[EM] A different "strategyproofness" notion

[Michael Allan]

Warren Smith wrote:
> A voting system is "naive-exag-proof" if its winners do not change when the
> labeling of two candidates as "frontrunners" is altered to another two
> and all (or in another version, just some, the rest being honest) voters use
> naive-exag strategy only.
> This is a far weaker notion than Gibbard/Satterthwaite "strategyproof."
> 
> Are there any interesting naive-exag-proof voting systems?

Systems that allow for continuous vote shifting, where the voters can
see the changing results in real time, are naive-exag-proof.  In such
systems, the differences between perception and reality vanish.  A
candidate is either a frontrunner, or is not.  Labels to the contrary
will be ignored, and will have no effect on the results.

-- 
Michael Allan

Toronto, 647-436-4521
Skype michael_c_allan
http://zelea.com/