[EM] FairVote in _Science_ magazine (MIKE OSSIPOFF)

[fsimmons at pcc.edu]

Mike,

Right ON!

But I tripped up for a second on an unintentional typo concerning Richie's second claim...

> 2. The article said that the best strategy in Approval is to 
> rank the candidates sincerely.

Replace "Approval" with "IRV" in the above statement:

Forest

> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF 
> To: 
> Subject: [EM] FairVote in _Science_ magazine
> Message-ID: 
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> 
> 
> Looking at some back-pages of electology discussion, I was 
> reminded of
> Richie's article in _Science_ magazine, published some time ago.
> 
> First, it's astonishing that someone like Richie was able to 
> publish in _Science_.
> 
> But equally astonishing was that he could make the statements 
> that he made there,
> and they were published without being checked for accuracy.
> 
> The postings pointed out two really silly statements made in the 
> article:
> 1. The article said that, according to (unnamed?) experts, 
> voters in Approval
> elections will tend to approve only one candidate.
> 
> That statement was answered in the electology posting. I'd 
> answered it for Richie
> decades ago.
> 
> Regarding the very many people who now think that they need to 
> vote (in Plurality) for
> the Democrat, and who say that that's necessary as a "pragmatic" 
> vote, to
> avoid wasting their vote, and who say that it's necessary to 
> "hold your nose" and
> vote for Democrat, though you don't really like her--Richie 
> thinks that those
> people are suddenly going to start voting only for their 
> favorite? :-)? 
> 
> No, those hold-their-nose lesser-of-2-evils Democrat voters, if 
> we switched to Approval,
> would continue voting for the Democrat in Approval. The 
> difference is that, with Approval,
> they can also vote for everyone whom they like better than the 
> Democrat.
> Of course, if it turns out, based on the Approval election vote-
> totals, or from
> (newly) honest and relevant polling, that those voters' favorite 
> can beat the Republican,
> then of course, at that time, they might very well stop voting 
> for the Democrat, and 
> might start voting only for one or more candidates whom they 
> like better than the
> Democrats.
> 
> One thing that Richie doesn't understand is that, if a voter, in 
> Approval, votes 
> only for hir favorite, that's because s/he feels that hir 
> favorite has a win, or 
> that s/he doesn't consider anyone else to be acceptable. That's 
> not a disadvantage of Approval.
> That's good strategy. Maybe Approval vote totals will soon show 
> that progressive, 
> better-than-Democrat candidates have a win and that their 
> supporters needn't vote for 
> a Democrat in Approval. That could result in well-informed, good-
> strategy "plumping",
> "bullet-voting".
> 
> But, more likely, people will vote, in Approval, for a set of 
> progressives, who are similar,
> and similarly-good candidates. ...unless there's only one that 
> they consider acceptable,
> or unless their favorite appears to have a clear win over all 
> the others.
> 
> Approval strategy, when the election has completely unacceptable 
> candidates who could win,
> is to vote for all of the acceptable candidates and for none of 
> the unacceptable candidates.
> 
> But regarding the person who now holds their nose and votes for 
> a Democrat whom s/he doesn't
> like, though s/he likes others more--That person will, in 
> Approval, vote for that 
> same Democrat, and for everyone whom s/he likes more.? ...until 
> Approval's vote totals,
> or genuinely worthwhile polling, show that there's no need to 
> vote for the unliked
> Democrat.
> 
> 2. The article said that the best strategy in Approval is to 
> rank the candidates
> sincerely.
> 
> ...and that was published in _Science_ magazine :-) 
> 
> It's common knowledge that strategy incentive is present in all 
> nonprobabilistic voting systems.
> Richie's statement is hardly surprising, coming, as it does, 
> from Richie. 
> But it's indeed surprising that no one at _Science_ questioned 
> the accuracy 
> of that statement before publishing it.
> 
> But, then, that could be said of statement #1, above, too.
> 
> Just as with the other statement, I and others had explained the 
> incorrectness of
> that statement to Richie decades ago.
> 
> As is common knowledge among everyone who discusses voting 
> systems (except for Richie, evidently),
> your needed compromise can be eliminated because s/he didn't 
> have your vote yet, when s/he 
> needed it, because your vote was on your favorite instead. 
> Voting for your favorite instead
> of insincerely voting your compromise in 1st place, has given 
> the election to someone who is
> worse than your compromise. How to avoid that? Rank your 
> compromise in 1st place, burying
> your favorite.
> 
> It's been reported that, when IRV is used in in national 
> elections, many voters say that they vote
> for a lesser-of-2-evils compromise in 1st place, burying their 
> favorite, so as not to
> "waste [their] vote."? Maybe not coincidentally, the use of IRV 
> there coincides with two-
> party dominance.
> 
> It has been pointed out that, if a particular two parties, 
> regarded by all voters as the worst
> two parties, are perceived (with lots of help from the mass 
> media) as "the two choices", the
> only viable parties, the only winnable parties, then, in 
> Plurality or IRV, those two parties
> will continue winning, at lesser-of-2-evils strategic 
> equilibrium, forever 
> (or at least as long as Plurality or IRV continues to be used).
> 
> That Richie was able to make those two statements in _Science_, 
> and that Richie was able
> to publish in _Science_ at all, demonstrates the grotesque and 
> obscene ability of money
> to buy influence, and a perception of authority, respectability 
> and credibility for the
> "executive director" and his "senior analysts". :-)
> 
> Mike Ossipoff
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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> End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 90, Issue 51
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