[EM] IRV ballot pile count (proof of closed form)

[Jameson Quinn]

> Consider the following votes:
>
> 34 A
> 33 B>C
> 33 C>B.
>
> The Condorcet winner is A, because in the two pairwise elections involving
> A, A wins
>
> A>B, 34:33
> A>C, 34:33.
>

Huh? I count 66 voters who prefer either B or C over A.

Change it up:

49 A
26 B>C
25 C>B

Now the CW is B. In the C vs. B competition, 26 pro-B voters beat 25 anti
and 49 indifferent voters. This is arguably problematic, but not nearly as
pathological as the original example would have been if true. The pro-(BC)
coalition has decided the relative worth of B and C, while the A voters have
abstained on that question.
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