[EM] FairVote in _Science_ magazine

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Looking at some back-pages of electology discussion, I was reminded of
Richie's article in _Science_ magazine, published some time ago.

First, it's astonishing that someone like Richie was able to publish in _Science_.

But equally astonishing was that he could make the statements that he made there,
and they were published without being checked for accuracy.

The postings pointed out two really silly statements made in the article:

1. The article said that, according to (unnamed?) experts, voters in Approval
elections will tend to approve only one candidate.

That statement was answered in the electology posting. I'd answered it for Richie
decades ago.

Regarding the very many people who now think that they need to vote (in Plurality) for
the Democrat, and who say that that's necessary as a "pragmatic" vote, to
avoid wasting their vote, and who say that it's necessary to "hold your nose" and
vote for Democrat, though you don't really like her--Richie thinks that those
people are suddenly going to start voting only for their favorite? :-)  

No, those hold-their-nose lesser-of-2-evils Democrat voters, if we switched to Approval,
would continue voting for the Democrat in Approval. The difference is that, with Approval,
they can also vote for everyone whom they like better than the Democrat.

Of course, if it turns out, based on the Approval election vote-totals, or from
(newly) honest and relevant polling, that those voters' favorite can beat the Republican,
then of course, at that time, they might very well stop voting for the Democrat, and 
might start voting only for one or more candidates whom they like better than the
Democrats.

One thing that Richie doesn't understand is that, if a voter, in Approval, votes 
only for hir favorite, that's because s/he feels that hir favorite has a win, or 
that s/he doesn't consider anyone else to be acceptable. That's not a disadvantage of Approval.
That's good strategy. Maybe Approval vote totals will soon show that progressive, 
better-than-Democrat candidates have a win and that their supporters needn't vote for 
a Democrat in Approval. That could result in well-informed, good-strategy "plumping",
"bullet-voting".

But, more likely, people will vote, in Approval, for a set of progressives, who are similar,
and similarly-good candidates. ...unless there's only one that they consider acceptable,
or unless their favorite appears to have a clear win over all the others.

Approval strategy, when the election has completely unacceptable candidates who could win,
is to vote for all of the acceptable candidates and for none of the unacceptable candidates.

But regarding the person who now holds their nose and votes for a Democrat whom s/he doesn't
like, though s/he likes others more--That person will, in Approval, vote for that 
same Democrat, and for everyone whom s/he likes more.  ...until Approval's vote totals,
or genuinely worthwhile polling, show that there's no need to vote for the unliked
Democrat.

2. The article said that the best strategy in Approval is to rank the candidates
sincerely.

...and that was published in _Science_ magazine :-) 

It's common knowledge that strategy incentive is present in all nonprobabilistic voting systems.
Richie's statement is hardly surprising, coming, as it does, from Richie. 
But it's indeed surprising that no one at _Science_ questioned the accuracy 
of that statement before publishing it.

But, then, that could be said of statement #1, above, too.

Just as with the other statement, I and others had explained the incorrectness of
that statement to Richie decades ago.

As is common knowledge among everyone who discusses voting systems (except for Richie, evidently),
your needed compromise can be eliminated because s/he didn't have your vote yet, when s/he 
needed it, because your vote was on your favorite instead. Voting for your favorite instead
of insincerely voting your compromise in 1st place, has given the election to someone who is
worse than your compromise. How to avoid that? Rank your compromise in 1st place, burying
your favorite.

It's been reported that, when IRV is used in in national elections, many voters say that they vote
for a lesser-of-2-evils compromise in 1st place, burying their favorite, so as not to
"waste [their] vote."  Maybe not coincidentally, the use of IRV there coincides with two-
party dominance.

It has been pointed out that, if a particular two parties, regarded by all voters as the worst
two parties, are perceived (with lots of help from the mass media) as "the two choices", the
only viable parties, the only winnable parties, then, in Plurality or IRV, those two parties
will continue winning, at lesser-of-2-evils strategic equilibrium, forever 
(or at least as long as Plurality or IRV continues to be used).

That Richie was able to make those two statements in _Science_, and that Richie was able
to publish in _Science_ at all, demonstrates the grotesque and obscene ability of money
to buy influence, and a perception of authority, respectability and credibility for the
"executive director" and his "senior analysts". :-)

Mike Ossipoff