[EM] FairVote in _Science_ magazine (MIKE OSSIPOFF)

[fsimmons at pcc.edu]

So basically Richie was stubbornly repeating his lies, but we cannot fault Science for propagating them.

----- Original Message -----
From: Jameson Quinn 
> I believe the only time FairVote has been published in Science 
> was as a
> response to an editorial by Steven Brams. Brams also got a 
> chance to
> respond, and while he didn't refute every one of their 
> distortions (and
> couldn't refute the empirical predictions which Burlington later 
> provedfalse), I believe that you can't really fault Science for 
> providing a forum
> for both sides of the debate. (On both sides, it was editorial 
> content, not
> subject to peer review.)
> 
> Jameson
> 
> 2011/12/21 
> 
> > Mike,
> >
> > Right ON!
> >
> > But I tripped up for a second on an unintentional typo 
> concerning Richie's
> > second claim...
> >
> > > 2. The article said that the best strategy in Approval is to
> > > rank the candidates sincerely.
> >
> > Replace "Approval" with "IRV" in the above statement:
> >
> > Forest
> >
> > > From: MIKE OSSIPOFF
> > > To:
> > > Subject: [EM] FairVote in _Science_ magazine
> > > Message-ID:
> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> > >
> > >
> > > Looking at some back-pages of electology discussion, I was
> > > reminded of
> > > Richie's article in _Science_ magazine, published some time ago.
> > >
> > > First, it's astonishing that someone like Richie was able to
> > > publish in _Science_.
> > >
> > > But equally astonishing was that he could make the statements
> > > that he made there,
> > > and they were published without being checked for accuracy.
> > >
> > > The postings pointed out two really silly statements made in the
> > > article:
> > > 1. The article said that, according to (unnamed?) experts,
> > > voters in Approval
> > > elections will tend to approve only one candidate.
> > >
> > > That statement was answered in the electology posting. I'd
> > > answered it for Richie
> > > decades ago.
> > >
> > > Regarding the very many people who now think that they need to
> > > vote (in Plurality) for
> > > the Democrat, and who say that that's necessary as a "pragmatic"
> > > vote, to
> > > avoid wasting their vote, and who say that it's necessary to
> > > "hold your nose" and
> > > vote for Democrat, though you don't really like her--Richie
> > > thinks that those
> > > people are suddenly going to start voting only for their
> > > favorite? :-)?
> > >
> > > No, those hold-their-nose lesser-of-2-evils Democrat voters, if
> > > we switched to Approval,
> > > would continue voting for the Democrat in Approval. The
> > > difference is that, with Approval,
> > > they can also vote for everyone whom they like better than the
> > > Democrat.
> > > Of course, if it turns out, based on the Approval election 
> vote-
> > > totals, or from
> > > (newly) honest and relevant polling, that those voters' favorite
> > > can beat the Republican,
> > > then of course, at that time, they might very well stop voting
> > > for the Democrat, and
> > > might start voting only for one or more candidates whom they
> > > like better than the
> > > Democrats.
> > >
> > > One thing that Richie doesn't understand is that, if a 
> voter, in
> > > Approval, votes
> > > only for hir favorite, that's because s/he feels that hir
> > > favorite has a win, or
> > > that s/he doesn't consider anyone else to be acceptable. That's
> > > not a disadvantage of Approval.
> > > That's good strategy. Maybe Approval vote totals will soon show
> > > that progressive,
> > > better-than-Democrat candidates have a win and that their
> > > supporters needn't vote for
> > > a Democrat in Approval. That could result in well-informed, 
> good-
> > > strategy "plumping",
> > > "bullet-voting".
> > >
> > > But, more likely, people will vote, in Approval, for a set of
> > > progressives, who are similar,
> > > and similarly-good candidates. ...unless there's only one that
> > > they consider acceptable,
> > > or unless their favorite appears to have a clear win over all
> > > the others.
> > >
> > > Approval strategy, when the election has completely unacceptable
> > > candidates who could win,
> > > is to vote for all of the acceptable candidates and for none of
> > > the unacceptable candidates.
> > >
> > > But regarding the person who now holds their nose and votes for
> > > a Democrat whom s/he doesn't
> > > like, though s/he likes others more--That person will, in
> > > Approval, vote for that
> > > same Democrat, and for everyone whom s/he likes more.? ...until
> > > Approval's vote totals,
> > > or genuinely worthwhile polling, show that there's no need to
> > > vote for the unliked
> > > Democrat.
> > >
> > > 2. The article said that the best strategy in Approval is to
> > > rank the candidates
> > > sincerely.
> > >
> > > ...and that was published in _Science_ magazine :-)
> > >
> > > It's common knowledge that strategy incentive is present in all
> > > nonprobabilistic voting systems.
> > > Richie's statement is hardly surprising, coming, as it does,
> > > from Richie.
> > > But it's indeed surprising that no one at _Science_ questioned
> > > the accuracy
> > > of that statement before publishing it.
> > >
> > > But, then, that could be said of statement #1, above, too.
> > >
> > > Just as with the other statement, I and others had explained the
> > > incorrectness of
> > > that statement to Richie decades ago.
> > >
> > > As is common knowledge among everyone who discusses voting
> > > systems (except for Richie, evidently),
> > > your needed compromise can be eliminated because s/he didn't
> > > have your vote yet, when s/he
> > > needed it, because your vote was on your favorite instead.
> > > Voting for your favorite instead
> > > of insincerely voting your compromise in 1st place, has given
> > > the election to someone who is
> > > worse than your compromise. How to avoid that? Rank your
> > > compromise in 1st place, burying
> > > your favorite.
> > >
> > > It's been reported that, when IRV is used in in national
> > > elections, many voters say that they vote
> > > for a lesser-of-2-evils compromise in 1st place, burying their
> > > favorite, so as not to
> > > "waste [their] vote."? Maybe not coincidentally, the use of IRV
> > > there coincides with two-
> > > party dominance.
> > >
> > > It has been pointed out that, if a particular two parties,
> > > regarded by all voters as the worst
> > > two parties, are perceived (with lots of help from the mass
> > > media) as "the two choices", the
> > > only viable parties, the only winnable parties, then, in
> > > Plurality or IRV, those two parties
> > > will continue winning, at lesser-of-2-evils strategic
> > > equilibrium, forever
> > > (or at least as long as Plurality or IRV continues to be used).
> > >
> > > That Richie was able to make those two statements in _Science_,
> > > and that Richie was able
> > > to publish in _Science_ at all, demonstrates the grotesque and
> > > obscene ability of money
> > > to buy influence, and a perception of authority, respectability
> > > and credibility for the
> > > "executive director" and his "senior analysts". :-)
> > >
> > > Mike Ossipoff
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
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> > >
> > > End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 90, Issue 51
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