[EM] FairVote in _Science_ magazine (MIKE OSSIPOFF)

[Jameson Quinn]

I believe the only time FairVote has been published in Science was as a
response to an editorial by Steven Brams. Brams also got a chance to
respond, and while he didn't refute every one of their distortions (and
couldn't refute the empirical predictions which Burlington later proved
false), I believe that you can't really fault Science for providing a forum
for both sides of the debate. (On both sides, it was editorial content, not
subject to peer review.)

Jameson

2011/12/21 <fsimmons at pcc.edu>

> Mike,
>
> Right ON!
>
> But I tripped up for a second on an unintentional typo concerning Richie's
> second claim...
>
> > 2. The article said that the best strategy in Approval is to
> > rank the candidates sincerely.
>
> Replace "Approval" with "IRV" in the above statement:
>
> Forest
>
> > From: MIKE OSSIPOFF
> > To:
> > Subject: [EM] FairVote in _Science_ magazine
> > Message-ID:
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> >
> >
> > Looking at some back-pages of electology discussion, I was
> > reminded of
> > Richie's article in _Science_ magazine, published some time ago.
> >
> > First, it's astonishing that someone like Richie was able to
> > publish in _Science_.
> >
> > But equally astonishing was that he could make the statements
> > that he made there,
> > and they were published without being checked for accuracy.
> >
> > The postings pointed out two really silly statements made in the
> > article:
> > 1. The article said that, according to (unnamed?) experts,
> > voters in Approval
> > elections will tend to approve only one candidate.
> >
> > That statement was answered in the electology posting. I'd
> > answered it for Richie
> > decades ago.
> >
> > Regarding the very many people who now think that they need to
> > vote (in Plurality) for
> > the Democrat, and who say that that's necessary as a "pragmatic"
> > vote, to
> > avoid wasting their vote, and who say that it's necessary to
> > "hold your nose" and
> > vote for Democrat, though you don't really like her--Richie
> > thinks that those
> > people are suddenly going to start voting only for their
> > favorite? :-)?
> >
> > No, those hold-their-nose lesser-of-2-evils Democrat voters, if
> > we switched to Approval,
> > would continue voting for the Democrat in Approval. The
> > difference is that, with Approval,
> > they can also vote for everyone whom they like better than the
> > Democrat.
> > Of course, if it turns out, based on the Approval election vote-
> > totals, or from
> > (newly) honest and relevant polling, that those voters' favorite
> > can beat the Republican,
> > then of course, at that time, they might very well stop voting
> > for the Democrat, and
> > might start voting only for one or more candidates whom they
> > like better than the
> > Democrats.
> >
> > One thing that Richie doesn't understand is that, if a voter, in
> > Approval, votes
> > only for hir favorite, that's because s/he feels that hir
> > favorite has a win, or
> > that s/he doesn't consider anyone else to be acceptable. That's
> > not a disadvantage of Approval.
> > That's good strategy. Maybe Approval vote totals will soon show
> > that progressive,
> > better-than-Democrat candidates have a win and that their
> > supporters needn't vote for
> > a Democrat in Approval. That could result in well-informed, good-
> > strategy "plumping",
> > "bullet-voting".
> >
> > But, more likely, people will vote, in Approval, for a set of
> > progressives, who are similar,
> > and similarly-good candidates. ...unless there's only one that
> > they consider acceptable,
> > or unless their favorite appears to have a clear win over all
> > the others.
> >
> > Approval strategy, when the election has completely unacceptable
> > candidates who could win,
> > is to vote for all of the acceptable candidates and for none of
> > the unacceptable candidates.
> >
> > But regarding the person who now holds their nose and votes for
> > a Democrat whom s/he doesn't
> > like, though s/he likes others more--That person will, in
> > Approval, vote for that
> > same Democrat, and for everyone whom s/he likes more.? ...until
> > Approval's vote totals,
> > or genuinely worthwhile polling, show that there's no need to
> > vote for the unliked
> > Democrat.
> >
> > 2. The article said that the best strategy in Approval is to
> > rank the candidates
> > sincerely.
> >
> > ...and that was published in _Science_ magazine :-)
> >
> > It's common knowledge that strategy incentive is present in all
> > nonprobabilistic voting systems.
> > Richie's statement is hardly surprising, coming, as it does,
> > from Richie.
> > But it's indeed surprising that no one at _Science_ questioned
> > the accuracy
> > of that statement before publishing it.
> >
> > But, then, that could be said of statement #1, above, too.
> >
> > Just as with the other statement, I and others had explained the
> > incorrectness of
> > that statement to Richie decades ago.
> >
> > As is common knowledge among everyone who discusses voting
> > systems (except for Richie, evidently),
> > your needed compromise can be eliminated because s/he didn't
> > have your vote yet, when s/he
> > needed it, because your vote was on your favorite instead.
> > Voting for your favorite instead
> > of insincerely voting your compromise in 1st place, has given
> > the election to someone who is
> > worse than your compromise. How to avoid that? Rank your
> > compromise in 1st place, burying
> > your favorite.
> >
> > It's been reported that, when IRV is used in in national
> > elections, many voters say that they vote
> > for a lesser-of-2-evils compromise in 1st place, burying their
> > favorite, so as not to
> > "waste [their] vote."? Maybe not coincidentally, the use of IRV
> > there coincides with two-
> > party dominance.
> >
> > It has been pointed out that, if a particular two parties,
> > regarded by all voters as the worst
> > two parties, are perceived (with lots of help from the mass
> > media) as "the two choices", the
> > only viable parties, the only winnable parties, then, in
> > Plurality or IRV, those two parties
> > will continue winning, at lesser-of-2-evils strategic
> > equilibrium, forever
> > (or at least as long as Plurality or IRV continues to be used).
> >
> > That Richie was able to make those two statements in _Science_,
> > and that Richie was able
> > to publish in _Science_ at all, demonstrates the grotesque and
> > obscene ability of money
> > to buy influence, and a perception of authority, respectability
> > and credibility for the
> > "executive director" and his "senior analysts". :-)
> >
> > Mike Ossipoff
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
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