[EM] PR election results
Jeffrey O'Neill
jeff.oneill at openstv.org
Mon Nov 21 06:25:53 PST 2011
Yes, to buy the OpenSTV software you need to pay $5.
On Mon, Nov 21, 2011 at 9:14 AM, David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com> wrote:
> a las, I had trouble accessing the vote outcomes.
> I need to purchase the software, right?
>
> dlw
>
>
> On Mon, Nov 21, 2011 at 8:11 AM, Jeffrey O'Neill <jeff.oneill at openstv.org>wrote:
>
>> OpenSTV can't do this automatically, but since the ballots are available
>> here:
>> http://www.opavote.org/vote?ekey=agNzdHZyEAsSCEVsZWN0aW9uGJTHHww
>> you can do it manually:
>> (1) edit the ballots to keep only the top 3 and do AV to get the
>> nominations.
>> (2) use the unedited ballots, withdraw candidates who didn't get
>> nominated, and count with IRV.
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Nov 21, 2011 at 9:03 AM, David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>wrote:
>>
>>> I was wondering if Jeff O'Neill could illustrate the IRV3/AV3 approach
>>> by counting only people's top 3 rankings of PR methods and treating the
>>> rankings as approval votes in a first stage to get three finalists and then
>>> doing IRV in the second stage?
>>>
>>> I voted closed list PR as my 1st, but I want to clarify that I think the
>>> valuation of election rules should be contextual. I value the use of
>>> 3-seat LR Hare in "more local" elections that don't typically command very
>>> much voter interest. In a 3-seat LR Hare, election, there's fewer
>>> candidates since there's only one per party, so there's fewer voices vying
>>> for voter attention. And if folks are less likely to do their homework to
>>> get reasonable rankings of the candidates then it'd be better to give them
>>> only one vote.
>>>
>>> dlw
>>>
>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>> From: "Jeffrey O'Neill" <jeff.oneill at openstv.org>
>>> To: election-methods-electorama.com at electorama.com
>>> Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 21:13:57 -0500
>>> Subject: [EM] Results of poll for favorite multi-winner voting system
>>>
>>> The results for the multi-winner voting system poll are in. Only 15
>>> people voted, but the results are interesting nonetheless. The votes were
>>> counted using instant runoff voting, Condorcet, and the Borda count.
>>> Instant Runoff Voting
>>>
>>> Not surprisingly, Meek STV was the runaway winner, and WIGM STV was a
>>> solid second place. I do find it interesting that some people prefer WIGM
>>> STV to Meek STV. Meek is clearly better than WIGM in terms of the quality
>>> of the proportional representation, but apparently some people find the
>>> simplicity of WIGM more important.
>>>
>>> Open list PR was in third although the one voter for closed list PR had
>>> Meek as the next choice. Because of the small number of voters we can't
>>> read much into this though.
>>> Condorcet
>>>
>>> All three STV candidates did well as did open list PR. I find it
>>> surprising that cumulative voting and limited voting did so poorly since
>>> these two methods provide reasonable proportional representation and are
>>> also very easy to count. Approval voting did not do well, likely because it
>>> does not provide good proportional representation. Plurality at-large
>>> voting was last on every ballot except that it beat mixed member on one
>>> ballot.
>>> Borda Count
>>>
>>> The three STV candidates again did very well as well as open list PR.
>>> I'm surprised that open list PR did so much better than closed list PR as I
>>> don't find the differences between the two that significant.
>>> Summary
>>>
>>> This was a more difficult poll to run since there are many factors to
>>> consider in selecting a multi-winner voting system and any particular
>>> system may be good in some situations but not in others. I personally
>>> believe that STV, and especially Meek STV, is a good choice in many
>>> situations, and many others seem to agree.
>>>
>>> Thank you for participating in these polls, and feel free to do your own
>>> polls at opavote.org or to contact me with suggestions for future polls.
>>> ------------------------------
>>>
>>> Counting votes using Instant Runoff Voting.
>>>
>>> R|Open l|Closed|Mixed |Cumula|Limite|Plural|Meek S|WIGM S|Other |Approv|Exhaus
>>> |ist PR| list |member|tive v|d voti|ity at|TV |TV (eg|STV |al vot|ted
>>> | |PR | PR |oting |ng |-large| |, Scot| |ing |
>>> | | | | | | votin| |tish S| | |
>>> | | | | | |g | |TV) | | |
>>> ===============================================================================
>>> 1| 1| 1| 1| 1| 0| 0| 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> | Count of first choices.
>>> ===============================================================================
>>> 2| 1| 1| 1| 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> | Count after eliminating Limited voting and Plurality at-large voting and
>>> | transferring votes. Since this is the first elimination round, all
>>> | candidates without any votes are eliminated.
>>> ===============================================================================
>>> 3| 2| 1| | 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> | Count after eliminating Mixed member PR and transferring votes. Candidates
>>> | Open list PR, Closed list PR, Mixed member PR, Cumulative voting, Other
>>> | STV, and Approval voting were tied when choosing candidates to eliminate.
>>> | Candidate Mixed member PR was chosen by breaking the tie randomly.
>>> ===============================================================================
>>> 4| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | 1| 0
>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> | Count after eliminating Other STV and transferring votes. Candidates Closed
>>> | list PR, Cumulative voting, Other STV, and Approval voting were tied when
>>> | choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Other STV was chosen by
>>> | breaking the tie randomly.
>>> ===============================================================================
>>> 5| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | | 1
>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> | Count after eliminating Approval voting and transferring votes. Candidates
>>> | Closed list PR, Cumulative voting, and Approval voting were tied when
>>> | choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Approval voting was chosen by
>>> | breaking the tie randomly.
>>> ===============================================================================
>>> 6| 2| | | 1| | | 8| 3| | | 1
>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> | Count after eliminating Closed list PR and transferring votes. Candidates
>>> | Closed list PR and Cumulative voting were tied when choosing candidates to
>>> | eliminate. Candidate Closed list PR was chosen by breaking the tie
>>> | randomly.
>>> ===============================================================================
>>> 7| 2| | | | | | 8| 3| | | 2
>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> | Count after eliminating Cumulative voting and transferring votes.
>>> ===============================================================================
>>> 8| | | | | | | 9| 3| | | 3
>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> | Count after eliminating Open list PR and transferring votes. Candidate Meek
>>> | STV is elected.
>>>
>>> Winner is Meek STV.
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------
>>>
>>> Counting votes using Condorcet Voting.
>>>
>>> Pairwise Comparison Matrix:
>>>
>>> |Open|Clos|Mixe|Cumu|Limi|Plur|Meek|WIGM|Othe|Appr
>>> ----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----
>>> Open| 0| 12| 10| 13| 12| 13| 3| 4| 5| 13
>>> Clos| 1| 0| 3| 9| 8| 10| 3| 2| 2| 8
>>> Mixe| 4| 9| 0| 9| 9| 11| 3| 2| 2| 10
>>> Cumu| 1| 2| 3| 0| 8| 10| 1| 1| 1| 8
>>> Limi| 1| 2| 3| 2| 0| 9| 0| 0| 0| 4
>>> Plur| 0| 0| 1| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0
>>> Meek| 10| 9| 10| 11| 11| 11| 0| 9| 8| 11
>>> WIGM| 9| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 3| 0| 8| 12
>>> Othe| 8| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 4| 4| 0| 12
>>> Appr| 2| 4| 3| 3| 7| 9| 2| 2| 2| 0
>>>
>>> Smith Set: Meek STV
>>>
>>> No completion necessary since the Smith set has just one candidate.
>>> Winner is Meek STV.
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------
>>>
>>> Counting votes using Approval Voting.
>>>
>>> Candidate | Count
>>> ===================================
>>> Open list PR | 13
>>> Closed list PR | 10
>>> Mixed member PR | 12
>>> Cumulative voting | 10
>>> Limited voting | 9
>>> Plurality at-large voting | 6
>>> Meek STV | 11
>>> WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 12
>>> Other STV | 12
>>> Approval voting | 9
>>> Exhausted | 0
>>>
>>> Count of all approvals.
>>>
>>> Winner is Open list PR.
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------
>>>
>>> Counting votes using Borda Count.
>>>
>>> Candidate | Count
>>> ===================================
>>> Open list PR | 85
>>> Closed list PR | 46
>>> Mixed member PR | 59
>>> Cumulative voting | 35
>>> Limited voting | 21
>>> Plurality at-large voting | 1
>>> Meek STV | 90
>>> WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 89
>>> Other STV | 85
>>> Approval voting | 34
>>> Exhausted | 130
>>>
>>> Borda count totals.
>>>
>>> Winner is Meek STV.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _________________________________________________________
>>> OpenSTV -- Software for counting STV and ranked-choice voting
>>> OpaVote -- Online elections for ranked-choice voting
>>> http://www.OpenSTV.org <http://www.openstv.org/>
>>> http://www.OpaVote.org <http://www.opavote.org/>
>>>
>>> On Sun, Nov 20, 2011 at 11:43 PM, <
>>> election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to
>>>> election-methods at lists.electorama.com
>>>>
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>>>>
>>>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
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>>>>
>>>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
>>>> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..."
>>>>
>>>> Today's Topics:
>>>>
>>>> 1. Markus: Re: Beatpath as a proposal in the U.S. (MIKE OSSIPOFF)
>>>> 2. Refinements to definition of voting x over y (MIKE OSSIPOFF)
>>>> 3. Results of poll for favorite multi-winner voting system
>>>> (Jeffrey O'Neill)
>>>> 4. TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?) (C.Benham)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>>> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
>>>> To: <election-methods at electorama.com>
>>>> Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 20:57:52 +0000
>>>> Subject: [EM] Markus: Re: Beatpath as a proposal in the U.S.
>>>> Markus:
>>>>
>>>> You wrote:
>>>>
>>>> The Schulze method is currently used by more than
>>>> 50 organizations with more than 70,000 members in
>>>> total.
>>>>
>>>> [endquote]
>>>>
>>>> Organizations aren't the general public. Certainly the fancier Condorcet
>>>> methods have been adopted by some organizations (and rejected by others
>>>> due to complexity). That doesn't mean that the person on the
>>>> streetcorner
>>>> accepts them.
>>>>
>>>> The requirements for a public proposal are entirely different than for
>>>> some organizations.
>>>>
>>>> Also, it depends on whether a particular country's "public" is already
>>>> familiar with
>>>> electoral systems more complicated than Plurality.
>>>>
>>>> You continued:
>>>>
>>>> Of all Condorcet methods, that are currently discussed,
>>>> the Schulze method is that method that has the best
>>>> chances of getting adopted.
>>>>
>>>> [endquote]
>>>>
>>>> Methods that meet Condorcet's Criterion fail FBC.
>>>>
>>>> I've told why FBC is necessary for the U.S.
>>>>
>>>> Aside from that, for the above-stated reasons, Beatpath has far less
>>>> chance of adoption in the U.S
>>>> than MTA or Approval.
>>>>
>>>> ...Or even ABucklin. Bucklin was adopted, and used to be used, by some
>>>> U.S. cities or counties.
>>>>
>>>> Mike Ossipoff
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>>> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
>>>> To: <election-methods at electorama.com>
>>>> Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 21:47:07 +0000
>>>> Subject: [EM] Refinements to definition of voting x over y
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> My definition of voting one x over y was:
>>>>
>>>> You're voting x over y if switching x and y on your ballot is more
>>>> likely to change the winnner from x to y than from y to x.
>>>>
>>>> [end of definition of voting x over y]
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I should add the clause "...if there is no information about other
>>>> voters' ballots."
>>>>
>>>> Of course that isn't a problem if "more likely" is defined or replaced
>>>> by "consistent with more possible configurations
>>>> of other voters' ballots".
>>>>
>>>> If there's any question of what "switching x and y on your ballot"
>>>> means, it could be changed to "switching the _names
>>>> of_ x and y on your ballot", or "voting x exactly as you were voting y,
>>>> and voting y exactly as you were votinlg x".
>>>>
>>>> Mike Ossipoff
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>>> From: "Jeffrey O'Neill" <jeff.oneill at openstv.org>
>>>> To: election-methods-electorama.com at electorama.com
>>>> Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 21:13:57 -0500
>>>> Subject: [EM] Results of poll for favorite multi-winner voting system
>>>>
>>>> The results for the multi-winner voting system poll are in. Only 15
>>>> people voted, but the results are interesting nonetheless. The votes were
>>>> counted using instant runoff voting, Condorcet, and the Borda count.
>>>> Instant Runoff Voting
>>>>
>>>> Not surprisingly, Meek STV was the runaway winner, and WIGM STV was a
>>>> solid second place. I do find it interesting that some people prefer WIGM
>>>> STV to Meek STV. Meek is clearly better than WIGM in terms of the quality
>>>> of the proportional representation, but apparently some people find the
>>>> simplicity of WIGM more important.
>>>>
>>>> Open list PR was in third although the one voter for closed list PR had
>>>> Meek as the next choice. Because of the small number of voters we can't
>>>> read much into this though.
>>>> Condorcet
>>>>
>>>> All three STV candidates did well as did open list PR. I find it
>>>> surprising that cumulative voting and limited voting did so poorly since
>>>> these two methods provide reasonable proportional representation and are
>>>> also very easy to count. Approval voting did not do well, likely because it
>>>> does not provide good proportional representation. Plurality at-large
>>>> voting was last on every ballot except that it beat mixed member on one
>>>> ballot.
>>>> Borda Count
>>>>
>>>> The three STV candidates again did very well as well as open list PR.
>>>> I'm surprised that open list PR did so much better than closed list PR as I
>>>> don't find the differences between the two that significant.
>>>> Summary
>>>>
>>>> This was a more difficult poll to run since there are many factors to
>>>> consider in selecting a multi-winner voting system and any particular
>>>> system may be good in some situations but not in others. I personally
>>>> believe that STV, and especially Meek STV, is a good choice in many
>>>> situations, and many others seem to agree.
>>>>
>>>> Thank you for participating in these polls, and feel free to do your
>>>> own polls at opavote.org or to contact me with suggestions for future
>>>> polls.
>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> Counting votes using Instant Runoff Voting.
>>>>
>>>> R|Open l|Closed|Mixed |Cumula|Limite|Plural|Meek S|WIGM S|Other |Approv|Exhaus
>>>> |ist PR| list |member|tive v|d voti|ity at|TV |TV (eg|STV |al vot|ted
>>>> | |PR | PR |oting |ng |-large| |, Scot| |ing |
>>>> | | | | | | votin| |tish S| | |
>>>> | | | | | |g | |TV) | | |
>>>> ===============================================================================
>>>> 1| 1| 1| 1| 1| 0| 0| 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
>>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> | Count of first choices.
>>>> ===============================================================================
>>>> 2| 1| 1| 1| 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
>>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> | Count after eliminating Limited voting and Plurality at-large voting and
>>>> | transferring votes. Since this is the first elimination round, all
>>>> | candidates without any votes are eliminated.
>>>> ===============================================================================
>>>> 3| 2| 1| | 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| 0
>>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> | Count after eliminating Mixed member PR and transferring votes. Candidates
>>>> | Open list PR, Closed list PR, Mixed member PR, Cumulative voting, Other
>>>> | STV, and Approval voting were tied when choosing candidates to eliminate.
>>>> | Candidate Mixed member PR was chosen by breaking the tie randomly.
>>>> ===============================================================================
>>>> 4| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | 1| 0
>>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> | Count after eliminating Other STV and transferring votes. Candidates Closed
>>>> | list PR, Cumulative voting, Other STV, and Approval voting were tied when
>>>> | choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Other STV was chosen by
>>>> | breaking the tie randomly.
>>>> ===============================================================================
>>>> 5| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | | 1
>>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> | Count after eliminating Approval voting and transferring votes. Candidates
>>>> | Closed list PR, Cumulative voting, and Approval voting were tied when
>>>> | choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Approval voting was chosen by
>>>> | breaking the tie randomly.
>>>> ===============================================================================
>>>> 6| 2| | | 1| | | 8| 3| | | 1
>>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> | Count after eliminating Closed list PR and transferring votes. Candidates
>>>> | Closed list PR and Cumulative voting were tied when choosing candidates to
>>>> | eliminate. Candidate Closed list PR was chosen by breaking the tie
>>>> | randomly.
>>>> ===============================================================================
>>>> 7| 2| | | | | | 8| 3| | | 2
>>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> | Count after eliminating Cumulative voting and transferring votes.
>>>> ===============================================================================
>>>> 8| | | | | | | 9| 3| | | 3
>>>> |----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> | Count after eliminating Open list PR and transferring votes. Candidate Meek
>>>> | STV is elected.
>>>>
>>>> Winner is Meek STV.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> Counting votes using Condorcet Voting.
>>>>
>>>> Pairwise Comparison Matrix:
>>>>
>>>> |Open|Clos|Mixe|Cumu|Limi|Plur|Meek|WIGM|Othe|Appr
>>>> ----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----
>>>> Open| 0| 12| 10| 13| 12| 13| 3| 4| 5| 13
>>>> Clos| 1| 0| 3| 9| 8| 10| 3| 2| 2| 8
>>>> Mixe| 4| 9| 0| 9| 9| 11| 3| 2| 2| 10
>>>> Cumu| 1| 2| 3| 0| 8| 10| 1| 1| 1| 8
>>>> Limi| 1| 2| 3| 2| 0| 9| 0| 0| 0| 4
>>>> Plur| 0| 0| 1| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0
>>>> Meek| 10| 9| 10| 11| 11| 11| 0| 9| 8| 11
>>>> WIGM| 9| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 3| 0| 8| 12
>>>> Othe| 8| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 4| 4| 0| 12
>>>> Appr| 2| 4| 3| 3| 7| 9| 2| 2| 2| 0
>>>>
>>>> Smith Set: Meek STV
>>>>
>>>> No completion necessary since the Smith set has just one candidate.
>>>> Winner is Meek STV.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> Counting votes using Approval Voting.
>>>>
>>>> Candidate | Count
>>>> ===================================
>>>> Open list PR | 13
>>>> Closed list PR | 10
>>>> Mixed member PR | 12
>>>> Cumulative voting | 10
>>>> Limited voting | 9
>>>> Plurality at-large voting | 6
>>>> Meek STV | 11
>>>> WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 12
>>>> Other STV | 12
>>>> Approval voting | 9
>>>> Exhausted | 0
>>>>
>>>> Count of all approvals.
>>>>
>>>> Winner is Open list PR.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> Counting votes using Borda Count.
>>>>
>>>> Candidate | Count
>>>> ===================================
>>>> Open list PR | 85
>>>> Closed list PR | 46
>>>> Mixed member PR | 59
>>>> Cumulative voting | 35
>>>> Limited voting | 21
>>>> Plurality at-large voting | 1
>>>> Meek STV | 90
>>>> WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 89
>>>> Other STV | 85
>>>> Approval voting | 34
>>>> Exhausted | 130
>>>>
>>>> Borda count totals.
>>>>
>>>> Winner is Meek STV.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _________________________________________________________
>>>> OpenSTV -- Software for counting STV and ranked-choice voting
>>>> OpaVote -- Online elections for ranked-choice voting
>>>> http://www.OpenSTV.org
>>>> http://www.OpaVote.org
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>>> From: "C.Benham" <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>>> To: em <election-methods at electorama.com>
>>>> Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2011 16:13:22 +1030
>>>> Subject: [EM] TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?)
>>>>
>>>> Mike Ossipoff has been understandably concerned about what he calls the
>>>> "Approval
>>>> Bad Example" (ABE), as exemplified by
>>>>
>>>> 49: C (sincere)
>>>> 27: A>B (sincere)
>>>> 24: B (sincere is B>C, but are trying to steal election from A).
>>>>
>>>> He considers that a voting method must meet the Favorite Betrayal
>>>> Criterion (FBC) and
>>>> also he objects to the B voters in the above scenario being rewarded
>>>> for their "defection"
>>>> from the sincere {A,B} coalition (as they are with any method that
>>>> meets both the Plurality
>>>> and Minimal Defense criteria).
>>>>
>>>> I suggest this method to fill the bill. It uses Kevin Venzke's special
>>>> "Tied-at-the-Top"
>>>> pairwise rule.
>>>>
>>>> http://wiki.electorama.com/**wiki/index.php?title=Tied_at_**the_top<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=Tied_at_the_top>
>>>>
>>>> *Voters submit 3-slot ratings ballots, default rating is Bottom
>>>> signifying least preferred,
>>>> Top rating signifies most preferred, the other ratings slot is Middle.
>>>>
>>>> According to the "Tied-at-the-Top" pairwise rule (TTP), candidate X
>>>> beats candidate Y
>>>> if the number of ballots on which X is given a higher rating than Y
>>>> *plus the number of
>>>> ballots on which X and Y are both rated Top* is greater than the number
>>>> of ballots on
>>>> which Y is given a higher rating than X.
>>>>
>>>> (And of course vice versa, so it is possible for any pair of candidates
>>>> X and Y that some
>>>> ballots show Top rating for both to TTP beat each other).
>>>>
>>>> If any candidate X TTP beats any candidate Y, is not in turn TTP
>>>> beaten by Y and is
>>>> not TTP beaten by any candidate Z that doesn't also TTP beat Y, then Y
>>>> is disqualified.
>>>>
>>>> Elect the undisqualified candidate that is rated Top on the highest
>>>> number of ballots.*
>>>>
>>>> I think and hope this meets the FBC. If it can be shown not to then I
>>>> will withdraw my
>>>> support for it. It meets the Mono-add-Plump and the Plurality criteria.
>>>>
>>>> In the above example election no candidate is disqualified and C wins.
>>>> If the B supporters
>>>> vote sincerely then C will be disqualified and A will win.
>>>>
>>>> My suggested name for this method "Tied at Top Pairwise
>>>> Disqualification, Top Ratings"
>>>> (TTPD,TR) is currently tentative and unenthusiastic, so if it is
>>>> agreed that it meets the FBC
>>>> then I'm open to other suggestions.
>>>>
>>>> Chris Benham
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> Election-Methods mailing list
>>>> Election-Methods at lists.electorama.com
>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>
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