[EM] Votes-only criteria vs preference criteria. IRV squeeze-effect. Divulge IRV election specifics?

[Jameson Quinn]

The scenario:

> 49: C
> 27: A>B
> 24: B(>A sincere)


Options:
1. Elect B
pro: it makes sense given the ballots
con: the B voters are getting away with their strategy, and next time the A
voters will probably follow them.

2. Elect A
pro: It is correct for these sincere preferences
con: it is badly wrong for other possible sincere preferences that could
have given these ballots, especially if the A voters are only strategically
voting for B.

3. Elect C
pro: well, that will teach those sneaky B voters a lesson!
con: What if the B voters were being sincere?

4. Allow candidate C to choose whether A or B is elected. (The SODA
solution)
pro: assuming that this is a 1D spectrum, the CW is elected.
con: C could deliberately choose the worse of the two, with his eye on next
time. (But the unlikeliness that voters would actually reward C for this
nihilistic behavior, should help to convince C not to do this.)

My preference over these options: 4>3>1>2. Apparently, Mike Osipoff's
preferences are something close to the reverse of this.

 Jameson
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