[EM] PR election results
David L Wetzell
wetzelld at gmail.com
Mon Nov 21 06:03:59 PST 2011
I was wondering if Jeff O'Neill could illustrate the IRV3/AV3 approach by
counting only people's top 3 rankings of PR methods and treating the
rankings as approval votes in a first stage to get three finalists and then
doing IRV in the second stage?
I voted closed list PR as my 1st, but I want to clarify that I think the
valuation of election rules should be contextual. I value the use of
3-seat LR Hare in "more local" elections that don't typically command very
much voter interest. In a 3-seat LR Hare, election, there's fewer
candidates since there's only one per party, so there's fewer voices vying
for voter attention. And if folks are less likely to do their homework to
get reasonable rankings of the candidates then it'd be better to give them
only one vote.
dlw
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: "Jeffrey O'Neill" <jeff.oneill at openstv.org>
To: election-methods-electorama.com at electorama.com
Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 21:13:57 -0500
Subject: [EM] Results of poll for favorite multi-winner voting system
The results for the multi-winner voting system poll are in. Only 15 people
voted, but the results are interesting nonetheless. The votes were counted
using instant runoff voting, Condorcet, and the Borda count.
Instant Runoff Voting
Not surprisingly, Meek STV was the runaway winner, and WIGM STV was a solid
second place. I do find it interesting that some people prefer WIGM STV to
Meek STV. Meek is clearly better than WIGM in terms of the quality of the
proportional representation, but apparently some people find the simplicity
of WIGM more important.
Open list PR was in third although the one voter for closed list PR had
Meek as the next choice. Because of the small number of voters we can't
read much into this though.
Condorcet
All three STV candidates did well as did open list PR. I find it surprising
that cumulative voting and limited voting did so poorly since these two
methods provide reasonable proportional representation and are also very
easy to count. Approval voting did not do well, likely because it does not
provide good proportional representation. Plurality at-large voting was
last on every ballot except that it beat mixed member on one ballot.
Borda Count
The three STV candidates again did very well as well as open list PR. I'm
surprised that open list PR did so much better than closed list PR as I
don't find the differences between the two that significant.
Summary
This was a more difficult poll to run since there are many factors to
consider in selecting a multi-winner voting system and any particular
system may be good in some situations but not in others. I personally
believe that STV, and especially Meek STV, is a good choice in many
situations, and many others seem to agree.
Thank you for participating in these polls, and feel free to do your own
polls at opavote.org or to contact me with suggestions for future polls.
------------------------------
Counting votes using Instant Runoff Voting.
R|Open l|Closed|Mixed |Cumula|Limite|Plural|Meek S|WIGM S|Other |Approv|Exhaus
|ist PR| list |member|tive v|d voti|ity at|TV |TV (eg|STV |al vot|ted
| |PR | PR |oting |ng |-large| |, Scot| |ing |
| | | | | | votin| |tish S| | |
| | | | | |g | |TV) | | |
===============================================================================
1| 1| 1| 1| 1| 0| 0| 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Count of first choices.
===============================================================================
2| 1| 1| 1| 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Count after eliminating Limited voting and Plurality at-large voting and
| transferring votes. Since this is the first elimination round, all
| candidates without any votes are eliminated.
===============================================================================
3| 2| 1| | 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Count after eliminating Mixed member PR and transferring votes. Candidates
| Open list PR, Closed list PR, Mixed member PR, Cumulative voting, Other
| STV, and Approval voting were tied when choosing candidates to eliminate.
| Candidate Mixed member PR was chosen by breaking the tie randomly.
===============================================================================
4| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | 1| 0
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Count after eliminating Other STV and transferring votes. Candidates Closed
| list PR, Cumulative voting, Other STV, and Approval voting were tied when
| choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Other STV was chosen by
| breaking the tie randomly.
===============================================================================
5| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | | 1
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Count after eliminating Approval voting and transferring votes. Candidates
| Closed list PR, Cumulative voting, and Approval voting were tied when
| choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Approval voting was chosen by
| breaking the tie randomly.
===============================================================================
6| 2| | | 1| | | 8| 3| | | 1
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Count after eliminating Closed list PR and transferring votes. Candidates
| Closed list PR and Cumulative voting were tied when choosing candidates to
| eliminate. Candidate Closed list PR was chosen by breaking the tie
| randomly.
===============================================================================
7| 2| | | | | | 8| 3| | | 2
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Count after eliminating Cumulative voting and transferring votes.
===============================================================================
8| | | | | | | 9| 3| | | 3
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Count after eliminating Open list PR and transferring votes. Candidate Meek
| STV is elected.
Winner is Meek STV.
------------------------------
Counting votes using Condorcet Voting.
Pairwise Comparison Matrix:
|Open|Clos|Mixe|Cumu|Limi|Plur|Meek|WIGM|Othe|Appr
----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----
Open| 0| 12| 10| 13| 12| 13| 3| 4| 5| 13
Clos| 1| 0| 3| 9| 8| 10| 3| 2| 2| 8
Mixe| 4| 9| 0| 9| 9| 11| 3| 2| 2| 10
Cumu| 1| 2| 3| 0| 8| 10| 1| 1| 1| 8
Limi| 1| 2| 3| 2| 0| 9| 0| 0| 0| 4
Plur| 0| 0| 1| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0
Meek| 10| 9| 10| 11| 11| 11| 0| 9| 8| 11
WIGM| 9| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 3| 0| 8| 12
Othe| 8| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 4| 4| 0| 12
Appr| 2| 4| 3| 3| 7| 9| 2| 2| 2| 0
Smith Set: Meek STV
No completion necessary since the Smith set has just one candidate.
Winner is Meek STV.
------------------------------
Counting votes using Approval Voting.
Candidate | Count
===================================
Open list PR | 13
Closed list PR | 10
Mixed member PR | 12
Cumulative voting | 10
Limited voting | 9
Plurality at-large voting | 6
Meek STV | 11
WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 12
Other STV | 12
Approval voting | 9
Exhausted | 0
Count of all approvals.
Winner is Open list PR.
------------------------------
Counting votes using Borda Count.
Candidate | Count
===================================
Open list PR | 85
Closed list PR | 46
Mixed member PR | 59
Cumulative voting | 35
Limited voting | 21
Plurality at-large voting | 1
Meek STV | 90
WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 89
Other STV | 85
Approval voting | 34
Exhausted | 130
Borda count totals.
Winner is Meek STV.
_________________________________________________________
OpenSTV -- Software for counting STV and ranked-choice voting
OpaVote -- Online elections for ranked-choice voting
http://www.OpenSTV.org <http://www.openstv.org/>
http://www.OpaVote.org <http://www.opavote.org/>
On Sun, Nov 20, 2011 at 11:43 PM, <
election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to
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> Today's Topics:
>
> 1. Markus: Re: Beatpath as a proposal in the U.S. (MIKE OSSIPOFF)
> 2. Refinements to definition of voting x over y (MIKE OSSIPOFF)
> 3. Results of poll for favorite multi-winner voting system
> (Jeffrey O'Neill)
> 4. TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?) (C.Benham)
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
> To: <election-methods at electorama.com>
> Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 20:57:52 +0000
> Subject: [EM] Markus: Re: Beatpath as a proposal in the U.S.
> Markus:
>
> You wrote:
>
> The Schulze method is currently used by more than
> 50 organizations with more than 70,000 members in
> total.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Organizations aren't the general public. Certainly the fancier Condorcet
> methods have been adopted by some organizations (and rejected by others
> due to complexity). That doesn't mean that the person on the streetcorner
> accepts them.
>
> The requirements for a public proposal are entirely different than for
> some organizations.
>
> Also, it depends on whether a particular country's "public" is already
> familiar with
> electoral systems more complicated than Plurality.
>
> You continued:
>
> Of all Condorcet methods, that are currently discussed,
> the Schulze method is that method that has the best
> chances of getting adopted.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Methods that meet Condorcet's Criterion fail FBC.
>
> I've told why FBC is necessary for the U.S.
>
> Aside from that, for the above-stated reasons, Beatpath has far less
> chance of adoption in the U.S
> than MTA or Approval.
>
> ...Or even ABucklin. Bucklin was adopted, and used to be used, by some
> U.S. cities or counties.
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
> To: <election-methods at electorama.com>
> Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 21:47:07 +0000
> Subject: [EM] Refinements to definition of voting x over y
>
>
> My definition of voting one x over y was:
>
> You're voting x over y if switching x and y on your ballot is more likely
> to change the winnner from x to y than from y to x.
>
> [end of definition of voting x over y]
>
>
> I should add the clause "...if there is no information about other voters'
> ballots."
>
> Of course that isn't a problem if "more likely" is defined or replaced by
> "consistent with more possible configurations
> of other voters' ballots".
>
> If there's any question of what "switching x and y on your ballot" means,
> it could be changed to "switching the _names
> of_ x and y on your ballot", or "voting x exactly as you were voting y,
> and voting y exactly as you were votinlg x".
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: "Jeffrey O'Neill" <jeff.oneill at openstv.org>
> To: election-methods-electorama.com at electorama.com
> Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 21:13:57 -0500
> Subject: [EM] Results of poll for favorite multi-winner voting system
>
> The results for the multi-winner voting system poll are in. Only 15 people
> voted, but the results are interesting nonetheless. The votes were counted
> using instant runoff voting, Condorcet, and the Borda count.
> Instant Runoff Voting
>
> Not surprisingly, Meek STV was the runaway winner, and WIGM STV was a
> solid second place. I do find it interesting that some people prefer WIGM
> STV to Meek STV. Meek is clearly better than WIGM in terms of the quality
> of the proportional representation, but apparently some people find the
> simplicity of WIGM more important.
>
> Open list PR was in third although the one voter for closed list PR had
> Meek as the next choice. Because of the small number of voters we can't
> read much into this though.
> Condorcet
>
> All three STV candidates did well as did open list PR. I find it
> surprising that cumulative voting and limited voting did so poorly since
> these two methods provide reasonable proportional representation and are
> also very easy to count. Approval voting did not do well, likely because it
> does not provide good proportional representation. Plurality at-large
> voting was last on every ballot except that it beat mixed member on one
> ballot.
> Borda Count
>
> The three STV candidates again did very well as well as open list PR. I'm
> surprised that open list PR did so much better than closed list PR as I
> don't find the differences between the two that significant.
> Summary
>
> This was a more difficult poll to run since there are many factors to
> consider in selecting a multi-winner voting system and any particular
> system may be good in some situations but not in others. I personally
> believe that STV, and especially Meek STV, is a good choice in many
> situations, and many others seem to agree.
>
> Thank you for participating in these polls, and feel free to do your own
> polls at opavote.org or to contact me with suggestions for future polls.
> ------------------------------
>
> Counting votes using Instant Runoff Voting.
>
> R|Open l|Closed|Mixed |Cumula|Limite|Plural|Meek S|WIGM S|Other |Approv|Exhaus
> |ist PR| list |member|tive v|d voti|ity at|TV |TV (eg|STV |al vot|ted
> | |PR | PR |oting |ng |-large| |, Scot| |ing |
> | | | | | | votin| |tish S| | |
> | | | | | |g | |TV) | | |
> ===============================================================================
> 1| 1| 1| 1| 1| 0| 0| 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> | Count of first choices.
> ===============================================================================
> 2| 1| 1| 1| 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> | Count after eliminating Limited voting and Plurality at-large voting and
> | transferring votes. Since this is the first elimination round, all
> | candidates without any votes are eliminated.
> ===============================================================================
> 3| 2| 1| | 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> | Count after eliminating Mixed member PR and transferring votes. Candidates
> | Open list PR, Closed list PR, Mixed member PR, Cumulative voting, Other
> | STV, and Approval voting were tied when choosing candidates to eliminate.
> | Candidate Mixed member PR was chosen by breaking the tie randomly.
> ===============================================================================
> 4| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | 1| 0
> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> | Count after eliminating Other STV and transferring votes. Candidates Closed
> | list PR, Cumulative voting, Other STV, and Approval voting were tied when
> | choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Other STV was chosen by
> | breaking the tie randomly.
> ===============================================================================
> 5| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | | 1
> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> | Count after eliminating Approval voting and transferring votes. Candidates
> | Closed list PR, Cumulative voting, and Approval voting were tied when
> | choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Approval voting was chosen by
> | breaking the tie randomly.
> ===============================================================================
> 6| 2| | | 1| | | 8| 3| | | 1
> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> | Count after eliminating Closed list PR and transferring votes. Candidates
> | Closed list PR and Cumulative voting were tied when choosing candidates to
> | eliminate. Candidate Closed list PR was chosen by breaking the tie
> | randomly.
> ===============================================================================
> 7| 2| | | | | | 8| 3| | | 2
> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> | Count after eliminating Cumulative voting and transferring votes.
> ===============================================================================
> 8| | | | | | | 9| 3| | | 3
> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> | Count after eliminating Open list PR and transferring votes. Candidate Meek
> | STV is elected.
>
> Winner is Meek STV.
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Counting votes using Condorcet Voting.
>
> Pairwise Comparison Matrix:
>
> |Open|Clos|Mixe|Cumu|Limi|Plur|Meek|WIGM|Othe|Appr
> ----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----
> Open| 0| 12| 10| 13| 12| 13| 3| 4| 5| 13
> Clos| 1| 0| 3| 9| 8| 10| 3| 2| 2| 8
> Mixe| 4| 9| 0| 9| 9| 11| 3| 2| 2| 10
> Cumu| 1| 2| 3| 0| 8| 10| 1| 1| 1| 8
> Limi| 1| 2| 3| 2| 0| 9| 0| 0| 0| 4
> Plur| 0| 0| 1| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0
> Meek| 10| 9| 10| 11| 11| 11| 0| 9| 8| 11
> WIGM| 9| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 3| 0| 8| 12
> Othe| 8| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 4| 4| 0| 12
> Appr| 2| 4| 3| 3| 7| 9| 2| 2| 2| 0
>
> Smith Set: Meek STV
>
> No completion necessary since the Smith set has just one candidate.
> Winner is Meek STV.
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Counting votes using Approval Voting.
>
> Candidate | Count
> ===================================
> Open list PR | 13
> Closed list PR | 10
> Mixed member PR | 12
> Cumulative voting | 10
> Limited voting | 9
> Plurality at-large voting | 6
> Meek STV | 11
> WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 12
> Other STV | 12
> Approval voting | 9
> Exhausted | 0
>
> Count of all approvals.
>
> Winner is Open list PR.
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Counting votes using Borda Count.
>
> Candidate | Count
> ===================================
> Open list PR | 85
> Closed list PR | 46
> Mixed member PR | 59
> Cumulative voting | 35
> Limited voting | 21
> Plurality at-large voting | 1
> Meek STV | 90
> WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 89
> Other STV | 85
> Approval voting | 34
> Exhausted | 130
>
> Borda count totals.
>
> Winner is Meek STV.
>
>
>
> _________________________________________________________
> OpenSTV -- Software for counting STV and ranked-choice voting
> OpaVote -- Online elections for ranked-choice voting
> http://www.OpenSTV.org
> http://www.OpaVote.org
>
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: "C.Benham" <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
> To: em <election-methods at electorama.com>
> Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2011 16:13:22 +1030
> Subject: [EM] TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?)
>
> Mike Ossipoff has been understandably concerned about what he calls the
> "Approval
> Bad Example" (ABE), as exemplified by
>
> 49: C (sincere)
> 27: A>B (sincere)
> 24: B (sincere is B>C, but are trying to steal election from A).
>
> He considers that a voting method must meet the Favorite Betrayal
> Criterion (FBC) and
> also he objects to the B voters in the above scenario being rewarded for
> their "defection"
> from the sincere {A,B} coalition (as they are with any method that meets
> both the Plurality
> and Minimal Defense criteria).
>
> I suggest this method to fill the bill. It uses Kevin Venzke's special
> "Tied-at-the-Top"
> pairwise rule.
>
> http://wiki.electorama.com/**wiki/index.php?title=Tied_at_**the_top<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=Tied_at_the_top>
>
> *Voters submit 3-slot ratings ballots, default rating is Bottom signifying
> least preferred,
> Top rating signifies most preferred, the other ratings slot is Middle.
>
> According to the "Tied-at-the-Top" pairwise rule (TTP), candidate X beats
> candidate Y
> if the number of ballots on which X is given a higher rating than Y *plus
> the number of
> ballots on which X and Y are both rated Top* is greater than the number of
> ballots on
> which Y is given a higher rating than X.
>
> (And of course vice versa, so it is possible for any pair of candidates X
> and Y that some
> ballots show Top rating for both to TTP beat each other).
>
> If any candidate X TTP beats any candidate Y, is not in turn TTP beaten
> by Y and is
> not TTP beaten by any candidate Z that doesn't also TTP beat Y, then Y is
> disqualified.
>
> Elect the undisqualified candidate that is rated Top on the highest
> number of ballots.*
>
> I think and hope this meets the FBC. If it can be shown not to then I
> will withdraw my
> support for it. It meets the Mono-add-Plump and the Plurality criteria.
>
> In the above example election no candidate is disqualified and C wins. If
> the B supporters
> vote sincerely then C will be disqualified and A will win.
>
> My suggested name for this method "Tied at Top Pairwise Disqualification,
> Top Ratings"
> (TTPD,TR) is currently tentative and unenthusiastic, so if it is agreed
> that it meets the FBC
> then I'm open to other suggestions.
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Election-Methods mailing list
> Election-Methods at lists.electorama.com
> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
>
>
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