[EM] IRV ballot pile count (proof of closed form)

[Dave Ketchum]

We all get careless and stumble, sooner or later!

But I choke on two details here:

You misuse the label "plurality" - having only the ability to vote for  
1 even though, for many races most intelligent voters will find there  
is only one candidate deserving approval.
      Even Approval has more power, letting voters vote for more than  
one, though unable to differentiate.
      Condorcet is another important step up, letting voters vote for  
more than one while indicating which they like best.

Forcing voters to act as if they wanted to vote for more than they  
wish to is a step backward, and should not pretend to be an asset for  
a method.

"Majority" is a word whose merits need more serious thought - see an  
earlier post from today.

Ditto "runoffs".

Dave Ketchum

On Feb 11, 2010, at 9:02 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

> At 01:45 PM 2/11/2010, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>> 34 A
>> 33 B>C
>> 33 C>B.
>>
>> The Condorcet winner is A, because in the two pairwise elections  
>> involving A, A wins
>>
>> A>B, 34:33
>> A>C, 34:33.
>
> Oops. Of course, A is the Condorcet loser. I added the second  
> preferences as an afterthought. I meant
>
> 34 A
> 33 B
> 33 C
>
> But more examples could be constructed where there is deeper  
> ranking. Why bother, though?
>
> Condorcet methods, like any deterministic single-ballot method, is a  
> plurality method, unless voters are coerced into voting for  
> candidates they do not wish to be responsible for supporting, as  
> with mandatory full ranking.