[EM] a question about apportionment

Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Sun May 8 20:53:08 PDT 2011


How hard it is to vote in each system is an empirical, not a theoretical
system. The evidence is pretty clear that it is easier for most people to
rate candidates on an absolute scale - whether numeric or verbal - rather
than ranking them relative to each other. That is true despite the fact that
it is illogical, that in some sense it should be easier to give a ranked
vote which contains less information. But the fact remains: people can
usually vote faster, with less ballot spoilage, and with less self-reported
difficulty, under Range as compared to Condorcet.

2011/5/8 Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com>

> One of his thoughts caught my eye.
>
> On May 8, 2011, at 1:32 AM, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
>
>>
>>        With Condorcet, one must rate many candidates and then one must
>> resolve cycles.  I prefer scorevoting.
>>
>
> We do not usually say "rate" with Condorcet but, thinking:  Two thoughts
> fit together for Score.
> We optimize the ratings but, before we can really do that, we need to order
> the candidates from best to worst.
>
> In Condorcet we also need to order the candidates - so it makes sense to
> separate this shared task before comparing the differences in the systems.
>  So now, comparing the systems:
>
> For either, order the candidates from best, that this voter hopes wins, to
> the collection of worst that this voter equally dislikes and wants to help
> none of.
>
> For Score distribute ratings equally, with equal ratings ok for equal
> liking - trivial effort.  Then optimize ratings - perhaps for each trio,
> B/S/W, adjust S up to help S beat W, or down to help B beat S - THIS is
> LABORIOUS.
>
> For Condorcet simply rank as sorted, with equal rankings ok, and leaving
> worst unranked - trivial effort.  DONE, for the voter is not concerned with
> cycles, a task for the method when there are three or more nearly tied
> candidates that form a cycle.
>
>
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