[EM] A different "strategyproofness" notion

[Jonathan Lundell]

On Oct 19, 2009, at 8:50 AM, Warren Smith wrote:

> But this leads to another interesting idea.   Consider this "naive- 
> exag"
> voter strategy:  rank the two frontrunners A&B (where you prefer A>B)
> top & bottom, then anybody better than A is ranked co-equal top (or if
> that forbidden, then just below A)
> anybody worse than B is ranked co-equal bottom (or if that forbidden
> then just above B)
> and anybody between A&B is ranked between using honest normalized  
> utility.

IIRC, this is a variation on the "bury B" strategy that Clay uses for  
his regret simulations. But such a strategy would be anti-rational for  
any method (STV, for example) that satisfies later-no-harm. For  
example, if my sincere preference is A>B>everyone-else, why would I  
strategize A>everyone-else>B in, say, an IRV election?