[EM] IRV ballot pile count (proof of closed form)

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 01:45 PM 2/11/2010, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>34 A
>33 B>C
>33 C>B.
>
>The Condorcet winner is A, because in the two pairwise elections 
>involving A, A wins
>
>A>B, 34:33
>A>C, 34:33.

Oops. Of course, A is the Condorcet loser. I added the second 
preferences as an afterthought. I meant

34 A
33 B
33 C

But more examples could be constructed where there is deeper ranking. 
Why bother, though?

Condorcet methods, like any deterministic single-ballot method, is a 
plurality method, unless voters are coerced into voting for 
candidates they do not wish to be responsible for supporting, as with 
mandatory full ranking.