[EM] A different "strategyproofness" notion

[Warren Smith]

In plurality voting, it pays to be perceived as one of the two "frontrunners"
since it is pointless for strategic voters to waste their vote on any
other ("underdog") candidate.

But Clay Shentrup suggested that with range voting, it might actually
*pay* for a candidate to be perceived as an underdog -- increases his
winning chances.  (It can!)
This if true might have some important implications.

Specifically, with plurality, *appearing* to be a frontrunner is
all-important and takes huge amounts of cash.  Remove that and cash's
importance diminishes.

However, Clay has done some computer simulations (and hopefully will
do some more) which (so far) indicate his suggestion was wrong:  With
range voting, it still (usually)
pays better for a candidate to be perceived as overdog.

But this leads to another interesting idea.   Consider this "naive-exag"
voter strategy:  rank the two frontrunners A&B (where you prefer A>B)
top & bottom, then anybody better than A is ranked co-equal top (or if
that forbidden, then just below A)
anybody worse than B is ranked co-equal bottom (or if that forbidden
then just above B)
and anybody between A&B is ranked between using honest normalized utility.

A voting system is "naive-exag-proof" if its winners do not change when the
labeling of two candidates as "frontrunners" is altered to another two
and all (or in another version, just some, the rest being honest) voters use
naive-exag strategy only.
This is a far weaker notion than Gibbard/Satterthwaite "strategyproof."

Are there any interesting naive-exag-proof voting systems?

(My initial guess is "no," but it is only a guess.)

-- 
Warren D. Smith
http://RangeVoting.org  <-- add your endorsement (by clicking
"endorse" as 1st step)
and
math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html