[EM] Multiwinner Bucklin - proportional, summable (n^3), monotonic (if fully-enough ranked)
jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Sun Mar 28 13:19:59 PDT 2010
2010/3/28 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
> Jameson Quinn wrote (26 March 2010):
> "Right now, I think MCV - that is, two-rank, equality-allowed Bucklin, with
> top-two runoffs if no candidate receives a majority of approvals in those
> two ranks - is my favorite proposal for practical implementation."
> What does "MCV" stand for?
Ooops. I garbled your term, didn't I? It's supposed to be Majority Choice
Approval, not Majority Choice Voting.
> Does "top-two runoffs" mean a second trip to the polls?
Yes. I regard this as an advantage. If the situation is divisive enough to
prevent a majority choice in two rounds of approval, then a further period
of campaigning is a healthy thing. It's the only way to guarantee a
majority. (I don't think that mandating full ranking counts as a true
> How are the candidates scored to determine the top two? Is it based on the
> candidates' scores after the second Bucklin round?
That's the simplest answer, and I'd support it. It's also the best answer
with honest voters.
Actually, the best answer for discouraging strategy is to use the two
first-round winners. That tends to discourage strategic bullet voting, since
expanding your second-round approval can not keep your favorite candidate
from a runoff.
As a compromise between these two, I would run the first-round approval
winner against the second-round winner. If these are the same, it probably
shows that people are voting to narrowly; to discourage this from happening,
in that case you use the two first-round winners.
But these are details. I'd strongly support any of these systems, whichever
one had more support from other activists.
> Chris Benham
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