, Meek STV was the runaway winner, and WIGM STV was a
>> solid second place. I do find it interesting that some people prefer WIGM
>> STV to Meek STV. Meek is clearly better than WIGM in terms of the quality
>> of the proportional representation, but apparently some people find the
>> simplicity of WIGM more important.
>>
>> Open list PR was in third although the one voter for closed list PR had
>> Meek as the next choice. Because of the small number of voters we can't
>> read much into this though.
>> Condorcet
>>
>> All three STV candidates did well as did open list PR. I find it
>> surprising that cumulative voting and limited voting did so poorly since
>> these two methods provide reasonable proportional representation and are
>> also very easy to count. Approval voting did not do well, likely because it
>> does not provide good proportional representation. Plurality at-large
>> voting was last on every ballot except that it beat mixed member on one
>> ballot.
>> Borda Count
>>
>> The three STV candidates again did very well as well as open list PR. I'm
>> surprised that open list PR did so much better than closed list PR as I
>> don't find the differences between the two that significant.
>> Summary
>>
>> This was a more difficult poll to run since there are many factors to
>> consider in selecting a multi-winner voting system and any particular
>> system may be good in some situations but not in others. I personally
>> believe that STV, and especially Meek STV, is a good choice in many
>> situations, and many others seem to agree.
>>
>> Thank you for participating in these polls, and feel free to do your own
>> polls at opavote.org or to contact me with suggestions for future polls.
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> Counting votes using Instant Runoff Voting.
>>
>> R|Open l|Closed|Mixed |Cumula|Limite|Plural|Meek S|WIGM S|Other |Approv|Exhaus
>> |ist PR| list |member|tive v|d voti|ity at|TV |TV (eg|STV |al vot|ted
>> | |PR | PR |oting |ng |-large| |, Scot| |ing |
>> | | | | | | votin| |tish S| | |
>> | | | | | |g | |TV) | | |
>> ===============================================================================
>> 1| 1| 1| 1| 1| 0| 0| 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> | Count of first choices.
>> ===============================================================================
>> 2| 1| 1| 1| 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> | Count after eliminating Limited voting and Plurality at-large voting and
>> | transferring votes. Since this is the first elimination round, all
>> | candidates without any votes are eliminated.
>> ===============================================================================
>> 3| 2| 1| | 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> | Count after eliminating Mixed member PR and transferring votes. Candidates
>> | Open list PR, Closed list PR, Mixed member PR, Cumulative voting, Other
>> | STV, and Approval voting were tied when choosing candidates to eliminate.
>> | Candidate Mixed member PR was chosen by breaking the tie randomly.
>> ===============================================================================
>> 4| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | 1| 0
>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> | Count after eliminating Other STV and transferring votes. Candidates Closed
>> | list PR, Cumulative voting, Other STV, and Approval voting were tied when
>> | choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Other STV was chosen by
>> | breaking the tie randomly.
>> ===============================================================================
>> 5| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | | 1
>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> | Count after eliminating Approval voting and transferring votes. Candidates
>> | Closed list PR, Cumulative voting, and Approval voting were tied when
>> | choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Approval voting was chosen by
>> | breaking the tie randomly.
>> ===============================================================================
>> 6| 2| | | 1| | | 8| 3| | | 1
>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> | Count after eliminating Closed list PR and transferring votes. Candidates
>> | Closed list PR and Cumulative voting were tied when choosing candidates to
>> | eliminate. Candidate Closed list PR was chosen by breaking the tie
>> | randomly.
>> ===============================================================================
>> 7| 2| | | | | | 8| 3| | | 2
>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> | Count after eliminating Cumulative voting and transferring votes.
>> ===============================================================================
>> 8| | | | | | | 9| 3| | | 3
>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> | Count after eliminating Open list PR and transferring votes. Candidate Meek
>> | STV is elected.
>>
>> Winner is Meek STV.
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> Counting votes using Condorcet Voting.
>>
>> Pairwise Comparison Matrix:
>>
>> |Open|Clos|Mixe|Cumu|Limi|Plur|Meek|WIGM|Othe|Appr
>> ----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----
>> Open| 0| 12| 10| 13| 12| 13| 3| 4| 5| 13
>> Clos| 1| 0| 3| 9| 8| 10| 3| 2| 2| 8
>> Mixe| 4| 9| 0| 9| 9| 11| 3| 2| 2| 10
>> Cumu| 1| 2| 3| 0| 8| 10| 1| 1| 1| 8
>> Limi| 1| 2| 3| 2| 0| 9| 0| 0| 0| 4
>> Plur| 0| 0| 1| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0
>> Meek| 10| 9| 10| 11| 11| 11| 0| 9| 8| 11
>> WIGM| 9| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 3| 0| 8| 12
>> Othe| 8| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 4| 4| 0| 12
>> Appr| 2| 4| 3| 3| 7| 9| 2| 2| 2| 0
>>
>> Smith Set: Meek STV
>>
>> No completion necessary since the Smith set has just one candidate.
>> Winner is Meek STV.
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> Counting votes using Approval Voting.
>>
>> Candidate | Count
>> ===================================
>> Open list PR | 13
>> Closed list PR | 10
>> Mixed member PR | 12
>> Cumulative voting | 10
>> Limited voting | 9
>> Plurality at-large voting | 6
>> Meek STV | 11
>> WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 12
>> Other STV | 12
>> Approval voting | 9
>> Exhausted | 0
>>
>> Count of all approvals.
>>
>> Winner is Open list PR.
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> Counting votes using Borda Count.
>>
>> Candidate | Count
>> ===================================
>> Open list PR | 85
>> Closed list PR | 46
>> Mixed member PR | 59
>> Cumulative voting | 35
>> Limited voting | 21
>> Plurality at-large voting | 1
>> Meek STV | 90
>> WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 89
>> Other STV | 85
>> Approval voting | 34
>> Exhausted | 130
>>
>> Borda count totals.
>>
>> Winner is Meek STV.
>>
>>
>>
>> _________________________________________________________
>> OpenSTV -- Software for counting STV and ranked-choice voting
>> OpaVote -- Online elections for ranked-choice voting
>> http://www.OpenSTV.org
>> http://www.OpaVote.org
>>
>>
>>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>> From: "C.Benham" <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>> To: em <election-methods at electorama.com>
>> Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2011 16:13:22 +1030
>> Subject: [EM] TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?)
>>
>> Mike Ossipoff has been understandably concerned about what he calls the
>> "Approval
>> Bad Example" (ABE), as exemplified by
>>
>> 49: C (sincere)
>> 27: A>B (sincere)
>> 24: B (sincere is B>C, but are trying to steal election from A).
>>
>> He considers that a voting method must meet the Favorite Betrayal
>> Criterion (FBC) and
>> also he objects to the B voters in the above scenario being rewarded for
>> their "defection"
>> from the sincere {A,B} coalition (as they are with any method that meets
>> both the Plurality
>> and Minimal Defense criteria).
>>
>> I suggest this method to fill the bill. It uses Kevin Venzke's special
>> "Tied-at-the-Top"
>> pairwise rule.
>>
>> http://wiki.electorama.com/**wiki/index.php?title=Tied_at_**the_top<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=Tied_at_the_top>
>>
>> *Voters submit 3-slot ratings ballots, default rating is Bottom
>> signifying least preferred,
>> Top rating signifies most preferred, the other ratings slot is Middle.
>>
>> According to the "Tied-at-the-Top" pairwise rule (TTP), candidate X beats
>> candidate Y
>> if the number of ballots on which X is given a higher rating than Y
>> *plus the number of
>> ballots on which X and Y are both rated Top* is greater than the number
>> of ballots on
>> which Y is given a higher rating than X.
>>
>> (And of course vice versa, so it is possible for any pair of candidates X
>> and Y that some
>> ballots show Top rating for both to TTP beat each other).
>>
>> If any candidate X TTP beats any candidate Y, is not in turn TTP beaten
>> by Y and is
>> not TTP beaten by any candidate Z that doesn't also TTP beat Y, then Y is
>> disqualified.
>>
>> Elect the undisqualified candidate that is rated Top on the highest
>> number of ballots.*
>>
>> I think and hope this meets the FBC. If it can be shown not to then I
>> will withdraw my
>> support for it. It meets the Mono-add-Plump and the Plurality criteria.
>>
>> In the above example election no candidate is disqualified and C wins. If
>> the B supporters
>> vote sincerely then C will be disqualified and A will win.
>>
>> My suggested name for this method "Tied at Top Pairwise
>> Disqualification, Top Ratings"
>> (TTPD,TR) is currently tentative and unenthusiastic, so if it is agreed
>> that it meets the FBC
>> then I'm open to other suggestions.
>>
>> Chris Benham
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Election-Methods mailing list
>> Election-Methods at lists.electorama.com
>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
>>
>>
>
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